garrison. "The channel of the conscription being exhausted, he ordered all the males fit to carry arms," both in France and Italy, to be organised as a National Guard, and divided into three classes, according to their age:"The Grand Army destined for the invasion of Russia consisted of thirteen corps of the line, and four corps of cavalry, besides the corps of the Guard, and the auxiliary troops of Austria, under the orders of Prince Schwartzenberg."

In the course of the month of April these enormous masses began their march, and after inundating various states of Europe, the Grand Army reached the banks of the Vistula at the commencement of May. Marienbourg, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plosk, Warsaw, &c. were occupied by different divisions; but the Guards were quartered at Dresden.

While Napoleon prepared his means of aggression, the Emperor of Russia did not neglect to put himself in a state of defence. As a rupture between the two sovereigns was foreseen in 1810, orders were then given to fortify different places which were to support the operations of the armies. Directions were given to augment the defences, to raise new fortresses upon the Dnieper, the Beresina, and the Dvina, and the Minister of War ordered an augmentation of the army. In consequence of the new and active measures, on the 1st of January 1812 the forces of Russia were disposed in the following manner: In Finland, the corps of Count Steingell, consisting of 30,653 men; the corps of the Grand-Duke Constantine, composed of 28,526 men, at Petersburgh; the corps of Count Wittgenstein, of 34,290 men, in Livonia and Courland; the corps of General Baggavout, of 47,520, in the governments of Wilna and Witepsk; the corps of General Essen, of 41,045 men, in the governments of Grodna, Minsk, and Mohilef; the army of Prince Bagration, of 104,322 men, in Volchinia and Podolia; the Moldavian army of General Kutúsof, of 87,026 men, upon the Danube; the corps of the Duc de Richelieu, of 19,501 men, in the Krimea; and the corps of General Rtitchef, of 9,928 men, in the Caucasus; the corps of General the Marquis de Paulucci, of 23,745 men, in Georgia; and at Moscow, the 27th division, newly formed, of 10,641. By adding to the general sum of the above mentioned forces, 2,417 exercising men, 4,051 pioneers, 4,851 artillery of reserve, and 69,166 soldiers in the garrisons, and invalids employed in active service, the total number, 517,682 men, formed, at this epoch, the total of the regular troops of the Russian empire.

According to an ukáz of the 16th of September 1811, a conscription of four men from every 500 males took place throughout the Russian empire, with the exception of New Finland, of Georgia, and the provinces of Bialostok and Tarnapole. By this levy, numerous dépôts of recruits were formed in the provinces adjacent to the stations of the Russian armies. In order to provide a certain subsistance for the troops, immense dépôts of provisions and forage were formed along the Polish frontier, as well as at Novgorod, Riga, Drissa, &c.

Such was the state of the two vast powers, when Napoleon made known his designs, by causing the French troops to march into Prussia, and toward the Vistula. The Emperor Alexander, who had wished to avoid giving Napoleon the shadow of a pretext for the invasion of his territories, now felt that the moment was arrived to lay aside all ménagement, and to occupy himself almost entirely with the organization of the armies upon the western frontiers of his empire. "The Guards received orders to march from Petersburgh, and General Kutúsof was directed to detach two divisions of the Moldavian army towards Loutsk." A new levy of two males from every 500 was ordered, in consequence of the exigency of the times.

The whole forces assembled upon the western frontier of Russia were formed into two great armies. The first army of the west was placed under the command of Barclay de Tolly, whose head-quarters were at Wilna. It was composed of six corps, commanded by Count Wittgenstein, General Baggavout, General Tutchkof, Count Shuválof, the Grand-Duke Constantine, and General Essen, besides two corps of cavalry of reserve, under the command of General Uvárof and General Korf. The second army of the

west was placed under the command of Prince Bagration, who was to remove his head-quarters from Jitomir to Loutsk. It was composed of four corps of infantry, and two of cavalry of reserve. The 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th corps of this army were commanded by General Raëvskoi, Count Kaménskoi, General Márkof, and General Doktorof; and the 4th and 5th corps of cavalry were commanded by General Tchaplits and Count Lambert. The second army had also in its suite twelve companies of artillery, and ten regiments of Kozáks. Besides, two corps of reserve were formed and placed under the command of Baron Muller-Zakomelskoi, whose head-quarters were at Toropets; and of General Ertell, whose head-quarters were at Romen. A strong garrison was organized at Riga, under orders of Prince Labánof; and a division of cavalry remained at Olviopole, ready to join either the Moldavian army, or the second army of the west, according to the exigency of circumstances. Many dépôts of recruits were disposed throughout those provinces of the empire nearest the theatre of war, so as to supply any deficiencies in the armies which might be actively engaged. Immense reserve lines of artillery were also arranged along the frontiers of Poland and Russia. The Emperor Alexander arrived at Wilna on the 16th of April, and immediately an entrenched camp was formed at Drissa, upon the Dvina, and a fortification was raised at Borissof, upon the Beresina. In consequence of the motions of the French army, a number of changes took place in that of the Russians, which Boutourlin details with much clearness.

On the 10th of June Napoleon had fixed his head-quarters at Volkoviski, and the mass of his forces directed itself upon Kovno. The Russians now saw the absolute necessity of reinforcing their first army, as, apparently, it was to be most exposed to the attacks of the enemy. The sixth corps was again united to it, and received orders to move from Volkoviski to Lida. General Platóf proceeded from Bielostok to Grodno. General Bagration received orders to carry the second army from the environs of Pronjani to Volkoviski.

The author here interrupts his narrative, and employs sixteen pages in a dry description of the country which became the theatre of war, and almost as many more in a still more tiresome detail of all the roads which pass through it, especially of those which conduct to Moscow; a description which may become highly useful, in case of another campaign in this part of the world. Some of the concluding remarks of the chapter, however, deserve notice. In the circumstances in which the Russians were placed, the point which it was of the greatest consequence to defend was Wilna, as the enemy, it was expected, would not fail to direct the mass of their forces against that point. The author, after stating the disadvantages of attack by Nesvig and Jitomir, remarks, that "the manoeuvres which we have indicated clearly demonstrate the falsity of the opinion too generally spread among military men, that a frontier, to be advantageous, ought to be straitened (retrecié.)" The Russians, perfectly sensible of the importance of Wilna, united their Grand Army in its environs, and caused the second army to approach it. "However," says Boutourlin, "while we render justice to the judicious choice of the point of Wilna, it must be admitted, that the line of retreat which the works executed at the camp of Drissa indicated, and which must. have been directed from Wilna upon this camp, was not so fortunately determined. This line, besides the inconvenience of removing the first army from the second, presented also that of giving to the enemy the power of arriving first at the important point of Smolensk, and of placing himself between it and the fertile provinces of the South. It appeared more advantageous to return back from Wilna upon Minsk, where the first army would have been formed in intimate connection with the second, and upon the most natural line of operations, which was the central route from Moscow by Smolensk."

In his Third Chapter, Colonel Boutourlin treats of the position of the armies at the commencement of hostilities; of the passage of the Niemen by Napoleon; of the retreat of the first army of the west to the Dvina, then upon Polotsk, Witepsk, and Smolensk; of the retreat of the second army

upon Mohilef; of the camp at Drissa; of the departure of the Emperor Alexander to Moscow, and afterwards to Petersburgh, to order new armaments in the interior of the Empire; of the combats of Ostróvno and Sultánovka; of the junction of the two Russian armies; and of the delay of Napoleon at Witepsk. We shall select a few remarks from it.

At the commencement of hostilities, the first army, whose head-quarters were at Wilna, consisted of about 127,000 men; the second army, whose head-quarters were at Volkoviski, amounted to 39,000, including 4000 Kozáks; and the third army, whose head-quarters were at Loutsk, had about 43,000 combatants, including likewise about 4000 Kozáks. The total of the three armies amounted to about 217,000 men, besides a reserve of nearly 35,000, and a disposable force of 50,000 men, not including Kozáks, disengaged in consequence of the conclusion of peace between Turkey and Russia, and destined to invade Italy under the command of Admiral Tchitchagof. The concentration of the principal forces of the French toward Kovno led to the presumption that Napoleon would not delay the passage of the Niemen, so as to penetrate into Russia. The Grand Russian Army, scattered over too long a line, was not in a state to prevent this invasion, and the General-in-Chief, Barclay de Tolly, determined to avoid a combat till he had united all the corps of his army. A retreat was determined on, and executed according to orders by the generals of the different corps, the rendezvous being fixed at Sventsiani.

While these arrangements were making at the head-quarters of Wilna, Napoleon was busily occupied with his dispositions for opening the campaign. He divided his disposable forces, which amounted to nearly 500,000 men, into three grand divisions. "He himself, with his Guards, the corps of Davoust, Oudinot, and Ney, and the cavalry corps of Nansouty, Montbrun, and Grouchy, in all 25,000 men, prepared to crush the first army of the west: the King of Westphalia, with the corps of Junot, Poniatovski, and Regnier, and the cavalry of Latour-Maubourg, forming a mass of 80,000 men, was to overthrow the second army; the Viceroy of Italy, with a central army also of 80,000 soldiers, was to throw himself between the two Russian armies, and to cut off their communications; Marshal Macdonald, with his flank corps on the left, consisting of 30,000 men, was to penetrate into Courland; and on the right, Prince Schwartzenberg, with the Austrian auxiliary corps, also of 30,000 men, was destined to keep Tournasof in check. The declaration of war was at length made known to the opposing armies, who awaited the signal for hostilities with impatience. But the Russian armies fell back upon Drissa, from which place Alexander, fearing that this retreat might have an injurious influence upon the spirit of his troops, and in order to excite new animation, again addressed them.

Meanwhile, the Poles, cajoled by Napoleon, rather prematurely declared the kingdom of Poland re-established.

We cannot pass over in silence what the author says of the camp at Drissa, a point which, we, along with many others, expected to have been the theatre of contest, and of a bloody battle between the contending armies, and the name of which is fixed in the memory of the world by the anxiety which was created in the year 1812. Colonel Boutourlin gives a detailed description of this camp, and of the forces it contained, and then says, Although the position which we have described, in spite of some faults in the disposition of the works, was sufficiently strong, it was no longer convenient for the French army: it had presented an excellent strategical point if Napoleon had manœuvred seriously upon Pskof or Livonia; but as he had only made demonstrations toward his left, while he moved the mass of his forces upon the right, it became evident that the Russians could no longer remain at Drissa, without the risk of being turned by their left, and thrown back upon Livonia and the sea, entirely without communications with the interior of the empire. At length, to avoid this terrible result, it was resolved to evacuate the camp of Drissa, and to ascend the right bank of the Dvina by Potolsk toward Vitepsk :" this evacuation of Drissa took place on the 2d (14th) of July.

The Emperor quitted the army at Polotsk after having dispatched an address to the city of Moscow, and a proclamation to his people, dated from the camp near this town the 6th (18th) of July: and on the 11th (23d) of the same month he arrived there himself, and was received with the most touching testimonials of fidelity and devotion. "The general enthusiasm manifested in the cause of their country by the nobility and the merchants, and the enormous sacrifices they made, as well as the zeal they shewed in procuring the means of defence, are well known to the world, and may be justly cited with pride and veneration. Well might his Majesty Alexander exclaim, I did not expect less; you have fully confirmed the opinion which I had of you;'" and our author is no less justifiable in the following expressions, which must have flown spontaneously from his heart, "Glory to the sovereign who knows how to appreciate his nation! Glory to the nation which knows how to render itself so worthy of confidence!"

We shall not follow the Russian armies in their retreat, nor the French armies in pursuit, nor notice the trifling engagements to which allusion has already been made. The great object Napoleon had in view was to prevent the junction of the Russian armies; the main view of the Russians was to effect that junction—and they succeeded. "Napoleon, on his arrival at Vitepsk, seeing that his enemies had escaped from him, and that he was not able to arrive before them at Smolensk, and consequently to prevent the union of the two armies, thought it proper to stop for some days, with the design of giving time to the corps of Poniatóvski and Junot to rejoin Davoust, and also to procure some repose for his troops, who had been greatly fatigued by the marches which they had made through a devastated country. The cantonments of the French stretched from Suraje even to Mohilef."

Colonel Boutourlin winds up his Third Chapter by telling us," that the events which signalized this first period of the campaign do more honour to the Russians than to the Emperor Napoleon;" and then, having praised their masterly movements in the retreat, he adds, " It ought to be remarked, that the errors of the Emperor of the French contributed much to the success of the operations of the Russians. It seems it had entirely escaped Napoleon, that the direct road from Wilna to Smolensk ought to have been his principal line of operations. By following this line in mass, he would easily have succeeded in passing the left of the army of Barclay, and the right of that of Bagration, and then with advantage he would have been able to have beat the one or the other of these armies; or even, taking into view his great superiority, both at once, with the view of throwing the second army upon the marshes of Pripet, and the first upon the Baltic Sea. But to have operated in this manner, it was necessary to have acted with vigour and resolution; on the contrary, Napoleon, apparently frightened with the grandeur of the enterprize which he had conceived, acted with a timidity which unveiled his uncertainty as to the result." In a note by the Editor, it is allowed that Napoleon did not act with the same vigour and activity he had shown at Ulm in 1805, at Ratisbon in 1809, &c.; but he says, that Boutourlin forgets the alarming difficulty of finding provisions, and of the roads, and the enormous loss of men and horses which had resulted from the first forced marches upon Wilna. But as the magazines of supply of Dantzick and of Königsberg were good for nothing at Minsk and at Gluboyozé, and as they were too remote to help to the establishment of an immediate and regular service, it would have been better to have marched quickly, than with so much circumspection.

The two Russian armies, after their junction, formed a force of 120,000 soldiers; and it was necessary to determine their future operations. On the 25th of July, (Aug. 6,) a council of war was summoned, in which Colonel Toll proposed that they should take advantage of the dissemination of the French corps, to attack the center of their cantonments. His plan was adopted, and the troops were put in motion for Roudnia; but in consequence of the movement of some of the French troops, Barclay de Tolly, fearing to have his right turned, and to be cut off from Smolénsk, countermanded the march to Roudnia, and ordered it to be prolonged upon the right. Prince Ba4 M

VOL. XV.

gration having been informed that the enemy had appeared in the left of the Dnieper at Rasasna and Tchauvsi, feared that the corps of Nevérovskoi was com promised, and that the enemy might arrive at Smolensk before the Russians. To avoid this danger, he approached the town, and had his head-quarters under its walls. Afterwards, Barclay de Tolly having nothing to fear for his right flank, again determined upon the march to Roudnia, and again the troops were put in motion. But as Colonel Boutourlin, with equal candour and justice, remarks, "during these marches and counter-marches of the Russian army, Napoleon executed the finest movement which he made during the campaign." The advanced guard of the King of Naples, commanded by Sebastiani, had had an affair with Platóf and his Kozáks near MolevoBoloto. This combat having taught Buonaparte" that the Russian generals carried the mass of their forces towards Roudnia, he felt the sad consequences with which this manoeuvre might be attended, and resolved to concentrate himself upon his right, with the intention of endeavouring to repair, upon the spot, the error which he had committed of being too much disseminated." The troops under the orders of the Viceroy and Grouchy marched toward Rasasna upon the Dnieper. "The Emperor of the French, seeing that these first motions had been executed without opposition, and that the Russians still remained in the environs of Kauplia, resolved to turn them by their left by passing the Dnieper en masse, and transporting himself by the left bank of this river upon Smolensk, with the intention of seizing this town against the last of their armies, which he flattered himself he might throw back afterwards by Porekzié upon Velikie-Luki or Toropets, deprived of all communication with the southern provinces, the most fertile in the empire." Accordingly, three bridges were thrown across the Dnieper at Rasasna, and a fourth was constructed at Khomino, by which the French troops crossed. A good deal of skirmishing took place, especially with the corps of General Nevérovskoi, who effected his difficult retreat to Smolensk in fine style, and was met at the distance of six versts by General Raëvskoi coming to his assistance. The Russian forces now assembled in and near Smolensk, to which town the French advanced. The former made all preparations for defence, the latter for attack, and, according to our author, with a force of 185,000 fighting men. A good deal of skirmishing took place between the opposing armies, and Doktorof even made a successful sally. However, "Napoleon, who expected to have seen the Russian army debouche from Smolensk to give him battle, seeing that this was not their intention, determined at length to make the attack himself;" which he accordingly did, and a dreadful contest followed. Colonel Boutourlin states, that "the combats before Smolensk cost the enemy 20,000 men hors de ligne;" and that the loss of the Russians was also considerable; on the 5th (17th) of August alone they had 6,000 men hors de combat. He adds, that the defence of Smolensk by Doktorof, who remained master of the town on the 5th (17th), was the more honourable to him, because he had only about 30,000 men to oppose to 72,000, which the enemy engaged in the first line.

The extraordinary success of the defence of Smolénsk gave room to hope, that, on the following days, the renewed efforts of the enemy to capture it would be equally vain; but in spite of this, General Barclay judged that Napoleon, by stretching his troops by his right, was able to become master of the road to Moscow, which the second isolated army would not be in a state to defend efficaciously. Upon this hypothesis, the Russian armies would be thrown back upon Porekzie, and the northern provinces entirely without the important line of the centre, and from all connection with the fertile provinces of the south." The General-in-chief of the first army, against the opinions of some other officers, therefore decided to evacuate Smolensk, and this was executed in the night between the 5th and 6th (17th and 18th) of August: and the bridges upon the Dnieper were removed.

In the night between the 6th and 7th, (18th and 19th) the French established bridges at Smolensk. We shall take no particular notice of the skir mishes, nor of the details of the combat of Lubino, or of Valutina, which, according to our guide, should be considered as " a chef-d'œuvre of firmness