ples which the science of Political Economy can alone ascertain and elucidate. Nor is this all. The acquisition of wealth is not merely necessary because it affords the means of subsistence, but because, without it, society must remain in a state of comparative barbarism. This may be easily demonstrated. Where the mind is constantly occupied in providing for the immediate wants of the body, in other words, where wealth has not been amassed, no leisure remains for its culture; the intellectual part of our nature is neglected in the all-engrossing care of providing for its animal wants; the people are mere hewers of wood and drawers of water; and their views, sentiments, and feelings, become consequently contracted, selfish, and sordid. "Hence," as our author well remarks," the acquisition of wealth is not desirable merely as the means of procuring direct and immediate gratifications, but as being indispensably necessary to the advancement of society in civilization and refinement. Without the tranquillity and leisure afforded by the possession of accumulated wealth, those speculative and elegant studies, which expand and enlarge our views, purify our taste, and raise us higher in the scale of being, can never be successfully prosecuted. It is certain, indeed, that the comparative barbarism and refinement of nations depend more upon the comparative amount of their wealth than upon any other circumstance. A poor people are never refined, nor a rich people ever barbarous."

Having shown that the possession of wealth is thus indispensable, not merely to individual existence and comfort, but to the advancement of nations in civilization, our author next endeavours to account for the remarkable fact, that so few efforts have been made to investigate its sources, and that the study of Political Economy should not even yet be considered as forming a principal part in a comprehensive system of education. This strange neglect of so useful and important a branch of general knowledge he traces to the prejudices prevalent at the time when our Universities were established. At that period, the clergy were almost the sole possessors of the little knowledge then in existence, and in framing schemes of education, naturally accommodated them to their own professional pursuits. The learned languages, logic, rhetoric, scholastic theology, and civil law, comprised the whole course of study; the prejudices of the Greeks and Romans against commerce, manufactures, and luxury, had descended with unabated force; no one pretended to have any clear, comprehensive ideas, concerning the sources of national opulence, happiness, and prosperity; and to have appointed professors to explain the principles of commerce, or the means by which labour might be rendered most productive, would have been considered as degrading to the dignity of science, or perhaps as ministering to the vice of luxury, which long continued a favourite topic of clerical declamation. These prejudices, taken in conjunction with the limited intercourse which then subsisted between different nations, serve to account for the late rise of this science, and the little attention paid to it, up to a very recent period. Its importance, however, is now so universally acknowledged, that at no great distance of time it must form an integral part of the scheme of general instruction in our Universities and Colleges, the defects in the original constitution of which all the science and liberality of this enlightened age have not yet been able to rectify. Unhappily, prejudice, and a preposterous and monkish attachment to what has been established in ages of comparative darkness and ignorance, are nowhere more powerful and unassailable than in the seats of learning, many of which are all but hermetically sealed against every branch of science and philosophy which the progress of discovery and investigation has brought to light since the period when they were endowed. It was not till about the year 1805 that the Logic of Bacon superseded that of Aristotle in one of the principal seminaries of the South, and that the great instrument by which Newton effected his discoveries was taught and explained; so slow is the march of improvement in those seats of science where the punishment of Theseus seems to be inflicted upon every species of knowledge.

II. But since Political Economy has become an object of more general

attention, the variety of systems which have been advanced to explain the phenomena about which it is conversant, and the contradictory results which some of its most eminent professors have deduced from the same data, have not only proved unfavourable to its improvement, but have led many to question the certainty of its best-established conclusions, and to represent the science as purely theoretical and speculative; affording, like metaphysics, a good exercise to the ingenuity, but likely to be productive of little real practical benefit. The author shows, that this opinion, or rather prejudice, is destitute of any solid foundation, and proceeds upon mistaken notions as to the nature of the evidence upon which the conclusions of the science are founded. "The discrepancy," he remarks, "between the various systems that have been successively sanctioned by the ablest physicians, chemists, natural philosophers, and moralists, is quite as great as the discrepancy between those advanced by the ablest political economists. But who would, therefore, conclude that medicine, chemistry, natural philosophy, and morals, rest on no solid foundation, or that they are incapable of presenting us with a system of well-established and consentaneous truths? We do not refuse our assent to the demonstrations of Newton and Laplace, because they are subversive of the hypotheses of Ptolemy, Tycho Brahe, and Descartes; and why should we refuse our assent to the demonstrations of Smith and Ricardo, because they have subverted the false theories that were previously advanced respecting the sources and the distribution of wealth?" All the sciences have sustained more or less injury from the natural propensity of the human mind to generalize, and an impatience of long-continued observation and analysis; but it does not follow, that deductions, formed from a more enlarged basis of fact and experiment, though subversive of hasty and premature generalizations, are calculated to destroy all confidence in the certainty and practical utility of science. In Political Economy, in particular, the errors which have hitherto obstructed its advancement have now nearly disappeared, and have given place to doctrines founded on the most rigorous analysis, and the most comprehensive induction; doctrines which, it is probable, future observation and experience will serve, not to invalidate, but to confirm, and which, reduced to practice, as the knowledge of the science becomes more extended, can hardly fail to exert the most beneficial influence on the general happiness and comfort of nations.

As the laws which regulate the production and accumulation of wealth and the progress of civilization are the offspring, not of legislative enactments, but of that desire of improving his condition which God has implanted in the breast of man; so the principles which form the basis of Political Economy make part of the original constitution of human nature, and of the physical world; "and their operations, like those of the mechanical principles, are to be traced by observation and analysis." But, between the physical, and the moral and political sciences, there exists this material distinction, that the conclusions of the former apply in every case, those of the latter only in a majority of cases. Into whatever inquiry the principles of human nature enter as an element, that inquiry can only conduct us to results generally, not universally true; that is, to results, the certainty of which, in the majority of instances, is as great as that of the results of the mechanical principles in every possible instance. For example, as a general theorem, the tendency of the population in every country to press against the means of subsistence, and its power of increasing in a given ratio, and doubling in a given time, is no less certain, we mean as a general theorem, than the proportionality of the areas to the times in Kepler's law, as a universal theorem. It is by not keeping this distinction steadily in view that so many have fallen into error in regard to the conclusions of Political Economy. Our author places this in the clearest possible light.

It is an admitted principle in the science of Morals, as well as of Political Economy, that by far the largest proportion of the human race have a much clearer view of what is conducive to their own interests, than it is possible for any other man, or select number of men, to have, and, consequently, that it is sound policy to allow every individual to follow the bent of his inclination, and to engage in any branch of

industry he thinks proper. This is the general theorem; and it is one which is established on the most comprehensive experience. It is not, however, like the laws which regulate the motions of the planetary system,-it will hold good in nineteen out of twenty instances, but the twentieth may be an exception. But it is not required of the economist, that his theories should quadrate with the peculiar bias of the mind of a particular person. His conclusions are drawn from observing the principles which are found to determine the condition of mankind, as presented on the large scale of nations and empires. He has to deal with man in the aggregate-with states, and not with families-with the passions and propensities which actuate the great bulk of the human race, and not with those which are occasionally found to influence the conduct of a solitary individual.

It should always be steadily kept in view, that it is never any part of the business of the economist to inquire into the means by which the fortunes of individuals may have been increased or diminished, except to ascertain their general operation and effect. The public interests ought always to form the exclusive objects of his atten. tion. He is not to frame systems, and devise schemes, for increasing the wealth and enjoyments of particular classes; but to apply himself to discover the sources of national wealth, and universal prosperity, and the means by which they may be rendered most productive.

Nothing, indeed, is more common than to hear it objected to some of the bestestablished truths in political and economical science, that they are at variance with such and such facts, and that therefore they must be rejected. It is certain, however, that these objections most frequently originate in an entire misapprehension of the nature of the science. It would be easy to produce a thousand instances of individuals who have been enriched by monopolies, as they are sometimes by robbery and plunder; but it would be not a little rash to conclude from thence, without farther inquiry, that the community in general can be enriched by such means! This, however, is the single consideration to which the political economist has to attend. The question never is, whether a greater or smaller number of individuals can be enriched by the adoption of a particular measure, or by a particular institution, but whether its tendency is to enrich the public. Admitting that monopolies and restrictive regulations frequently enable individuals to accumulate ample fortunes, this is so far from being, as is often contended, any proof of their real advantageousness, that it is distinctly and completely the reverse. It is demonstrably certain, that if monopolies and exclusive privileges enrich the few, they must, to the same extent, impoverish the many; and are, therefore, as destructive of that NATIONAL WEALTH, to promote which ought to be the principal object of every institution, as they are of the natural freedom of industry.

To arrive at a well-founded conclusion in economical science, it is not, therefore, enough to observe results in particular cases, or as they affect particular individuals; we must further inquire whether these results are constant, and universally applicable, -whether the same circumstances which have given rise to them in one instance, would, in every instance, and in every state of society, be productive of the same or similar results. A theory which is inconsistent with an uniform and constant fact must be erroneous; but the observation of a particular result at variance with our customary experience, and when we may not have had the means of discriminating the circumstances attending it, ought not to induce us hastily to modify or reject a principle which accounts satisfactorily for the greater number of appearances.

The example of the few arbitrary princes who have been equitable, humane, and generous, is not enough to overthrow the principle which teaches that it is the nature of irresponsible power to debauch and vitiate its possessors-to render them haughty, cruel, and suspicious: nor is the example of those who, attentive only to present enjoyment, and careless of the future, lavish their fortunes in boisterous dissipation or vain expense, sufficient to invalidate the general conclusion, that the passion for accumulation is infinitely stronger and more universal than the passion for expense. Had this not been the case, mankind could never have emerged from the condition of savages. The multiplicd and stupendous improvements which have been made in different ages and nations-the forests that have been cut down-the marshes and lakes that have been drained and cultivated-the harbours, roads, and bridges, that have been constructed-the cities and edifices that have been raised-are all the fruits of a saving of income, and establish, in despite of a thousand particular instances of prodigality, the vast ascendancy and superior force of the accumulating principle.

From all this, it is evident that the alleged facts, so frequently brought forward to prove the fallacy of general principles, can only be admitted as

exceptions to these principles, even when they are of undoubted and unquestionable authenticity. But this is far from being always, or even generally, the case. To observe accurately, and define modifying circumstances with the requisite degree of precision, pre-suppose an acuteness, intelligence, patience, and superiority to prejudice, which are among the rarest endowments of the understanding. "The simplest narrative of a case," says Dr Cullen," almost always involves some theories;" hence," without principles deduced from analytical reasoning, experience is an useless and a blind guide;" and hence, according to the same learned physician, "the number of false facts afloat in the world infinitely exceeds that of the false theories." But, from what has been already said, it is absurd to suppose that a few isolated facts, however carefully observed, can either overturn or become the basis of a general theorem in a science, the professed object of which is to discover, by comprehensive induction, the laws which govern the vast majority of instances, making no account of particular exceptions arising from varieties of individual feeling, habit, custom, or caprice, or from the operation of local causes, which can never enter as an element into an investigation of principles. On the contrary, to arrive at a true knowledge of the laws which regulate the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth, the Political Economist must take enlarged views, and draw his materials from a very wide surface. To use the words of our author, "he should study man in every different situation,—he should have recourse to the history of society, arts, commerce, and civilization-to the works of philosophers and travellers-to every thing, in short, that can throw light on the causes which accelerate or retard the progress of civilization he should mark the changes which have taken place in the fortunes and condition of the human race in different regions and ages of the world: he should trace the rise, progress, and decline of industry; and, above all, he should carefully analyse and compare the effects of different institutions and regulations, and discriminate the various circumstances wherein an advancing and declining society differ from each other. Such investigations, by disclosing the real causes of national opulence and refinement, and of poverty and degradation, furnish the economist with the means of giving a satisfactory solution of almost all the important problems in the science of wealth, and of devising a scheme of public administration calculated to ensure the continued advancement of the society in the career of improvement."

III. Having thus explained the objects of the science, with the peculiar species of evidence upon which its conclusions are founded, our author next proceeds to unfold the causes which gave rise to what has been called the MERCANTILE SYSTEM, and to the celebrated doctrine of the Balance of Trade deduced from it. This system was only a modification of the opinion once so prevalent, that wealth consists exclusively in gold and silver; an opinion which naturally arose from the circumstance that the currency of all civilized nations was formed almost entirely of these metals, and that they were used in a double capacity, as standards whereby to measure the relative value of different commodities, and as the equivalents for which they were most frequently exchanged. While the popular notion prevailed, the different nations of Europe studied, though to little purpose, every possible means of accumulating gold and silver, the exportation of which was forbidden under heavy penalties. They were permitted to flow in, and the great object was to prevent them from flowing out again. But in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when commerce received an extraordinary extension, this prohibition was found, on many occasions, to be extremely inconvenient. Merchants discovered that they could frequently buy more advantageously with gold and silver, than with any other commodity, the foreign goods they wanted, for the purpose, either of importing them into their own, or carrying them into some other country. They remonstrated, therefore, against this prohibition, as injurious to trade; first, because the exportation of gold and silver, for the purchase of foreign goods, did not always diminish the quantity of those metals in the kingdom, but, on the contrary, might frequently

increase that quantity, by the re-exportation of the foreign goods not consumed there, which, being sold for a profit, might bring back more treasure than had originally been exported to purchase them: and, secondly, because no prohibition could effectually prevent the exportation of gold and silver, which, on account of the smallness of their bulk, in proportion to their value, might easily be smuggled abroad. The establishment of a direct intercourse with India by the Cape-of-Good-Hope seems to have had the greatest influence in effecting this change. The precious metals having always been one of the most advantageous articles of export to the East, notwithstanding the deeplyrooted prejudices engendered by the popular notion above alluded to, the East-India Company, at the period of its institution in 1600, obtained leave to export, annually, foreign coins, or bullion, to the amount of £.30,000; on condition, however, that they should import, within six months after the termination of every voyage, except the first, as much gold and silver as should, together, be equal to the value of the silver exported by them. But the enemies of the Company alleged that this condition was not complied with; and that, moreover, it was repugnant to all principle, and highly injurious to the public interests, to permit gold and silver to be sent out of the kingdom. The advocates of the Company could not controvert the reasoning of their antagonists, without openly impugning the policy of prohibiting the exportation of the precious metals; but they did not venture to contend, that the exportation of bullion to the East was advantageous, on the ground that the commodities purchased by it were of greater value in England; they only contended, that the exportation of bullion to India was advantageous, because the commodities imported from thence were chiefly re-exported to foreign countries, from which a much greater quantity of bullion was obtained in return than had been originally required to pay for these commodities in India.

Such was the origin of what has been called the MERCANTILE SYSTEM: and, when compared with the previous prejudice-for it hardly deserves the name of system-which wholly interdicted the exportation of gold and silver, it must be allowed that its adoption was a considerable step in the progress to sounder opinions. The supporters of the mercantile system, like their predecessors, held that gold and silver alone constituted wealth; but they thought that sound policy dictated the propriety of allowing their exportation to foreigners, provided the commodities imported in their stead, or a portion of them, were afterwards sold to other foreigners for a greater amount of bullion than had been originally laid out on their purchase; or, provided the importation of the foreign commodities caused the exportation of so much more native produce than would otherwise have been exported, as would more than equal their cost. These opinions necessarily led to the celebrated doctrine of the Balance of Trad`. It was obvious, that the precious metals could not be imported into countries destitute of mines, except in return for exported commodities; and the grand object of the supporters of the mercantile system was to monopolise the largest possible supply of the precious metals, by the adoption of various complex schemes for encouraging exportation, and restraining the importation of almost all products, except gold and silver, that were not intended for future exportation. In consequence, the excess of the value of the Exports over that of the Imports came to be considered as being at once the sole cause and measure of the progress of a country in the career of wealth. This excess, it was taken for granted, could not be balanced otherwise than by the importation of an equal value of gold or silver, or of the only real wealth it was then supposed a country could possess.

According to this system, the ordinary way of increasing our wealth and treasure by foreign trade, was by selling more to strangers yearly than we consumed of theirs in value; by which means the excess of our exports over our imports would fall to be paid in bullion, the course of exchange would be turned in our favour, and the country would be enriched in proportion to the amount of the balance payable in gold and silver. Thus, assuming our annual exports as equal to £.10,500,000, and our annual imports as only equal to £.10,000,000, the difference, or £.500,000, was the amount by which, according to the principles of this system, the country would be yearly enriched by this favourable balance of trade; and conversely. "No