ly instinctive mode of expression cannot satisfy the wants of man. He desires a more extensive communication with his fellow beings. He finds by experience that certain sounds produce a certain impression upon him, and he is prompted to produce the same impression upon others by the employment of the same sounds. The more he attends to these intonations of the voice, so much the more readily does he form a conception of the object of the sensations which they indicate; and when he has once formed this conception, he has a desire to express it. He has this desire in consequence of that tendency of his nature, which has been already noticed, to place himself in sympathy and harmony with beings around him. He therefore feels impelled to designate by his voice the objects which he has conceived. He applies to some of them the sounds which he had previously used as signs of sensation; to others he applies sounds resembling these; for a third class he uses imitative sounds; for a fourth class he employs such utterances as are naturally suggestive, although not strictly imitative; and for still other classes of objects he forms vocal expressions by numerous changes and combinations of sounds, which he had previously assigned to things more easily designated. When he has once invented names for a certain number of objects, his progress in the extension of his vocabulary is obviously facilitated. The distinction, then, between sounds as composing language, and sounds as employed by man in his natural state and by brutes, is the following:-the former are made with an intelligent design, the latter are made under the impulse of a mere sensuous feeling; the former are expressive of conceptions, the latter of mere sensations; the former are articulate, the latter inarticulate. Language, therefore, is the intentional expression of human conceptions by means of articulate and significant sounds, by means of words.

But in process of time words are communicated not only to the ear but also to the eye. Language does not satisfy the desire of man for communion and harmony with the world around him, until it is written as well as oral. It must become a fixed and permanent expression of his states of mind, and thus facilitate the transactions which are necessary for the progress of society, for commerce, for the conduct of States, etc. Spoken language is the immediate expression of our conceptions; written language the mediate. The former suggests its meaning as soon as perceived by the sense; the latter must first be translated from the language of visible signs into that of audible sounds, before it can

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be understood. The eye perceives the word, and suggests the sound of it, and then the signification of it is communicated to the soul. Thus the audible words are appreciated directly; the visible, indirectly. Hence the spoken language can produce upon the mind and heart a much more rapid and powerful impression, than can be produced by the written language. The former can also express a feeling or idea much more vividly than the latter by means of the variation of tone, which designates the slightest shading of sentiment and appeals at once to the heart. Still, the written language has in its turn some advantages over the oral. It is more favorable to calm, dispassionate thought, to the predominance of the judgment above the imagination and the feelings, to continuous and repeated views of the same proposition. It retains the expressed opinions of men for a longer time than they can be preserved by the most powerful oratory, and during thousands of years it continues to be a treasury of thoughts which, when uttered by the living voice, would be quickly efficacious and quickly forgotten.

§ 2. The different Susceptibilities of the Soul originating different Forms of Language; the Origin of Prose, Poetry and Eloquence; the distinctive Character of each.

The various susceptibilities of the soul may be divided into three classes. The first class may be comprehended under the cognitive or knowing faculty, and the following acts are referrible to it; first, perceptions; secondly, conceptions, acts of imagination; thirdly, notions, generalizations, (perceptions of the understanding); fourthly, judgments; fifthly, inferences, conclusions; and sixthly, ideas, (perceptions of the reason). To this general faculty therefore belong the subordinate powers of perception, conception, imagination, understanding, reason, memory. When all these powers act in unison with each other, they constitute the perfection of man's intellectual nature. The second class of susceptibilities may be comprehended under the sensitive faculty, and to it may be referred the sensations, and the inward feelings or affections. When all the feelings of man are in harmony with each other, he has reached the perfection of his sensitive being. The third class of susceptibilities may be comprehended under the appetitive faculty, or what is sometimes called, in its more. general sense, the will. The will, in its more specific and limited meaning, chooses an object, when that object stands in a cer

tain relation to some previous inclination of the soul. If the object be more distinctly perceived by the mind, and the inclination be intelligently directed to it, then is the inclination called desire; and if the desire be long continued, it is termed disposition, and if the disposition have a certain degree of strength, and a certain measure of excitement, it is denominated passion. When all the acts of the will are in unison with each other and with the reason and judgment, when the lower inclinations are kept subordinate to the higher, then is the moral nature of man in its state of perfection.

Of the different susceptibilities which have been mentioned, sometimes one, and sometimes another has the predominance in an individual, and characterizes his whole course of action. There is a state of calm contemplation and thoughtfulness; there is a state of animated feeling; there is a state of voluntary desire, and each of these states forms often the peculiarity by which one man is distinguished from another. The occupation of the soul with perceptions, conceptions, notions, judgments, inferences, ideas, does not altogether exclude the contemporaneous indulgence of feelings and affections, but it prevents such a degree of them as may give any other than a meditative character to the mind. So the occupation of the soul with lively feeling presupposes the exercise of the cognitive faculty, but precludes any such degree of the exercise as may in any way diminish the predominance of the sensitive, emotive character of the individual. The feelings are indeed often excited and heightened by the imagination. This power is peculiarly fitted to move the affections, by its presenting to the mind specific images of an object; also by its presenting images resembling and nearly related to the particular feelings which are to be excited; by its presenting images of the cause which precedes, or of the effect which follows the existing emotion; by its presenting images which are in contrast with the object of that emotion, and which therefore make the object so much the more vivid and affecting. As the imagination acts on the feelings, so the feelings reäct on the imagination, and thus a reciprocal influence is exerted by these distinct susceptibilities, which increases the intensity of each. Similar remarks may be applied to the appetitive part of our nature. The inclinations and desires are excited by the imagination; for the clear images of this faculty arouse the involuntary affections which are the precursors of voluntary acts. The will, in its turn, exerts a reflex influence on the fancy. Whenever we choose an

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object we fix our attention upon it; the more attentively we view it, so much the deeper impression does it make on our involuntary feelings; and the more intensely our feelings are excited, so much the greater activity and vivacity are imparted to the imagination. Thus an act of the will vivifies both the affections and the fancy, and receives itself a stimulus from the powers which it reciprocally quickens. All our faculties act and reäct upon each other, and the man acquires a distinctive character by the preponderance of one or another of his several susceptibilities.

When, therefore, he is in a state of calm, dispassionate thought, he has a desire of unity with himself; that is, of making his intellectual operations consistent with one another, and reducing them to one harmoniously connected train. He has also a desire of unison with others, that is, of making their perceptions and judgments one with his own. This leads him to adopt the language of instruction, and this kind of language is termed prose, in its restricted sense. When likewise he is in the state of excited feeling, he naturally inclines to a similar harmony with himself; that is, to a consistency, likeness and union between his affections. He wishes to feel as one man, and not as divided against his own nature. He will not freely express his emotions, unless they are congruous with one another and unite in one general character. He is also instinctively impelled to be in unison with his fellow men, and make his feelings their own. He therefore gives utterance to the feelings of his heart, in order to raise the same affections in the hearts of his fellow beings. His feelings have excited his imagination, and the language which he employs is that of the imagination and the affections united. This kind of language is termed poetry. Again, when he is in a state of voluntary desire, he feels the same impulse to be at one with himself; to have all his inclinations and volitions consistent with each other; and also to be at one with other men, to bring their wills into a state of harmony with his own. Hence he expresses himself in a peculiar species of language, called eloquence. As his voluntary emotions are excited by previous thoughts and feelings, so the style which he employs for communicating his acts of will contains the elements of the style for the operations of the intellect and of the heart. In other words, eloquence, although distinguished from prose and poetry, has many qualities in common with them both.

In distinguishing prose from eloquence, the word prose is used in a narrower acceptation than ordinary. It is employed to denote

the language of the intellect, and is thus distinct from eloquence, which is the language of the voluntary power. In a more general sense, however, the word prose includes eloquence, and denotes that species of language which is constructed with prominent reference to a particular definite effect upon the mind of the reader or hearer. Thus, the writer of prose, in its limited sense, aims to be didactic, to impart a certain degree of knowledge on a specific subject. He constructs his sentences with obvious reference to the facility and clearness of his communications. The eloquent writer aims to move the will; to awaken in his readers some particular inclination, or excite them to some definite purpose. But the writer of poetry has no such prominent reference in his composition to a specific effect upon his readers. He does not shape his verses with the prominent design of imparting definite instruction, nor of persuading the will to a particular act. He writes freely, and without the appearance of calculating consequences. When he begins to calculate, he has ceased to be inspired. True, he does instruct and does persuade, but never makes it his prominent aim to produce these effects. As a writer

he does calculate, but as a poet he utters his feelings without constraint. After he has written, he considers the influence of his words on others; but while he is writing, he is borne onward by his own feelings. His object is to bring the feelings of others into a state of sympathy with his own, but this is a general object, and the prominent avowal of it would tend to convert his poetry into prose. He must not reduce this general design to any particular form, nor can he, as a poet, devise any specific plan for affecting others in correspondency with his main purpose. He must not select his images or his words with an obvious or primary reference to their effect on his readers, but must be influenced first of all by the spontaneous suggestions of his own feeling, and if he ever thinks of making a stanza useful to his fellow men, the thought must be an incidental one, secondary to the desire of giving vent to his own emotions, concealed from the view of others, and never so prominent as to interfere with his seeming, as well as his real inspiration. It must be, moreover, of a general nature, and must never assume that specific, definite form which characterizes the orator and the didactic prose writer.

Poetry has been defined, the language of the imagination and the feelings. This definition does not imply, that the language prompted by these susceptibilities is never used in simple didactic prose. It teaches, however, that the fancy and the affections