rience of mankind, on which that conviction is founded.

It must not be altogether omitted, that in the works of human art and labour, nothing is ever left to chance. The most experienced carpenter makes the most constant use of his rule the oldest mason keeps his wall in the perpendicular by his line. It is impossible, ninety-nine times. in a hundred, to make a complete circle or a perfect square without the use of instruments. The story of the painter, who, when his art had failed, produced the foam of his horse's mouth by the accidental dash of his brush, has even found a place in history. Why is this, but from our accumulated experience, that chance, in reality, does nothing at all for us?

This then is the outline of the argument from final causes against the production of the world from chance. It is the result of our uniform experience, that no certain effect can be obtained without some regular means of con

trivance. But whatever part of the universe we examine, from the minutest insect to the noblest animal, from the meanest plant to that magnificent system which the researches of modern astronomers unfold, we trace the undoubted evidence of means corresponding to their intended object, and attaining their end. Therefore we conclude, by a natural and irresistible analogy, that a world which exhibits throughout an unbroken chain of contrivances and means, is the effect, not of fortuitous concurrence in its constituent parts, whether termed molecules or atoms, but of their regular disposition; and is the work, not of chance, but of an intelligent contriver. For, if we should despise the philosopher, who told us that even the rudest and most imperfect petrifactions of vegetable or animal substances were the work of chance: if this is so well acknowledged, that no one has ever dared to supply the greatest desiderata in philosophy, such as the cause of polarity in the magnet, by attributing it to accidental inclination; and that it would be deemed legitimate proof of insanity in an architect, if he undertook to produce the

meanest cabin by the fortuitous concurrence of beams and tiles; we must renounce all consistency of principle, unless we infer that this world, in which we see so many complicated and various means all conspiring to accomplish their prescribed purpose, so many springs of action and motion all coinciding in the most perfect order, was produced, and only could be produced according to the regular design of an intelligent Being.*

* If this Chapter had been intended as any thing more than a brief statement of the nature of the argument from final causes, it would have been necessary of course to detail the chief marks of contrivance which the world exhibits, which have here been only alluded to incidentally. But, in addition to other numerous volumes upon this subject, the recent and popular work of Dr. Paley seems to render any fresh enumeration of those instances quite superfluous. I do not mean to say that the subject is exhausted; nor indeed can it be, till every part of the universe is laid open to our inquiry. But perhaps there is some justice in the remark, that it already labours under disadvantage from its unlimited extent. "A single example seems altogether as conclusive as a thousand; and he that cannot discover any traces of contrivance in the formation of an eye, will probably retain his atheism at the end of a whole system of physiology." Edin. Rev. vol. i. p. 289.

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CHAPTER III.

ON THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF THE

CREATION OF THE WORLD.

SECT. I.

The Probability that some Account of the Creation would be revealed and preserved.

THE preceding survey of two out of the three accounts which have been at different times proposed to explain the phenomenon of an existing world, though brief and rapid, may be sufficient to make it appear, that neither its independent eternal existence, nor its fortuitous production, furnish any thing like a satisfactory solution of the problem. In particular, the undeniable appearance of innumerable instances of design throughout the universe in all its parts, irreconcilable with our experience of accidental effect; and the existence of sentient beings, endued with a faculty of voluntary reflection and motion which does not belong to

unorganized or mere vegetable matter; lead us insensibly to the only solution which remains to be adduced, the operation of an Immaterial Intelligent Creator. I proceed, therefore, to inquire more particularly into the evidence that may exist of such actual creation, in addition to the incidental probability arising from the undisputed existence of a world, and the difficulty of ascribing its existence to any other origin.

Now, it cannot be denied that this probability would be counterbalanced by a formidable objection on the opposite side, if, after the diligent inquiry which an inhabitant of the world might be expected to make concerning the formation of the globe to which he belongs, no records were found to have been left of its author, or original constitution. Suppose it granted, for the present, that a Creator exists; it is difficult to believe that such a world, and such beings as it contains, were created without any definite or assignable object: that its intelligent inhabitants were summoned into life, and then immediately abandoned by their