1845.] Government of God a matter of Joy. 449 the divine authority and transgressing the divine law he proclaims to all in the strong language of action his firm conviction that the law of God is a bad one, that the principles of his administration are hurtful to the well being of creatures, and that the overthrow of his government would afford good reasons for a general jubilee. By doing it he enters the very audience chamber of God and with nerves of iron and a face of triple brass, he says to Him before whom angels bow and archangels veil their faces, "You are unworthy to hold the throne, your law bespeaks ignorance or malignity, your government is unwisely and ruinously administered, give to me the sceptre, to me surrender the crown, if not, I will spread rebellion in your empire and tear the diadem from your brow." Such is the expressive and awful language of resistance to the divine authority. And if this is not the consummation of depravity then where is it to be found? We cannot close this Article without an expression of grateful feeling that a Being perfectly qualified to rule does hold the reins of unlimited empire. The fact that a perfect God reigns affords good grounds of universal rejoicing. In respect to the government of the universe only three suppositions are possible ;-God must reign, or some other being or beings, or there be no government. But would it be best to have no government? Would it be best to lift off from the moral universe all the restraints of law and permit every moral being to act out, unbridled all the feelings of his heart? Would it be best to abolish all laws human and divine and leave all hearts to the natural working of every good and evil passion? What would be the consequence of such a universal emancipation of mind from the restraints of law? Would created mind rule itself? That question has been long since settled. Notwithstanding all the controlling influences which the laws of God and man throw around it, its constant tendency even now is, to break loose from this control and follow recklessly the leadings of passion. And were these restraints entirely removed and a full license given throughout the universe to the natural workings of created mind and heart, what would the universe become but one broad Aceldama, a field of terror and anarchy and blood. Thanks, then, to the great Universal Lawgiver that this is not the scene everywhere presented to the eye. Would it then be best that any other being than God should take the government upon his shoulders? Who would under take to bear the burden? Who would presume, Phaeton like, to drive the chariot of the sun? Who, to guide the comets through the complicated system of revolving worlds? Who, to govern and keep in harmony the still more complicated sys tem of the moral universe,-liable as every flaming orb of mind there is, to its countless aberrations? But admitting that beings might be found presumptuous enough to undertake the work, (as we know there would be, for all naturally love preeminence,) still who would be willing to entrust them with the government? Who is there to whom you would not shudder to commit it? Would you give the dominion to the arch-apostate? What! take the sceptre from the hands of infinite mercy and love and transfer it to the hands of perfect malignity and rage! The blood flows heavily in upon the heart and curdles there at the mere thought of such a change. The eye of imagination runs downward to the murky throne of the infernal king, glances over his flaming dominions, and then passes upward and throughout creation and beholds it all under the dominion of Satan, transformed into a hell. Would you then entrust the government to man? Why he has been already tried and found incompetent to govern even himself. And having been proved unfaithful in that which is his own who shall commit to him that which is another's? Would you then put the reigns of empire into the hands of any of the spirits of heaven, even of the highest arch-angel there? But could he manage well the interests of the universe? Could he rule the world of nature? Could he give laws to the world of mind and heart, and see them wisely executed? And if those laws were broken could he contrive a redemptive scheme? Why, give him the sceptre and evil would soon enter the system, and then go on accumulating,-derangement following derangement and disaster treading on the heels of disaster,-till the whole train of worlds, broken loose from law and dashing on. ward in wild disorder, and with lightning speed, leaping at length from the appointed track, became one universal wreck. To whom then would you give the government? We have ranged creation through and find no hand competent to wield the sceptre. We gaze on the appalling spectacle which the universe without a ruler or under the guidance of any created mind presents, and we are forced in horror to turn away from it and look upwards for relief to the great Creator; and as we see in his character every conceivable attribute of a perfect Universal Ruler, and see too the reins of government held calmly in his hand, and then 1845]. Intellectual and Moral Influence of Romanism. 451 look around and witness everywhere the beneficent results of his wise and benevolent administration, our souls with a full gush of rapturous emotion involuntarily exclaim: "The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoice, let the multitude of isles be glad thereof." A Dudleian Lecture delivered before the University in Cambridge, May 14, 1845. By Prof. k, of Andover Theological Seminary. Edwards X Park, WHEREFORE BY THEIR FRUITS YE SHALL KNOW THEM.-Matt. 7: 20. THE character of a religious system may be learned, first, from the relation of its principles to the standard of reason and scripture; secondly, from its influence on the soul of man. The influence of a system may be ascertained by an examination either of its inherent fitnesses or of its actual operations. If we confine our regard to its inward tendencies we may become visionary; our speculations not being verified by facts. If we limit our view to the consequences which have apparently flowed from it, we may become empirical and mistake the appendages of the system for the effects of it. In order to be certain that its real influence is good or evil, we must combine a philosophical inquiry into its adaptations, with an historical inquiry into its consequences; each of these different views serving to illustrate and complete the other. Our survey of Romanism, for example, may be too superficial, if we dwell on the circumstances that have occurred in its train, and pass by the commentary which they receive from the essential fitnesses of the system. Its more skilful advocates will allow that its history is stained with many dark scenes, but they affirm that although conjoined with certain evils as accidents, it has not been united with them as appropriate developments; that it has happened to be allied with political despotism, with the Feudal system, with the peculiar tastes of the middle ages, and has been tinctured in this manner with influences which are far from being congenial with its own spirit. We say in reply, that the evils connected with Romanism have been prominent through so many successive ages, in so many different nations, for so long a time and with such marked uniformity, as to give evidence of emanating from the very nature of the system, rather than from its ephemeral position. Certainly we may know a tree by its fruits, when we have observed these fruits for many seasons, and in various climes. Still, in all our inferences from the event to the cause we feel the more secure when we analyze the cause itself, and find à priori that it is intrinsically adapted to work out the same things as effects, which have been noticed as its uniform adjuncts. We may therefore be justified in attempting to show, on the present occasion, that the essential tendencies of Romanism are injurious to the mind and heart of man. They are injurious to the mind. Our Maker intended to leave the evidences for religion such as not only to try the feelings, but also to sharpen the intellect. He designed to invigorate the reason, as well as discipline the will, by allowing arguments of real weight to exist in favor of what may be proved on the whole to be false, and in opposition to what may be proved on the whole to be true. But the Romish idea of the infallibility of the church is, in itself and its results, at variance with the nature of moral reasoning, and encourages a spirit of dogmatism incompatible with a due regard to the evidence which exists for and against the truth. Catholic theologians have assumed that to their cardinal doctrines nothing can be properly objected, and have deemed it a kind of religious suicide to call in question any 1 Many object to the term Catholic as applied to the church of Rome, because the term expresses a Christian virtue for which that church is not distinguished. Some refuse to employ the word, because it implies that the Romish church differs from every other in the fact of its being a visible corporation, capable of being extended over the whole world and including under one hierarchy all individuals of all nations. There is no reason, it is said, why the Romish church should monopolize the designation, Catholic, more than the Anglican Church. It is indeed true that names are things, and that a good name is precious in its influence; but when usage has so generally sanctioned the application of this term to the church of Rome, it appears hopeless to attempt a change. There is in itself no sufficient reason why those who believe in three orders of the clergy should assume the title-Episcopalians, in order to distinguish themselves from such as believe that all ordained ministers are bishops. The believers in the parity of the clergy might as well assume the title-evangelical, in order to distinguish themselves from such as exalt the diocesan bishop above the preachers of the word. If the work of giving names to sects were now to be commenced we might invent a more distinctive and expressive vocabulary than has yet been established; but we cannot, at this late day, make an innovation upon the current phraseology without more labor than profit. Still the phraseology is unfortunate. See Whateley on the Errors of Romanism, pp. 359–367. 1845.] Duty of Theological Progress. 453 principle which is essential to the stability of their faith. They compare the evidences for their theology to those for their personal existence and identity. They fear that in canvassing the proofs for an essential dogma, they will lose their implicit faith in it, and have therefore believed without asking for a reason, or have searched for arguments rather than for the truth. Their system appears to have logical props instead of logical grounds; to have been made up first, and afterward confirmed by reasonings which had no influence in its formation. They object to untrammeled inquiry, because it results in diversities of opinion, in skepticism, in pride of intellect. These are indeed evils; but they are avoidable, are at the worst incidental to a positive good, and withal are less to be feared than the inanity and deadness and corruption which come from an unthinking reception of a human creed. Nor is it merely by discountenancing the investigation of first principles that Romanists have injured the tone of the intellect. They have done the same by checking the instinctive longings of the soul for progress in the science of divine things. "However some men may deride new light," says Dr. Owen, "he will not serve the will of God in his generation, who sees not beyond the line of foregoing ages." The spirit of the Reformation is that of improvement, the principle of the Romanists is that of hyperconservatism. Their œcumenical councils are supposed to have established the faith of the church; the decisions of these councils are deemed infallible, and no private scholar has a right to impugn them. Now the human mind was not made to be thus stationary. It is wronged when forbidden to examine and reject the errors of past, especially of dark ages. We are but mocked, when we are told that we have powers for research, and may "The certainty which the church has of the truth of her tenets, is imme, diate; for she received her doctrines from the mouth of Christ and his apostles, and they are indelibly stamped upon her conscience, or, as Irenaeus says, upon her heart, by the power of the Divine Spirit. If she were obliged to ascertain her doctrines first by means of a learned investigation, she would fall into the most absurd contradiction with her own self, and would annihilate herself; for, as it would be the church that seeks for the ground of her doctrines, she would be presupposed to exist, inasmuch as she examines; and at the same time not to exist, inasmuch as she is obliged first to obtain an existence, that is, to learn the truth, which is her proper being, the very thing in which and by which she is. She would seek for her own self, and this can be done only by an insane man. She would resemble the man, who would first determine whether or not he had an existence by an examination of the papers written by himself!"—Moehler's Symbolik, S. 378. |