to Publick Juftice. And this I fhall do Diftinctly according to the Method of my former Pofitions, fhewing what Arguments for Integrity do Naturally arife from the Confideration of Each of them.

I. The Doctrine of the Firft Pofition was this; That the Magiftrate in Judgment fuftains the Perfon of God, and acts for Him. Now this Confideration is of a Reasonable Force to keep the Magistrate Just and Upright in his Determi. nations; and no other but this.

For let the Magistrate suppose himself to fuftain any other Person, or to act by or for any other whatsoever, but only God, he fhall find himself immediately faln under the power of such Reasons as will pervert him from being Juft; because there is no Perfon in the World, but God alone, whose Ends may not Jometimes be better ferved by Injustice: God's Ends are always ferved by Juftice, and no bodies always fo, but His.

And

And hence Springs the Great Difficulty of being Juft, and the neceffity of that Caution, which we find fo frequently inculcated to Magiftrates in the Holy Scripture, viz. That they fhould be Strong, Couragious, very Couragious: Because it is but Needful that He whofe Duty will not permit him to Oblige in what is Unjust, fhould arm himself against the possible Malevolence of Many, who will account themselves Difoblig'd by the Direct Iflues of Justice. He therefore that will be Juft, muft harden himself against all the Impreffions of Intereft; though in that he may seem Imprudent; against all the Impreffions of Affection, though in that he may seem Ill-natured; against all the Impreffions of Benefits, though in that he may seem Ingrateful; nay, against all the Impreffions of Vulgar Piety, though in that he feem Hardhearted: He muft render himself difengaged from all the World, and from Himself above all; Because Self is un

doubtedly

doubtedly the greatest Byass to Humane Prevarication.

But these (in the mean time) are Difficulties, which I think no other Confideration can enable a Man to furmount, but only the Respect of God, and the Confcience of doing that service which God himself doth both Require and Reward.

I know indeed that to be Juft is in it felf a very glorious thing, without any farther Religious Profpect: And therefore there are fome Spirits (naturally Generous) which though it fhall happen that they have not much of Religion, will yet def pife all the Temptations of Intereft, and be Just for the very Glory of being fo: But then we must observe that Glory it self is another Byass, and can draw men from their Integrity, as well as any other Paffion; and fo it fometimes happens that a Man, that could not have been bribed with Gold, will yet be bribed with Air, that is, the Affectation of a Popular Fame. An Inftance of this kind is intended in

that

that Precept, Ex. 23.3. where 'tis said, Thou shalt not countenance a poor man in his caufe: Intimating, that when a Poor Man has a Bad Cause, though there can be no Other Temptation, yet there may be that of Vainglory, to be Unjust Because a Sentence given in behalf of a Poor Man is fo Popular and Specious, that though it should be Unjuft, yet it may gain a Man the Reputation of a more Impartial Juftice. And indeed when a Man comes to affect Glory from any thing, though from Vertue it felf, he is faln into the Temptation of preferring the Glory above the Vertue; and fo of Leaving the Vertue for the Glory's fake, if at any time they shall happen to be Divided. So Important a Reason there is for that Precept of the Apostle, Let him that glorieth, glory in the Lord: To which let me fubjoin; Let him that will be just, be just for the Lord; Because it is impoffible for any one to be accurately Just for any other Profpect.

II. The

II. The fecond Pofition was this, That the Matter of Judgment is God's Caufe: And this Confideration is very forcible to engage all Others to bring in their Respective due Affiftances to Publick Juftice.

'Tis a Notion to be met with more than once among the Heathen Moralifts, that A Good Man is a Perpetual Magiftrate; and that, though he be not made fo by the Governing Power, he is made fo by Nature; that is, A Good Man cannot but be a Friend and a Patron to the Laws; His Love to Vertue and the Publick Good will not fuffer him to be unconcern'd, when he fees them broken and contemned. And if it be fo with a Good Man; I am fure it cannot be otherwise with a Good Chriftian: It is impoffible that fuch a one should fee and bear with Indifference, that the Concerns of Truth, the Offices of Morality and Religion (which I say are the general Matters of the Law) those Duties wherein God's Ho

nour,