to nature to be just, and to do to others, as we would have them to do to us; for this is to make our own natural inclinations and defires the rule of our dealing with others; and to be merciful; for no man that hath not divested himself of humanity, can be cruel and, hard-hearted to others, without feeling a pain in himself.

Secondly, Reafon fhews us the tendency of thefe things to our happiness and intereft. And indeed the notion of good and evil does commonly refer to the confequences of things, and we call that good, which will bring fome benefit and advantage to us, and that eyil, which is likely to produce fome mifchief and inconvenience; and by this rule reafon discovers to us that these duties are good.

To begin with piety towards God. Nothing ca more evidently tend to our intereft, than to make him our friend, upon whofe favour our happiness depends. So likewife for gratitude; it is a virtue, to which if nature did not prompt us, our intereft would direct us; for every man is ready to place benefits there where he may hope for a thankful return. Tempérance does apparently conduce to our health, which, next to a good confcience, is the most pleasant and valuable thing in the world; whereas the intempe rate man is an open enemy to himself, and continu

ally making affaults upon his own life. Mercy and pity are not more welcome to others, than they are delightful and beneficial to ourselves; for we do not only gratify our own nature and bowels, by relieving thofe who are in mifery, but we provoke mankind by our example to the like tendernefs, and do prudently befpeak the commiferation of others towards us, when it fhall be our turn to ftand in need of it. And if we be wife enough, our reason will likewife direct us to be juft, as the fureft art of thriving in this world; it gives a man a reputation, which is a powerful advantage in all the affairs of this world; it is the fhorteft and eafieft way of difpatching business, the plainett, and leaft entangled; and though it be not fo fudden a way of growing rich, as fraud and oppreffion, yet it is much furer and more lafting, and

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not

not liable to thofe terrible back-blows and after-reckonings, to which eftates got by injustice are.

And natural reafon does not only fhew us that these things are good, but that the Lord requires them of us, that is, that they have the force and obligation of laws. For there needs nothing more to make any thing a law, than a fufficient declaration, that it is the will of God; and this God hath fufficiently fignified to mankind by the very frame of our natures, and of thofe principles and faculties which he hath endued us withal; fo that whenever we act contrary to thefe, we plainly difobey the will of him that made us, and violate thofe laws which he hath enacted in our natures, and written upon our hearts.

And this is all the law that the greatest part of mankind were under, before the revelation of the Gofpel. From Adam to Mofes, the world was almoft folely governed by the natural law; which feems to be the meaning of that hard text, Rom. v. 13. For until the law fin was in the world; that is, before the law of Mofes was given, men were capable of offend ing against fome other law, for otherwife fin could not have been imputed to them, for fin is not impu. ted where there is no law. And then it follows, Nevertheless death reigned from Adam to Mofes, even over them that had not finned after the fimilitude of Adam's tranfgreffion; that is, during that space from Adam to Mofes, men finned against the natural law, and were liable to death upon that account, though they had not offended against an exprefs revelation from God, as Adam had done; for that the Apostle; feems to mean, by finning after the fimilitude of A-, dam's tranfgreffion.

Thirdly, God hath fhewn us what is good by the general vote and confent of mankind. Not that all mankind do agree concerning virtue and vice; but that as to the greater duties of piety, juftice, mercy, and the like, the exceptions are but few in comparifon, and not enough to infringe a general confent. And of this I fhall offer to you this threefold evidence:

1. That

1. That thefe virtues are generally praised and held in efteem by mankind, and the contrary vices generally reproved and evil spoken of. Now to praife any thing, is to give teftimony to the goodness of it, and to cenfure any thing, is to declare that we believe it to be evil. And if we confult the history of all ages, we fhall find that the things which are generally praifed in the lives of men, and recommended to the imitation of pofterity, are piety and devotion, gratitude and juftice, humanity and charity s and that the contrary to these are marked with ignominy and reproach; the former are commended even in enemies, and the latter are branded even by those who had a kindness for the perfons that were guilty of them. So conftant hath mankind always been in the commendation of virtue, and the cenfure of vice. Nay we find not only those who are virtuous themfelves giving their teftimony and applause to virtue, but even thofe who are vicious; not out of love to goodness, but from the conviction of their own minds, and from a fecret reverence they bear to the common consent and opinion of mankind. And this is a great teftimony, because it is the teftimony of an enemy extorted, by the mere light and force of truth.

And on the contrary; nothing is more ordinary than for vice to reprove fin, and to hear men condemn the like, or the the fame things in others, which they allow in themfelves. And this is a clear evidence, that vice is generally condemned by mankind, that many men condemn it in themfelves; and thofe who are fo kind as to fpare themfelves, are very quick-fighted to fpy a fault in any body elfe, and will cenfure a bad action done by another, with as much freedom and impartiality, as the most virtuous man in the world.

And to this confent of mankind about virtue and vice, the feripture frequently appeals. As when it commands us to provide things honeft in the fight of all men; and by well-doing to put to filence the ignorance of foolish men; intimating, that there are fome things fo confeffedly good, and owned to be fuch

by fo general a vote of mankind, that the worst of men have not the face to open their mouths against them. And it is made the character of a virtuous action, if it be lovely and commendable, and of good re-: port, Philip. iv. 8. What foever things are lovely, whatfoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praife, make account of these things; intimating to us, that mankind do generally concur in the praife and commendation of what is virtuous.

2. Men do generally glory and ftand upon their innocency, when they do virtuously; but are afhamed and out of countenance, when they do the contrary. Now glory and fhame are nothing elfe but an appeal to the judgment of others concerning the good or evil of our actions. There are indeed fome fuch monsters as are impudent in their impieties, but thefe are but few in comparison. Generally mankind is modeft, the greatest part of those who do evil are apt to blufh at their own faults, and to confefs them in their countenance, which is an acknowledgment that they are not only guilty to themselves that they have done amifs, but that they are apprehen. five that others think fo.. For guilt is a paffion refpecting ourselves, but fhame regards others. Now it is a fign of fhame, that men love to conceal their faults from others, and commit them fecretly, in the dark, and without witnesses, and are afraid even of a child or a fool Or if they be discovered in them; they are folicitous to excufe and extenuate them, and ready to lay the fault upon any body elfe, or to transfer their guilt, or as much of it as they can, upon others. All which are certain tokens, that men are not only naturally guilty to themselves, when. they commit a fault; but that they are fenfible also what opinions others have of these things..

And on the contrary, men are apt to ftand upon their juftification, and to glory when they have done well. The conscience of a man's own virtue and integrity, lifts up his head and gives him confidence before others, because he is fatisfied they have a good epinion of his actions. What a good face does a

man

man naturally fet upon a good deed? And how does he fneak when he hath done wickedly, being fenfible that he is condemned by others, as well as by himfelf? No man is afraid of being upbraided for having dealt honestly or kindly with others, nor does he account it any calumny or reproach, to have it reported of him, that he is a fober and chafte man. No man blufheth when he meets a man with whom he hath kept his word, and difcharged his truft: but every man is apt to do fo, when he meets one with whom he has dealt difhoneftly, or who knows fome notorious crime by him.

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3. Vice, is generally forbidden and punished by. human laws; but against the contrary virtues there never was any law. Some vices are fo manifeftly evil in themselves, or fo mifchievous to human fociety, that the laws of moft nations have taken care to discountenance them by fevere penalties. Scarce any nation was ever fo barbarous, as not to main tain and vindicate the honour of their Gods and religion by publick laws. Murder and adultery, rebellion and fedition, perjury and breach of truft, fraud and oppreffion are vices feverely prohibited by the laws of moft nations. A clear indication, what opinion the generality of mankind, and the wifdom of nations have always had of these things.

But now against the contrary virtues there never was any law. No man was ever impeached for living foberly, righteously, and godly in this prefent world. A plain acknowledgment, that mankind always thought them good, and never were fenfible of the inconvenience of them; for had they been fo, they would have provided against them by laws. This St. Paul takes notice of as a great commendation of the Christian virtues; The fruit of the Spirit is love, joy, peace, long-fuffering, gentleness, kindness, fidelity, meekness, temperance; against fuch there is, no law; the greatest evidence that could be given, that these things are unquestionably good in the esteem of mankind, against fuch there is no law. As if he had faid, turn over the law of Mofes, fearch thofe of Athens, and Sparta, and the twelve tables of the