We have read, or heard it said, that the excellent Chancellor d'Aguesseau conceived a project, for the gratuitous administration of justice to the poor. It would be a well spent hour which a man should employ in turning over the nine quarto volumes of his works, in search of the essay in which this project is set forth. We remember once to have made this search unsuccessfully; another may be more fortunate, and, at any rate, as was said by Fox to Wakefield, advising him to search the Odyssey for a passage, in which the note of the nightingale is described as cheerful, "if you do not find what you seek for, you will at all events find something good."

We do not perceive why the kind hearted Chancellor should have limited his benevolence to the poor. Justice is not a thing which all who can pay for it ought to buy, and which is to be given to the poor as an alms, only because they can afford no equivalent. On the contrary, it is the right of all men. The expense of distributing it is a fair charge on the public as a portion of the general cost of maintaining the government. But no man ought individually to be obliged to pay his money to be protected in the rights, which the laws give him, any more than he ought individually to pay a consideration to the legislators, who enact those laws.

It is computed that there are, in the United States of America, about twelve thousand lawyers. In the large cities, a few of these acquire great fortunes from their profession; several receive a very handsonie support; many live comfortably; and as the number of the profession are constantly increasing, all must be presumed to be able to get a livelihood out of the community :-otherwise, the num bers of the profession would diminish.

Now we suppose a family cannot be supported, without manual labor, by a monied income, and in the manner in which professional

men usually live, under five hundred dollars per annum. We assume therefore that each lawyer, on an average, receives from the community five hundred dollars per annum. We are aware that many never see the color of half this sum; but on the contrary no lawyer is thought to do well who does not receive more than this sum; and as less will not support a family, and the profession, on the whole, is supported and is increasing, it follows that each lawyer must, on an average, receive thus much.

Twelve thousand lawyers at five hundred dollars each, make six millions of dollars per annum. The people of the United States then, in addition to the salaries of the Federal and State Judges of all ranks, in addition to the salaries of clerks, marshalls, sheriffs, and all other judicial officers, in addition to the cost of court-houses and prisons, juries, and the other expenses incidental to the administration of justice, pay annually six millions of dollars to their lawyers. This is equal to one half of the expenses of the federal government, exclusive of the interest of the debt; that is, the people of the United States, in addition to the whole expense of the judicial establishment, pay to their lawyers a sum equal to one half of the expense of carrying on the government at home and abroad, paying the army and navy, of the fortifications, of the Indian department, and of every other public establishment and institution.

But this great sum is not distributed equally over the people; it is paid by those who are suitors in the courts of justice. It is the price which those who require the interposition of the courts to protect them in their rights, pay to the lawyers in order to obtain that interposition. How numerous are these suitors? This it is not very easy to calculate. A large majority of the community never go to court. A man who should have half a dozen lawsuits in the course of his life, would be thought litigious or unfortunate. We think, then, it would not be extravagant to calculate, that not more than one in fifty of the whole population, or one in twelve of the heads of families, has one lawsuit per annum. The proportion is probably much less, but take it at one in fifty. This will give two hundred and forty thousand suitors annually in the courts of justice, And these two hundred and forty thousand persons pay six millions of dollars to have justice done them. This is in addition to their share of the expense of the judicial establishments of the general and state governments, which they bear, of course, in common with their fellow citizens. It averages twenty-five dollars per annum to every citizen who chooses or is compelled to go to court, to be secure in the enjoyment of his rights. In other words, those who want justice done them must pay twenty-five dollars each to the lawyer annually. Those whose neighbors aim to do them an injustice must pay twenty-five dollars each to be protected against these

injurious attempts. Or if a matter of a nature to be settled in the courts of law be doubtful between man and man, they must pay twenty-five dollars each to have it settled. If the whole population of this country, taken at twelve millions, were taxed, in proportion as suitors for justice are taxed to pay lawyers, they would pay annually a sum of three hundred millions of dollars, which is equal to sixty millions of pounds sterling, the whole expense of the English government for the interest of the national debt, and all its other purposes.

The suitors for justice, therefore, in the United States, besides paying their share of all the public burdens, are taxed for justice in proportion as much as the whole English people are for all the public expenses of the British government; that is, the annual sums paid by suitors for justice, if paid by each citizen of the United States, would amount to an aggregate equalling the whole expense of the British government. But the population of Great Britain is about twice as great as that of the United States; consequently, each inhabitant of Great Britain pays for the ordinary expenses of government and the interest of the debt a tax about half as great as that paid by each suitor for justice in the United States. Taking the public debt of the United States at fifty millions, the suitors for justice pay annually to the lawyers a sum which, if levied on each inhabitant, would pay off the whole debt of the country in two months, or pay it six times over in one year. If Congress, therefore, were to pass a law laying a tax sufficient to pay the whole debt, principal and interest, in two months from the time the law went into effect, they would not lay a greater burden on each individual than is laid on the suitors for justice to pay the fees of the lawyers. The entire public debt of the Revolution was about fifty millions of dollars. The suitors for justice in this country pay a tax which, if paid by the whole people, would have wiped off that debt in two months.

NULLI VENDEMUS, nulli negabimus aut differemus, JUSTITITIAM, vel rectum. WE WILL SELL JUSTICE TO NO MAN. Thus saith Magna Charta, confirmed, as my Lord Coke assures us, "by thirty-two several acts of Parliament in all." It seems, however, that the people of this country do buy that justice which is to be sold to no one, and pay for it at a price, per suitor, equal to the whole taxation paid per man in that most taxed of all countries, Great Britain.

If any one think we have put the number of lawyers too high by one half, (although there are more than twice as many in Boston as our average would give,) let him make the allowance, and then the price paid by the suitor for justice will be in proportion equal to half the burden of English taxation. If any one think that instead of allowing a lawyer five hundred dollars per annum, we ought to

allow two hundred and fifty dollars only, although this sum is surely too small to represent the entire livelihood of an individual member of the leading profession, being the head of a family, let him make the same deduction. Let him make it also, if he thinks we have put the number of suitors twice too small; although we have assumed about one suitor to every twelve families. Let him make all these deductions at once, and obtain a result amounting to only oneeighth of what we have calculated, and he would get a rate of taxation on the suitors which, if assessed on each individual in the United States, would pay the national debt, supposing it to be fifty millions, in sixteen months.

Justice, therefore, in this country is bought, and paid dearly for; not by the mass in the way of supporting the judicial establishments, but by the individual suitors for justice, in their own particular cases.

But justice is a thing which must be had. The administration of private justice is that part of government which, next to the preservation of public peace and independence, goes most home to the business and bosoms of the people. They must therefore have it, at all events; and if it cannot be had without paying dearly for it, it must be paid dearly for.

But let us consider whether the expense of which we have spoken is necessary, and whether justice could not be administered without it. If we were in possession of Chancellor d'Aguesseau's plan for the gratuitous distribution of justice to the poor, we should probably find some hints toward a general plan for a gratuitous distribution of justice. In order to conceive a plan for the gratuitous administration of justice, we must consider for a moment the mode in which the present expense is incurred. Men who have important suits at law are in the practice of retaining, on either side, one or more of the ablest counsel, who are paid according to their reputation, the magnitude of the case, and the time and labor required to carry it through the courts. We shall confine our remarks, at present, to important and expensive cases, because they best illustrate the principle, and because what is true of them holds proportionally of minor causes. Now the services rendered by the counsel on both sides are not a joint effort, by which they endeavor unitedly to unravel the facts and settle the law of the case, and thus present both to the greatest advantage to the court and the jury. Were this the duty of counsel, as at present employed, and were the sums now paid them no more than the necessary compensation for such services, we should admit at once that, however great and oppressive the tax, it must be paid.

Still it is no part of our idea, in order to the gratuitous or cheaper administration of justice, that the court, or even the court and jury should, without the aid of counsel, undertake to decide doubtful

points of fact and law; on the contrary, we admit that men of the first rate ability should be employed to prepare important cases for the court and jury, and to conduct the trial of them, and that they ought to be paid for it. But the difficulty is here. On the present system, the administration of justice is controversial. The counsel on either side operates ex parte. The lawyer aims not simply to elicit truth, but to gain his cause. He endeavors, by exerting all the powers of his mind, and applying all the stores of his learning, not to arrive at the right of the cause, but to bring off his client triumphantly. If the law is clear against him, he endeavors to draw a nice distinction. If the facts are clear against him, he endeavors to weaken their force. Where there is no doubt, either as to law or fact, he endeavors to take advantage of some technical informality in the proceedings, and this he can often do with success. The more ingeniously and more skilfully he can do all this, the more faithfully he is thought to do his duty. Now, the most that can be said in favor of such a course is, that these efforts of counsel aid the court and jury in discerning the truth, that is, on one side. All the light and assistance derived from counsel on one side, must be counterbalanced by the doubts excited on the other. The cause cannot be decided for both. It must be given for plaintiff or defendant. If the argument of the counsel for the plaintiff has been of great aid in leading the court and the jury to the opinion that the cause ought to be decided in favor of plaintiff, the argument of the counsel for the defendant, supposing him to be equally skilful, (and such in the general he will be,) must have the direct contrary effect.

It cannot promote the discovery of truth, that a man of first rate talent and learning should spend four hours in endeavoring to weaken its evidence and obscure its light. But it will be said, that when counsel, equally able, has spent four hours more on the opposite side, the evidence of the truth will be re-established, and its force felt. Granted; but what have the counsel done? One has built up a wall, and the other has come and pulled it down. Why does a man of common sense go to a lawyer to plead his cause? Does he distrust his own power to tell his own tale? No; because after all, the lawyer himself must get his information from his client as to the facts, which the client could tell directly to the court, as well as to the lawyer. Does he go the lawyer to get the law of the case explained to the court? No, because the court already knows the law as well as the counsel. Does he go to a lawyer because he is afraid to trust his cause with the court unargued? No. We venture to say, there is not a suitor of good sense in any country, where there is a respectable court, who would not be willing to go and tell his own story to the judge, and let the opposite party do the same, and leave the court and jury to settle it.