not so. This ought never to be forgotten. When the rays of light strike upon the eye, they produce a certain change in the expansion of the optic nerve, called the retina, which is immediately and instantly followed by a change in the mind. We are then said So when the air is

to see, and sight is a sensation. put in motion by some material body, and the vibrations of the atmosphere, at last, reach the ear, they make an impression on the auditory nerve, and hearing is the instant consequence. The same holds true of what has sometimes been called internal sensation, arising from some change in the inward parts of the frame. A certain change in the state of the stomach and throat creates hunger and thirst, and the various and obscure changes which occur in disease, produce sensations of a very unpleasant nature. Perfect health, on the contrary, produces a permanently agreeable sensation, though not of a very lively character.

The inward phenomena are separated from sensation by this well-marked distinction, that they are always preceded immediately not by a change in the body, but by some change in the mind, whether a sensation or another inward phenomenon. They are of two sorts, according as they do or do not necessarily involve pleasure or pain, happiness or misery. By the late Dr. Brown of Edinburgh the latter of these were called the intellectual states of mind; but as this phrase is somewhat long for ordinary use, I shall employ the common word Thoughts to express what is here meant. The Emotions constitute the second class of inward phenomena. Thoughts differ from

emotions in this, that they are in themselves neutral as respects sensibility, though they may, and constantly do give rise to pleasurable and painful, exciting and lowering feelings. But these feelings can always be distinguished from the thoughts from which they sprang, and they are properly known by the term emotions, the most comprehensive that our language affords to express those states of mind other than sensations which delight or grieve, rouse or depress, agitate inwardly, and impel us to outward actions. To attempt to explain them any more in words, would be useless, for he who knows them not by feeling never can by description.

Thoughts are of two kinds, simple and relative, or Conceptions and Relations. When I think of a single tree, I have a conception of it; but when I consider two trees together, and am sensible that one is thicker than the other, I am impressed with a relation between them, which in this case is one of comparison. This may be enough for our present purpose; for to pursue the subject further, belongs to a work on metaphysics.

From the above it follows that happiness or misery, pleasure or pain, consists in sensation and emotion, and in these alone. However small, or however great, however fleeting, or however durable pleasures or pains may be, they must all be classed under one or other of these general heads. Here then already we see a little order breaking through the apparent chaos of the human mind.

Paley indeed has maintained the singular opinion that happiness consists not at all in sensation. Such

an opinion, if broached by the spiritual Malebranche, would have surprised us less; but coming from an author who has gone so far as to say that he knows no difference between pleasures, except in their continuance and intensity, and that the refined, the delicate, and the gross, are otherwise quite on a par; it must strike us as very extraordinary. Even the words in which he expresses his views are utterly contradictory. Happiness," he says, "does not consist in the pleasures of sense, in whatever profusion or variety they be enjoyed." Here it is allowed that there are pleasures of sense, and if so, they must form a part of happiness. Depreciate, vilify, and revile them as much as you please, still you must allow them to be something, and something always bears an infinite proportion to nothing. But the opinion will appear still more unaccountable when we reflect, that Paley comprehends under the pleasures of sense not only sensations properly so called, but various more refined pleasures, as "music, painting, architecture, gardening, splendid shows, theatric exhibitions; and the pleasures lastly of active sports, as of hunting, shooting, fishing," &c. Here is a sweeping deduction, indeed, from the elements of human happiness. It is unnecessary to enter upon the arguments by which he attempts to support his views, for even if correct, they prove not that the above pleasures are worthless, but only that they are inferior to others. That this is the case of most of them I shall not pretend to dispute. He says that they continue but a little while at a time; still they do continue some time, and this is enough for our

present purpose. Nor is it true of all of them, that they are so short-lived, not even of sensations, in the strict sense of the word. That general feeling of enjoyment which arises directly from a sound state of body, the sensation of comfort produced by fine weather, or by a good fire, are of a very durable nature. Much of the pleasure of indolent and uneducated people in southern countries arises merely from the bodily luxury produced by a fine climate. And however much we may pity those persons, who from dulness of mind, whether natural or acquired, have little or no relish for any thing beyond a good dinner and a bottle of wine, still, as they do enjoy them, we surely would not wish to deprive them of all they have. "Laying aside the preparation and the expectation, and computing strictly the actual sensation, we shall be surprised to find how inconsiderable a portion of our time they occupy, how few hours in the four-and-twenty they are able to fill up." But if they do create preparation and expectation, or in other words, a flow of thought and emotion, they do a great deal, however insignificant the end may be. Of those who are neither young, nor have any fixed employment, not a few, I believe, spend a good part of the forenoon in planning the feast, and expecting the hour of dinner, and thus the mind is amused and the demon ennui put to flight. Besides, the objection of Paley applies not to sensations only, but to many other enjoyments which, in themselves but transitory, are valuable as objects of pursuit.

As to the other pleasures above enumerated, especially field sports, these have a very great influence

on the happiness of certain classes of men, and are so far from fleeting, that they occupy no small part of life, and are pursued with eagerness even to old age. How many country gentlemen are kept in good health and spirits by the activity mental and bodily to which they give rise!

To complete the inconsistency of Paley, he finishes by saying, that "these pleasures, after all, have their value; and as the young are always too eager in the pursuit of them, the old are sometimes too remiss, that is, too studious of their ease to be at the pains for them which they really deserve." After this we need say no more, only we may observe that the rest of the chapter is valuable, though the author, as he is wont, contents himself with a broad common sense view of the question, and makes no attempt at deep or subtle investigation.3

Having thus established the point that sensation must always be considered as an element of human happiness, it must nevertheless be allowed, that by far the greater part is included in the class of emotions. It belongs not to a work of this sort to examine these in detail. They form one principal branch of metaphysics, or the philosophy of the human mind, which undertakes to analyse, to classify them, and to trace the general causes in which they originate. Every science has some point where it joins on to other and contiguous sciences. Thus sensation marks the line where physiology and mental philosophy meet, for

3 See Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy. Ch. ou Happiness.

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