They began to make settlements upon the coast of Spain, in thofe ports where they unloaded their goods. The eafe with which they had founded these settlements, and the conveniences they met with, infpired them with the defign of conquering thofe vaft regions; and fome time after, Nova Carthago, or New Carthage, gave the Carthaginians an empire in that country, almost equal to that they enjoyed in Africa.

SECT. V. The Mines of Spain, fecond Source of the Riches and Power of Carthage.

h

"D'vermines, found by the Carthaginians in Spain,

IODORUS juftly remarks, that the gold and fil

were an inexhauftible fund of wealth, that enabled them to fuftain fuch long wars against the Romans. The natives had long been ignorant of thefe treasures (at least of their use and value) which lay concealed in the bowels of the earth. The Phoenicians first made the difcovery; and, by bartering fome wares of little value for this precious metal, which the natives fuffered them to dig up, they amaffed infinite wealth. The Carthaginians improved, from their example, when they conquered that country; as did the Romans afterwards, when they had difpoffeffed the latter of it.

The labour employed to come at these mines, and to dig the gold and filver out of them, was incredible, for the veins of these metals rarely appeared on the fuperficies: they were to be fought for, and traced through frightful depths, where very often floods of water ftopped the miners, and feemed to defeat all future pursuits. But avarice is as patient in undergoing fatigues, as ingenious in finding expedients. By pumps, which Archimedes had invented when in Egypt, the Romans afterwards threw up the water out of thefe kind of pits, and quite drained them. Numberlefs multitudes of flaves perifhed in these mines, which were dug to enrich their mafters, who treated them with the utmost barbai Ibid.

h Lib. iv. p. 312, &c.

k

gave

rity, forced them by heavy stripes to labour, and them no respite either day or night. Polybius, as quoted by Strabo, fays, that in his time, upwards of forty thousand men were employed in the mines near Nova Carthago; and furnished the Romans every day with twenty-five thousand drachmas, or eight hundred fifty-nine pounds, feven fhillings, and fixpence*.

We must not be surprised to fee the Carthaginians, foon after the greatest defeats, fending fresh and numerous armies again into the field; fitting out mighty fleets, and fupporting, at a great expence, for many years, wars carried on by them in far-diftant countries. But it muft furprise us, to hear of the Romans doing the fame; they whofe revenues were very inconfiderable before thofe great conquefts, which fubjected to them the most powerful nations; and who had no refources, either from trade, to which they were abfolute ftrangers; or from gold or filver mines, which were very rarely found in Italy, in case there were any; and confequently, the expences of which muft have fwallowed up all the profit. The Romans, in the frugal and fimple life they led, in their zeal for the public welfare, and their love for their country, poffeffed funds which were not lefs ready or fecure than thofe of Carthage, but at the fame time were far more honourable.

SECT. VI. War.

CAR Ane time a warlike republic. Its genius and the nature of its governments led it to traffic; and the neceffity the Carthaginians were under, firft of defending their fubjects against the neighbouring nations, and afterwards a defire of extending their commerce and empire, led them to war. This double idea gives us, in my opinion, the true plan and character of the

ARTHAGE must be confidered as a trading, and

* Lib. iii. p. 147.

25,000 drachmas-An Attic drachma, according to Dr. Bernard -8d. English money, confequently 25,000-8591. 75, 6d.

Carthaginian

Carthaginian republic. We have already spoken of its

commerce.

The military power of the Carthaginians confifted in their alliances with kings; in tributary nations, from which they drew both men and money; in fome troops raised from among their own citizens; and in mercenary foldiers purchased of neighbouring states, without their being obliged to levy or exercise them, because they were already well difciplined and inured to the fatigues of war; they making choice, in every country, of fuch foldiers as had the greatest merit and reputation. They drew from Numidia, a nimble, bold, impetuous, and indefatigable cavalry, which formed the principal ftrength of their armies; from the Balearian ifles, the moft expert flingers in the world; from Spain, a ftout and invincible infantry; from the coast of Genoa and Gaul, troops of known valour; and from Greece itself, foldiers fit for all the various operations of war, for the field or the garrifon, for besieging or defending cities.

In this manner the Carthaginians fent out at once powerful armies, compofed of foldiers which were the flower of all the armies in the universe, without depopulating either their fields or cities by new levies; without fufpending their manufactures, or difturbing the peaceable artificer, without interrupting their commerce, or weakening their navy. By venai blood they poffeffed themselves of provinces and kingdoms! and made other nations the inftruments of their grandeur and glory, with no other expence of their own, but their money; and even this furnifhed from the traffic they carried on with foreign nations.

If the Carthaginians, in the courfe of a war, sustained fome loffes, thefe were but as fo many foreign accidents, which only grazed, as it were, over the body of the ftate, but did not make a deep wound in the bowels or heart of the republic. These loffes were speedily repaired, by fums arifing out of a flourishing commerce, as from a perpetual finew of war, by which the government was furnished with new supplies for the pur

1

chafe

chafe of mercenary forces, who were ready at the first fummons. And, from the vast extent of the coafls which the Carthaginians poffeffed, it was eafy for them to levy, in a very little time, a fufficient number of failors and rowers for the working of their fleets, and to procure able pilots and experienced captains to conduct them.

But as these parts were fortuitoufly brought together, they did not adhere by any natural, intimate, or neceffary tie. No common and reciprocal intereft united them in fuch a manner, fo as to form a folid and unalterable body. Not one individual in thefe mercenary armies wifhed fincerely the profperity of the ftate. They did not act with the fame zeal, nor expofe themfelves to dangers with equal refolution, for a republic which they confidered as foreign, and which confe quently was indifferent to them, as they would have done for their native country, whofe happinefs conftitutes that of the feveral members who compofe it.

In great reverfes of fortune, the kings in alliance with the Carthaginians might eafily be detached from their intereft, either by a jealoufy which the grandeur of a more powerful neighbour naturally gives; or from the hopes of reaping greater advantages from a new friend; or from the fear of being involved in the miffortunes of an old ally.

The tributary nations, being impatient under the weight and difgrace of a yoke which had been forced upon their necks, greatly flattered themselves with the hopes of finding one lefs galling in changing their mafters; or, in cafe fervitude was unavoidable, the choice was indifferent to them, as will appear from many inftances in the course of this hiftory.

The mercenary forces, accuftomed to meafure their fidelity by the largeness or continuance of their pay, were ever ready, on the leaft difcontent, or the flighteft expectation of a more confiderable flipend, to defert to the enemy with whom they had juft before fought, As Syphax and Mafiniffa

VOL. I.

and

and to turn their arms against those who had invited them to their assistance.

Thus the grandeur of the Carthaginians, being fuftained only by these foreign supports, was fhaken to the very foundation when they were once taken away. And if to this there happened to be added an interruption of their commerce (by which only they fubfifted) arifing from the lofs of a naval engagement, they imagined themselves to be on the brink of ruin, and abandoned themselves to defpondency and defpair, as was evidently feen at the end of the firft Punic war.

Ariftotle, in the treatife where he fhows the advantages and defects of the government of Carthage, finds no fault with its keeping up none but foreign forces; it is therefore probable, that the Carthaginians did not fall into this practice till a long time after. But the rebellions which haraffed Carthage in its later years, ought to have taught its citizens, that no miferies are comparable to thofe of a government which is fupported only by foreigners; fince neither zeal, fecurity, nor obedience can be expected from them.

But this was not the cafe with the republic of Rome. As the Romans had neither trade nor money, they were not able to hire forces, in order to push on their conquefts with the fame rapidity as the Carthaginians; but then, as they procured every thing from within themfelves; and all the parts of the fate were intimately united; they had furer resources in great misfortunes than the Carthaginians. And for this reafon they never once thought of fuing for peace after the battle of Cannæ, as the Carthaginians had done in a lefs imminent danger. The Carthaginians had befides a body of troops (which was not very numerous) levied from among their own citizens; and this was a kind of fchool, in which the flower of their nobility, and those whofe talents and ambition prompted them to afpire to the first dignities, learned the rudiments of the art of war. From among thefe were selected all the general officers, who were put at the head of the different bodies of their forces, and had the chief command in the armies. This nation