and reasons, is to search for the master among his slaves. To these facts we must add the ingenious argument drawn by Mr. Rennell, from the changes sustained by the brain in common with the remainder of the body. An absorbent system exists in the brain, by which, in process of time, that organ undergoes a total change. Now, if the particles of the brain were capable of consciousness, consciousness would cease upon their removal; and personal identity would be destroyed. Personal identity depends on consciousness; and as that consciousness continues, it must be something which does not fluctuate and change; something extraneous to the brain. The body, like the Paralus of Athens, may, by the deposition of new particles similar to those absorbed, preserve an appearance of identity, when no one particle remains unaltered. there is no APPEARANCE of consciousness; in consciousness the individuality must be real; and this, seeing the brain transmutates, can only be by the existence of an immaterial essence, which never changes. But That insanity is a disease in the bodily organ, is a position equally to be disputed. Certainly, frequent cases of insanity occur, arising primarily from derangement of the brain, from repletion, pressure, or a blow. Under such circumstances, medical treatment alone is neces sary to restore the organ to its healthful tone. But most instances of derangement, perhaps, originate in the mind; and though the disorder may first affect the structure of the brain, and' so far demand medical treatment; yet the moral regimen is indispensable, and far more effectual than medicine, in attacking the primary cause of the evil. Insanity, then, while it shows the mutual dependence of mind and matter, strongly indicates them to be distinct. After all, so far is it from being a fact, that the brain is perceptibly diseased in all cases of insanity, that of thirty-seven dissections made at Bethlehem Hospital, the structure of the brain was, in eleven cases, firmer than usual; in six, softer; and in the remaining twenty, its consistence was natural. But were the case otherwise, what could be proved from an affection of the brain, in a disorder arising from mental causes, but that the morbid state of the organ is the consequence, not the cause, of the disease? We are apt to deny the separate existence of mind, in consequence of being continually conversant with material objects; and hence, when we come to study our own internal constitution, we find the operations of mind so intimately connected with the qualities of the body, that we cannot easily separate the one from the other. Yet nothing, in fact, can be more distinct. [18th Cent. Our ideas of body are derived from our percep tion of its sensible qualities; our ideas of mind, from consciousness of its inward operations in ourselves. Now, I have a stronger assurance of what passes within me, than of the qualities of external objects; and hence alone has materialism been deemed less absurd than the opposite system of Berkeley, who excluded matter from the universe. This last "contradicts only the suggestions of our perceptions, while the other contradicts those of consciousness *." But from these remarks it follows, that when we speak of mind as not material, we speak on the only conceptions of mind and matter that can be formed. When we remove our view from the animal creation, and consider the vegetable kingdom and the heavenly bodies; when we mark the growth and structure of the one, and the regular movements of the other; we ascribe these effects to an intelligent cause, which here exists separately from these plants or luminaries. Mind, as in that intelligent Cause, or God, acts independently of matter; and, far from being the result of matter, actuates it. Matter, on the other hand, as in the whole mineral kingdom, exists separately from mind; and no combination of its particles was ever known to produce * Dugald Stewart's Philosophy of Mind. Beattie's Elements of Moral Science. sensation or intelligence. Yet, when put in motion, it is impelled, directly or remotely, by an extraneous intelligent cause; as when the hand tosses a ball into the air. Mind and matter then, thus capable of separate existence, do probably exist as separate and independent elements in the human frame; although their intimate association renders it extremely difficult for us to distinguish them from each other in our conceptions; and this opinion is confirmed by the phenomena of dreaming, of false perception in delirium, and even of some vivid efforts of imagination and recollection; in all which the mind seems to act without the medium of an impression on the material organs. The general consent of nations respecting a future state, where the soul of man shall live im mediately on the dissolution of the body, and shall exist in a cloud-like, unsubstantial form; the dread of apparitions, and the belief in spirits; must be allowed some weight when added to the foregoing arguments. And these notions are not more prevalent in refined than in barbarous nations, who might appear incapable of that abstraction which separates mind from matter. Having established, by various arguments, the immateriality of the soul; we proceed to connect its immateriality with the doctrine of its separate existence. For, the separate exist ence of mind and matter being once admitted, the material organs, instead of being essential to the operations of mind, must necessarily be a clog upon them: and hence we infer a state, where the chrysalis will rise from its envolopement, to soar and glitter in the heavens: a state where the unfettered spirit will burst from the windows of its prison-house, to wave its plumage, and to exult in liberty and light: a condition, in which ampler knowledge and higher enjoyment will result from the full vigour of faculties, disencumbered from their grosser element, and liberated from their tabernacle of flesh *. Let us now shortly glance at the evidences from Scripture; and consider this inference as the only true interpretation of the passages: "Dust returns to dust, and the spirit to God who gave it ;" and, "Fear not them which kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do:" (now, if the body and soul were inseparable, here would be no antithesis: they who killed the one, would, for the time, kill the other over this last, however, the power belongs * Consciousness, the indication of mind, survives, as we have seen, several gradual dissolutions and changes of the body: why not, therefore, the sudden one of death -Beattie's Elements, vol. i. Eccles. xii. 7. |