BOOK in it; and it would have grown by degrees greater, till III. it had come to its perfection, and from thence it would sensibly decay till it came to dissolution: but nobody hath ever observed such a mutation in the world, neither is there any appearance of it ; ἀλλ ̓ ἀεὶ και ̓ αὐτὸ καὶ ὡσαυτῶς διατελεῖ καὶ ἴσον ὅμοιον αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ : but the world is semper idem ; it varies not, nor alters any thing from itself. For which he particularly instanceth in the courses, symmetries, figures, positions, intervals, proportions of motion which are in the world; which things are all capable of such a mutation: yet we see no such thing in the universe: from whence he infers that the universe was always, and will be, as it is. Upon the same principle doth Aristotle dispute for the eternity of the world, from the nature of his materia prima; because if the first matter were generated, it must be generated of other matter, and so in infinitum and so he argues from the nature of the heavens, that they are not capable of generation and corruption as other bodies are. All which arguments signify no more than this, that the world was not generated as plants or animals are; and who ever, right in his wits, asserted that it was? But do any of these arguments prove it impossible that God, having infinite power, should produce the universe after another way, than any of those things are produced in, which we observe in the world? For we assert an infinite and eternal Being, which was the efficient cause of the world, who by his omnipotent power produced it out of nothing, and continues it in its being; which is well expressed by the author of the Refutation of Aristotle, in Justin Martyr's works. We assert, saith he, one God who is eternal himself, that hath nothing else coequal with himself, neither by way of subjection or opposition, whose power is so great that nothing can hinder it; by which power he produced the world, ἀρχὴν ἔχοντος τοῦ εἶναι, Dogmat. καὶ τὸ τὶ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ πῶς διαμένειν, τὴν ἐκείνε θέλησιν; which Confut. in hath no other cause either of its beginning, or of its being, Ed. Par. or continuance, but only his will. Who fully answers, in a

Aristot.

Præfat.

Ibid.

philosophical manner, the particular allegations out of Aristotle, concerning the eternity of the world; his design being, as he saith, to shew μὴ κατὰ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπισήμην, καθ ̓ ἣν ἐπαίγέλλονται Ἕλληνες περὶ Θεοῦ τε καὶ κλίσεως τες λόγες ποιεῖν, τοῦτο πεποιηκότας, ἀλλ ̓ εἰκασμῷ τὸ δοκοῦν διορισαμένες, that the Greek philosophers, in their discourses concerning God and the creation, were very far from being as good as their word to observe the laws of demonstration; but instead of them, proceeded only upon opinions and conjectures. And

II.

as to this particular of the possibility of another way of CHAP. production, besides that of generation, he proves it from Aristotle's own opinion, from the equal necessity of the existence of matter, as of God. For, saith he, if God can Just. Mar. produce any thing out of matter, which is as necessarily exEp. istent as himself, he may produce something out of nothing; for the same repugnancy that there is in that which is absolutely nothing to be produced, the same must there be in that which is necessarily existent. How then can God produce something out of matter which necessarily exists, and not be able to produce something out of nothing? For if matter have its original from itself, how can it be subject to the power of another? And besides, if we acknowledge God to have his being from himself, and on that account attribute infinite power to him, by the same reason we must attribute it to matter. But whatever hath infinite power in itself, hath a power upon something beyond itself; but if God and matter have it both, they can never have power upon each other, or without themselves; which is a far greater absurdity than the mere asserting a power to produce something out of nothing, which is implied in the very notion of infinite power; for if it be confined to any matter, the power is not infinite, because we cannot but conceive the bounds of it; for it extends no farther than matter doth. So that a power of creation is implied in the very notion of a Deity; and therefore it is a mere sophism to argue, because the world could not be generated, therefore it could not be produced, unless any other way of production, but by generation, be proved impossible.

A third false hypothesis they proceeded on was this, That the being of the world was no effect of God's will, but of the necessity of nature. For although the philosophers we now speak of did assert a Deity, which in some sense might be called the cause of the world, yet they withal asserted, that the world was coequal with God himself; and so, though there might be some priority in order of causes between them, yet there was none in order of time or duration; as we see the light, though it flows from the sun, yet the sun is never without light. This Aristotle proves from the necessity of motion and time. For, saith he, whatever is moved, must be moved by something else, and consequently there must be a running in infinitum; but this runs on a false supposition of the necessity of a continual physical motion in things, which we deny, since God, by his infinite power, may give motion to that

VII.

3.

III.

BOOK which had it not before; and so all that can be proved is the necessity of some first cause, which we assert, but no necessity at all of his continual acting, since he may cause motion when he pleases. And for time continually existing, it denotes nothing real in itself existing, but only our manner of conception of the duration of things, as it is conceived to belong to motion; and so can argue nothing as to the real existence of things from all eternity. But the latter Platonists look upon these as insufficient ways of probation, and therefore argue from those attributes of God, which they conceive most necessary and agreeable to God's nature, and by which the world was produced, if at all; so that by the same arguments whereby we prove that the world was made by God, they prove it to have been from all eternity. It was well and truly said in Plato, in his Timæus, that the goodness of God was the cause of the production of the world; from which speech the more modern Platonists gather a necessity of the world's eternity; for from hence they infer, that since God was always good, he must always have an object to exercise his goodness upon; as the sun disperseth his light as soon as he is himself. True, were God of the nature of the sun, it would be so with him, or were the sun of the nature of God, it would not be so with it. But there is this vast difference between them, that though God be essentially and necessarily good, yet the communications of his goodness are the effects of his will, and not merely of his nature; for, were not the acts of beneficence and goodness in God the free acts of his will, man must be made as happy as he was capable of being, not only upon his first existence in the world, but as long as it should continue, by mere necessity of nature, without any intervention of the will or actions of men. And so there could be no such difference as that of good and bad men in the world; for, if the lettings forth of God's goodness to the world be so necessary, all men must become necessarily good, if God's goodness be so great as to be able to make men so; which I suppose will not be questioned. By this, then, when we see that the communications of God's goodness to the world are free, and depend upon the eternal counsels of his will, which is a depth too great for us to approach or look into; by what necessity, then, if God be a free agent, and of infinite wisdom as well as goodness, must we either assert the eternity of the world, or fear to deprive God of his essential goodness? Whereas to make the communications of God's goodness

II.

*ad extra necessary, and therefore to make the world from CHAP. eternity, that he might have an object to exercise his goodness on, is to take as much off from the infinite perfection and self-sufficiency of the Divine nature, as it would seem to flatter his goodness. For God cannot be himself without his goodness; and if his goodness cannot be without some creature to shew or display it upon, God cannot be perfect nor happy without his creatures, because these are necessary issues of his goodness; and consequently we make the being of the creatures necessary to his being God, which is the highest derogation from the absolute perfection of the Divine nature. We assert then so much goodness in God, as none can be imagined greater; we assert, that it was the communication of this Divine goodness, which gave being to the world; but withal we acknowledge God to be an agent infinitely wise and free, who dispenseth this goodness of his in such a way and manner as is best pleasing to himself, though ever agreeable to his nature. As God is infinitely good in himself, so whatever he doth is suitable to this nature of his; but the particular determinations of the acts of God's beneficence belong to the will of God, as he is a most free and independent agent; so that goodness, as it imports the necessary rectitude of the Divine nature, implies a perfection inseparable from the true idea of God; but as it is taken for the expressions of Divine bounty to somewhat without, as the object of it, it is not implied in our conception of God, as to his nature, but belongs to the free determinations of his will. We cannot then, neither ought we, to determine any thing concerning the particular ways of God's bounty towards the whole universe, or any part of it, any farther than God himself hath declared it to us. Now we see the world exists; we have cause to adore that goodness of God, which not only gave a being to the universe, but continually upholds it, and plentifully provides for the creatures which he hath made in it: which the Heathen was so sensible of, that the Stoic in Tully, taking notice of the Cicero de abundant provision which is made in the world, not only Nat. Deor. for man's necessity, but for delight and ornament, cries out, Ut interdum pronoa nostra Epicurea esse videatur; God's providence doth abundantly exceed man's necessity. We see then from this discourse how unsafe and unsatisfactory (that I may not say bold and presumptuous) those arguments are, which are drawn from a general consideration of the Divine nature and goodness, without regard

BOOK had to the determinations of his will, as to the existence III. of things in the world. It cannot certainly then be an argument of any great force with any candid enquirers after truth and reason, which hath been lately pleaded in the behalf of that Pythagorean hypothesis of the preexistence of souls, viz. that if it be good for men's souls to be at all, the sooner they are, the better; but we are most certain that the wisdom and goodness of God will do that which is best; and therefore if they can enjoy themselves before they come into those terrestrial bodies, (it being better for them to enjoy themselves than not,) they must be before they come into these bodies. Wherefore the preexistence of souls is a necessary result of the wisdom and goodness of God, who can no more fail to do that which is best, than he can to understand it. I now seriously enquire of such who love reason above Plato and Pythagoras, whether, if the eternity of the world were put into the argument instead of the preexistence of souls, this argument would not hold as strongly for that as it doth for preexistence? and if I am bound to believe preexistence on this ground, I be not likewise bound to believe at least the souls of men eternal, if not the universe? But how reconcileable the eternity of the world is to the Pythagoric cabala of the creation, I am yet to understand. But if this argument doth not at all infer the eternity of the world, as we have shewed it doth not, much less doth it preexistence of souls.

VIII.

Volkelius de Vera Rel. l. ii.

c. 4..

We have thus far considered the first hypothesis, which is repugnant to Moses, concerning the origin of the universe, which is that which asserts the eternity of the world as it is; we come now to the second, which attributes the formation of the world, as it is, to God, as the efficient cause; but attributes eternity to the matter out of which the world was framed. I am not ignorant that some, who would be taken for the masters of reason, are so far from conceiving this hypothesis to be repugnant to, the text of Moses, that they conceive it to be the genuine sense of it, viz. that there was a preexistent matter, out of which God formed the world. But I would willingly. understand how Moses would have expressed that matter itself was created, supposing it had been his intention to have spoken it for although the word may not of itself imply necessarily the production of things out of nothing, i. e. out of no preexistent matter, yet it is acknowledged by all, that no word used by the Jews is more proper to that than 7 is; and P. Fagius cites it