the store house, and his experience of these makes up the sum of his knowledge, but these are all of a spiritual nature, and yet people are always talking of material things, when, according to the supposition acknowledged as fact, no one could know of anything else but ideas and sensations, and no one has any reason to conclude that there is anything else in nature besides the little gentleman the mind, and his pictures, the ideas and sensations, and things resembling them; but these are no more matter than motion is matter; so that human beings have no knowledge of any such thing as matter, and have no right to think that there is anything of the kind. Now granting this supposition, that thoughts and feelings are not perceptions of, but produce perceptions in a being which can perceive nothing but thoughts, sensations, or feelings; of course the conclusion of Berkeley was irrefutable; what could such a being know of matter other than the idea or sensation of matter? but the idea no more resembled matter than it resembled motion, or than a thought resembles a horse, or light a piece of stone. Excitements, motions and substances have no resemblance to one another, and cannot be types of one another. The distinction between the "Mental Philosophers" and myself is this; I say, that when I look at an object it acts on my eyes, depicts itself on the retina by the agency of light, and excites a perception or knowledge of itself in my brain, afterwards this kind of thought or perception, called memory of the object, may come into excitement; they say that the object acts on my eyes, and produces sensations and ideas, and that these are the objects perceived by the being they call mind; now I maintain, with Bishop Berkeley, that if this mind of theirs, have perception of nothing but sensations and ideas, there can, on their theory, be no perception of the material creation, and the notion of such things as hills, valleys, houses, trees, &c., is (if the theory be true) merely a vulgar error. The fact is, that they have considered knowledge and perception as objects which produce knowledge and perception, and hence nothing could, on their theory, be known or perceived but knowledge and perception; so that the material universe has been given up by all who are consistent in the ideal speculation, which involves the error that what is in fact perception, is the object perceived. Dr. Reid had no notion of giving up his "Human Mind," and he felt almost equally averse to giving up the material universe, he was much puzzled by the Berkeleyan difficulty, but concluded, at last, that he must believe in both mind and matter, because he could not help doing so, a very correct conclusion perhaps in reference to himself, but by no means generally true. Neither I, nor any one else, is conscious of the existence of any such principle as Dr. Reid called "mind", and any one who is a holder of such a notion is exceedingly inconsistent in acknowledging the existence of matter. Some very stupid people will exclaim that there must be something to perceive the knowledge or perception, and hence the necessity for supposing a distinct being. To this I answer, that this being, to perceive knowledge, must have but the perception of knowledge, or perception excited in it, and if in the first instance it were necessary to assume a being to perceive perception, it is equally so in the second instance; the reason advanced, for assuming the existence of the first mind, can also be advanced with respect to a second, but this second requires something to perceive its perceptions, and so we may go on assuming minds to infinity, all the infinity of assumptions being based on the same notion that the first was, namely, that there must be something to perceive perception, or, in other words, know knowledge. The assertion that the faculties of the consciousness belong not to it, but to something else, is just as impertinent as to say that the powers of radiating light, burning the finger, consuming oxygen, &c., &c., do not belong to fire, but to something else totally distinct from it, or to say that the various abilities of anything do not belong to the thing in which we are conscious they exist, but in something else. The facts respecting the nature of consciousness, are few and simple; but those, who have written on the "mind," endeavouring to discover the nature of a being that had no existence, and thus getting away from science and reality, into regions of vacuity, have produced "huge volumes," "ponderous tomes" of the most unmeaning and sleepy verbiage that has perhaps ever been composed.* Out of all this mass of words, all that appears to me of importance, are the facts collected by Hume and Browne, relative to what the former calls association, and the latter suggestion; these may be detailed sufficiently diffusely in a few pages. If those who have written so much on 66 Mental Philosophy" had been devoted to the accumulation of facts for а "Science of Consciousness," much benefit would have resulted in all the relationships of society; it is now high time that reality took the place of vague specu lation. Though the expressions of the "Mental Philosophers" respecting "painting" and "impressing" the mind are in general use among those who have read, and are led by their speculations, and though the popular press diffuses the expressions among the people, still it will be found that the ancient and legitimate meaning of mind is consciousness, and not a permanent principle, on which things are printed, impressed, painted, or engraved; as the following quotations shew. "Sudden mind arose In Adam, not to let the occasion pass Given him by this great conference to know Of things above this world."-MILTON. "I am a very foolish fond old man, I fear I am not in my perfect mind"-SHAKESPEAR. "Not in my perfect mind" evidently means not in possession of a correct consciousness. "His mournful plight is swallowed up unwares, SPENCER'S FAERIE QUEENE. "I will have nothing else but only this, And now methinks I have a mind to it"-SHAKESPEAR. * Vide Reid, Kant, Dugald Stewart, &c.. "Cursed Athens, mindless of thy worth"-SHAKESPEAR. "As the strong eagle in the silent wood, Mindless of war-like rage and hostile care, Plays round the rocky cliff, or crystal flood"-PRIOR. In the last four of these quotations the disposition of the consciousness is referred to. Such phrases as "put him in mind", "mind him of it," "mind your business," "be mindful," "if you have a mind,” “quiet minded," "noble minded," are commonly used in reference to the thoughts and feelings, or consciousness; and people so far from ordinarily thinking mind a permanent thing on which "impressions" and "prints" are made, often say, "We have a different mind now to what we had then." We hear individuals express themselves thus; "My mind is not the same as it was," "My mind has changed," " "I minded him of it," "I have not a mind to do it," "I shall make you have a mind to do it,” “It minded me." Here mind is used as synonimous with notions or feelings, and is considered as a changeful series of distinct excitements, and not a permanent "painted" thing, or a block, on which impressions are stamped. Thus the ordinary and legitimate meaning of the term mind is consciousness, or thought and feeling; but the syllogistic reasoners define it to be that which thinks and feels, and thus give a new meaning to a term, and make it, from signifying a series of excitements, with which all are acquainted, to represent a nonentity with which no one can be acquainted, and to clothe this nonentity, and give it the semblance of existence, they have robbed the consciousness, or real mind of its powers, and vested them in this thing of their fancy; hence has emanated the confusion, contradiction, and perplexity of their systems. The meaning of the term spirit is analogous to mind, being in general use to signify our excitements of thought and feeling. A spirited man means a man of bold energetic impulses or feelings, and a spiritless one, the contrary. "Mean spirited," "high spirited," "low spirited," good spirits," "bad spirits," "low spirits," "a great flow of spirits," a bad flow of spirits," are phrases in common 99 66 99.66 99 66 use expressive of the states of our consciousness, and in giving the character of a person, we say a gentle spirit," a rough spirit," &c. Soul is another word, used to signify knowledge and feeling, as for instance we say a person of " no soul," a "mean soul," a "merry soul," a "good soul" &c., in reference to the excitements of consciousness. In explanation of the various phenomena of mind, spirit, soul, or consciousness, a science, as it is said to be by its advocates, called "Phrenology," has latterly obtained considerable popularity; the fact of its doing so, is a demonstration of the ignorance of the people, and of the irrationalness of the system that makes them thus ignorant. That the brain is the seat of knowledge has been admitted in all times, and that what we call a high forehead and well-shaped head, is more indicative of knowledge than a low forehead and ill-shaped head, is an assertion that has always been admitted as a general principle liable to much exception. Now all that the phrenologists have added to this is decidedly untrue, as can be easily explained, and this is all that belongs to them. First, then, they assert the existence of 35 organs, or pairs of organs, in the brain. Now this is an anatomical assertion, and, before it be admitted as a fact, it of course must be demonstrated, as all other anatomical facts are; that is, by dissecting the parts, and shewing the organs. Merely saying the brain is a compound organ, does not prove the existence of these 35 organs, any more than proving a muscle to be compounded of a multitude of tissues, bound in a cellular substance, proves the existence of 35 distinct muscles in the muscle. An organ means a distinct instrument for the performance of a certain function. Now the organs described by phrenologists are sizeable instruments, and no microscopic power would be needed for their detection, if such were in the brain; but no anatomist has ever seen any thing of the kind, however minute their dissections have been; and hence the assumption assumes the character of a mere dogma, instead of a scientific truth. U |