able to infidelity. The only way of escape from fatalism and pantheism, left us by the latter, is in a will which deter-mines itself, unswayed either by reason or inclination. Now it is certain, that many will be dissatisfied with this; some will say, that volitions, unprompted either by the intellect or the heart, must be unintelligent and senseless acts; and that, if our lives are to be under the control of such random volitions as these, then we are completely subjected to the dominion of caprice and chance, and are not deserving of the name of intelligent beings. Some will also say, if we are not accountable for these volitions, which we are induced to put forth by the determining power of ab extra influences, then all responsibility is at an end, and virtue and vice are mere empty and unmeaning names; for all the varied and complicated transactions of social and domestic life are but the direct or indirect results of the various influences which are at work in society. Others will say, that if it is inconsistent with free agency that our volitions should be, in any sense, caused by any influences without the will, then it is impossible for God himself to control free agents, without destroying their freedom; for if he, by his Spirit, should move upon their hearts so as to cause or induce certain volitions, then they are treated as machines, and no longer as free moral agents. To all these, the only reply this system can make, is, you must believe in the self-determining power of the will, or you must plunge into the dark and hopeless abyss of absolute atheism. And truly there could be little choice between atheism, and a system, which, by exempting the human will from all control of the intelligence, and subjecting it to the dominion of chance, makes virtue and religion impossible. Edwards, on the other hand, instead of leaving but one way of escape, which is, to follow the light of an ignis fatuus, shuts up every avenue, and makes it impossible even to hew a path from his system into the dark regions of atheism. He places all things, not excepting the most secret volitions, both of good and evil men, under the absolute control of the Deity; yet he so places the human will under the control of the agent's own intelligence, that the intelligent and sentient agent is responsible for every volition he puts forth; not only so, he is responsible for every affection or emotion which has a moral character, whether this is the result of a previous volition, or is excited instantaneously in view of certain ob

jects. The necessity of human volitions for which Edwards pleads, is not that fatal and unavoidable necessity advocated by the infidel; but it is the absolute certainty of volitions, when certain feelings and affections are presupposed; just as it is an absolute certainty, that a mother will fly to the relief of her child that has fallen into the fire, if it be presupposed that she is in her right mind, and has the usual affections of a mother. Could we know that she has these feelings, we might also know that to fly to her child would be the necessary result. Neither Clark nor Cudworth ever raised a pen against such necessity as this. Yet these distinguished men do not coincide with Edwards in all his views. Edwards would sustain Cudworth, where he undertakes "to discourse against the fatal necessity of all actions and events." He would agree with him in saying, that "such necessity, upon whatever grounds or principles maintained, will serve the design of atheism, and undermine Christianity and all religion, as taking away all guilt and blame, punishment and rewards, and plainly rendering a day of judgment ridiculous."* Yet Cudworth would contend, shoulder to shoulder with Edwards, for that necessity which consists in the certainty of human actions. For he is compelled to admit such a necessity, when he comes to meet the infidel argument against prophecy, which is drawn from the freedom of the will; as if human volitions were so contingent and uncertain, that they could not be foreknown as certain. Hence he says, "yet it is certain, that there is not so much contingency in all human actions, by reason of this liberty of will, as heretofore was by Epicurus, and still is by many, supposed; it being plain, that men act according to an appearance of good; and that, in many cases and circumstances, it may be foreknown, without any divine revelation, what such or such persons would do. As, for example, that a voluptuous person, having a strong temptation to satisfy his sensual appetite, and that without incurring any inconvenience of shame or punishment, would readily close with the same."+ Clark also says, "moral necessity is evidently inconsistent with the most perfect natural liberty. For instance, a man entirely free from all pain of body and disorder of mind, judges it unreasonable for him to hurt or destroy himself; and being under temptation or external + Ibid., Vol. II, p. 127.

*Intellectual System, Vol. I, p. 33.

violence, he cannot possibly act contrary to his judgment; not because he wants a natural power to do so, but because it is absurd, and mischievous, and morally impossible for him to choose to do it. Which is also the very same reason why the most perfect rational creatures cannot do evil, not because they want natural power to perform the material action, but because it is morally impossible, that, with a perfect knowledge of what is best, and without any temptation to evil, their will should determine itself to choose and act foolishly and unreasonably." This is precisely the necessity which Edwards advocates. "Yet," says Clark, "I know the opposers of liberty reply here, that there is no difference between natural and moral necessity."* In this they would be joined by some, who now profess to be the advocates of liberty. It seems enough, however, to establish the doctrine of fatalism, in Prof. T.'s view, that all events, from the beginning to the end of time, should be connected in one regular chain of causes and effects. But his own doctrine will require him to acknowledge this; for even volitions, he admits, have their cause in the will itself. Some of the causes in this chain, are intelligent and accountable beings, who, though the chain cannot be broken, are to be held responsible for the links which they themselves furnish; they are responsible for their own volitions. Prof. T. must have this chain so broken, that there will be no connecting link between men's desires and their volitions. Yet, if the chain is broken here, what becomes of responsibility? For how can we be held accountable for volitions, which spring neither from our desires, our wishes, nor our reason? If the chain of events, extending through all time, and, we may say, through all eternity, is to be made up of such capricious and unintelligent acts, what kind of chain must it be? The links are manufactured neither by human nor divine intelligence; God is dethroned, and the reign of chance universally established. Nor will Prof. T. allow, that even the divine will itself is under the control of the divine intelligence. This, too, must determine itself, and not be determined by the divine pleasure. He blames Edwards for affirming, that "the whole liberty of God is contained in this, to do as pleases him ;" and that his liberty and sovereignty consist in an ability to do whatever

* Being and Attributes, p. 203.

pleases him. He furthermore says, "that the divine volitions are necessarily determined, Edwards repeatedly affirms, and indeed represents, as the great excellency of the divine nature; because this necessity of determination is laid in the infinite wisdom and perfection of his nature."* This, however, is precisely the necessity which Clark claims for the divine volition; "which," he says, "would not suit the purpose of Spinoza. For this is a necessity, not of nature and fate, but of fitness and wisdom,-a necessity consistent with the greatest freedom and most perfect choice." But if the divine will is not controlled by the divine wisdom and pleasure, then it must be determined by chance. But if mere chance determines the divine will, and this will governs all things else, what is this, but to promote chance to the throne of the Deity, and proclaim it as the universal sovereign?

The following remarks of Cudworth are so applicable to this point, that we cannot refrain from submitting them to our readers:

"Where the atheist takes it for granted, that whosoever asserts a God, or a perfect mind, to be the original of all things, does, therefore, ipso facto, suppose all things to be well made, and as they should be. And this, doubtless, was the sense of all the ancient theologers, however some modern theists deviate therefrom; these, concluding the perfection of the Deity not at all to consist in goodness, but in power and arbitrary will only. As if, to have a will determined by a rule or reason of good, were the virtue of weak, impotent, and obnoxious beings only, or of such as have a superior over them to give law to them, that is, of creatures; but the prerogative of a Being irresistibly powerful, to have a will absolutely indifferent to all things, and undetermined by any thing but itself, or to will nothing because it is good, but to make its own arbitrary or contingent and fortuitous determination, the sole reason of all its actions, nay, the very rule or measure of goodness, justice and wisdom itself. And this is supposed by them to be the liberty, sovereignty, and dominion of the Deity. But what do these theists here else, than, whilst they deny the fortuitous motion of senseless matter to be the first original of all things, themselves, in the meantime enthrone fortuitousness and contingency in the will of an omnipotent Being, and there give it an absolute sovereignty and dominion over all?” -Intellectual System, Vol. II, p. 328.

But we have already transcended the limits we had assigned to this article; we should have been glad, had we been able, to dwell more upon the religious bearings of the subject we have been considering; but we must now satisfy ourselves with a brief remark upon a single topic. Should the doctrine

*Being and Attributes, Vol. I, p. 130. VOL. VIII.NO. XXXI.

+ Ibid., p. 140. 51

of Prof. T. be received, we shall be compelled to modify our whole views of the doctrine of regeneration. According to this, the Holy Ghost regenerates no man, till the will first chooses God and submits to Christ. Prof. T. admits, that regenerating grace may be bestowed in coincidence with this act of the will; but not before it.* If this be true, our hope in preaching the gospel is vain; for when would the depraved sinner ever choose God or submit to Christ, until his heart is changed by regenerating grace? It is well, however, that such questions as these are to be settled, not by metaphysical arguments, but by the authority of the word of God. this authority may we ever be willing to bow.

Το

ARTICLE IV.

DR. OLIN'S TRAVELS.

Travels in Egypt, Arabia Petræa and the Holy Land. By STEPHEN OLIN, D. D. With twelve illustrations on steel. In two volumes. New York. Harpers. 1843. pp. 458. 12mo.

478.

FEW portions of the earth's surface have been the scenes of more interesting events, than the countries enumerated in the work now quoted, and to which we propose to devote a few pages. They were the cradle of civilization, Christianity and the arts. In Egypt and the Holy Land, some of the arts were carried to a degree of excellence, which modern ingenuity has never been able to attain. The mechanical skill of our artizans has invented no means of elevating to high and difficult positions such immense blocks of stone, as are found in the construction of the pyramids, and uncovered in the massive foundations of the ancient Jewish temple. The pigment used by the Egyptians, which, after having been exposed to the vicissitudes of climate for thousands of years, retains the brilliancy of its coloring as effectually as if it had been spread over the walls but yesterday, has never been

* Being and Attributes, Vol. III, pp. 273, 290.