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CHAPTER II.

ON THE NATURE OF THE MORAL SENTIMENTS.

OWEVER great may be the scepticism of some

men on all subjects, or on that of morals in particular, it is impossible to deny the existence of certain sentiments of approbation and disapprobation, considered merely as mental phenomena, and without any reference to their causes or their consequences. Disputes may arise on the real nature of these sentiments, on their origin, and on their effects; but these very disputes suppose that there is something real at the bottom of the controversy. Some may assert that the sentiments are simple, unsusceptible of analysis, others that they are compound; those may maintain that they are original instincts, common to the human race and uniform in all men, like the feelings of hunger and thirst; these that they are gradually acquired by experience of the consequences of actions, or caught from others, and may be modified or totally changed by custom and education. Most men suppose that the sentiments in question are of the utmost importance to human life and happiness, while a few have endeavoured to prove that they are irrational and useless, a mere artifice of crafty politicians. But amidst all this diversity of opinions, the reality of such sentiments has not been called in question. Here then we can take our stand

on secure ground, and begin by enquiring what may be the true nature of these mental phenomena.

When certain actions and certain dispositions are presented to our view, we feel within us a sentiment of approbation; when other actions and dispositions are brought before us we are conscious of disapprobation. Now the question is, what is the nature of these sentiments?

There seem to be only three opinions which either have been or can be formed upon this subject. Some may suppose the above sentiments to be merely decisions of the Judgment as to the tendency of actions or dispositions; others may consider them simply as feelings or emotions no more connected with reason than the emotions of beauty or sublimity; while a third class may think that in such sentiments reason and feeling are united. In this as in all metaphysical questions, our ultimate reference must be made to the experience of what passes within us when we approve or disapprove the conduct of ourselves or others. Let us see then what says that experience. When we receive any benefit or token of kindness from another, we naturally feel an emotion of goodwill towards the individual; and when on the other hand we experience any injury or affront, we as readily swell with indignation. In these cases the existence of feeling whether of love or hatred cannot be disputed. But if the benefit or injury in no wise concern ourselves what will be our state of mind? When we hear for instance of some signal act of virtue, as of a man who at the hazard of his life leaps into the waves to save a drowning fellow creature, or

when we listen to a tale of cruelty and injustice, are we then totally unmoved? Is that good or ill feeling so ready to arise in our own case, now totally dead? Do we sit coldly by, and in saying that the one has acted well the other ill, do we feel no more emotion than when we pronounce such an one a good or bad mathematician, or when we call sugar wholesome and hemlock poisonous? Each man's experience will prove to him the contrary. Every one is conscious of some inward emotion on hearing of these opposite actions, and the words he uses and his tone of voice declare the same to the by-standers. When he applies to particular cases those terms of approbation or disapprobation with which all languages abound, he gives them a peculiar emphasis that marks the feeling within, and is readily understood by others. The emotion may not be so strong as when our own interests are at stake, but it is nevertheless real, and in some cases even intense, as when we execrate the memory of tyrants who have enslaved and preyed upon mankind. Where, we may ask, would be the interest of tragedies and all tragic stories, did we not long for the success of the good and sigh for the discomfiture of the wicked? or why should orators heap epithet upon epithet and exhaust all the energy of language in praising or blaming individuals, did they not hope to kindle a flame in the breasts of their attentive auditors? We may therefore rest assured, that emotion of some kind or other is at least a part of moral approbation or disapprobation, though it may not constitute the whole. Nor will it be difficult to discover the nature of that emo

tion. It seems to be exactly of the same kind as that which we experience when a benefit or injury is conferred upon ourselves, and is therefore some form of love or hatred, of good or ill-will. We cannot hear of any remarkable act of virtue or of vice without contemplating its author with some degree of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, and without at least a temporary wish of good or evil towards him. This then is one essential element of moral sentiment.

Already we perceive the radical error of those who consider moral sentiment as a mere decision of the judgment. But has judgment no part in this state of mind? Are those sentiments with which we look upon virtue and vice in all respects the same as the love or hatred we bear to our friends or foes? When we approve or condemn any one, do we mean nothing more than that we like or dislike him? Surely every person must perceive that there is a real difference in the cases, and though he may not quite know wherein it lies, he in general sees very well that moral approbation is not mere love, nor moral disapprobation mere hatred, and that the numerous set of terms expressive of praise and blame mean something more than simple regard or enmity. What more then do they mean? As it is not emotion, it must be either thought or sensation, for under one or other of these heads, we have seen that all the mental phenomena are comprehended. And as the nature of the case excludes the latter, we must conclude that thought of some kind forms a part of moral sentiment. Now thoughts are of two sorts, simple and relative, the former being the bare perception or the conception

of an object, the latter the consciousness of a relation between two or more objects. But in expressing love or hatred towards any one as well as in approving or condemning any action or character, we of course must have a perception or a conception of the being loved or hated in the one case, of the act or disposition, in the other, and therefore, here there can be no ground of distinction between mere emotion and sentiment. There remains then only relative thoughts to establish a difference between them, and these are the province of reason. Therefore moral approbation or disapprobation is distinguished from mere love or hatred by the presence of a judgment as to the nature or tendency of actions and characters, and the union of these two constitutes moral sentiment.

To confirm this reasoning, we may appeal to the experience of each individual, for in examining his own state of mind when he applauds or condemns any action or character, is he not conscious of forming an opinion, as to the nature or tendency of such action or character, as well as of an emotion? At times, the judgment may be so rapid as almost to escape observation, as when the nature of the action admits of no doubt, and is really self-evident; and at other times the emotion may be so intense as to make us inattentive to the previous reasoning; but however instantaneous, or however quickly forgotten, a relation of cause and effect has certainly been perceived between some mental quality and its consequences. The more practised our judgment becomes, the more accustomed to see at once the nature and tendency of actions and dispositions, the less will the