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PART II.

ON PRACTICAL MORALITY, OR THE RULE OF ACTION.

CHAPTER I.-ARGUMENT OF THIS PART.

N the preceding Part of this Book, having discussed

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the nature and causes of moral sentiment, in the present we have to consider what are the reasons which justify us in encouraging such sentiment, and what is the rule which we can rationally follow in awarding approbation or disapprobation. We have also to treat of the proper object of these sentiments, the circumstances which ought to modify praise and blame, and the motives to the practice of virtue.

In order to enlist the reason and feelings of mankind on the side of practical morality, it is not enough to discover the nature and causes of moral sentiment; for this nature and these causes being allowed, it may still be asked, why am I bound to favour such sentiment in myself and others? Can I find a guide to tell me when to approve and when to disapprove? or do I require no direction? What is meant by saying that I ought to act so and so, that it is my duty so to do, or that I am morally obliged? Lastly, are there any motives which reason can deem sufficient to lead me to the practice of virtue? To answer these questions is the object of the following Part.

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CHAPTER II.

ON THE FINAL CAUSE OR PURPOSE OF MORAL

SENTIMENT.

HE more we dive into nature, whether material

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or immaterial, organic or inorganic, the more are we convinced of the fact, that nothing has been made in vain. So far as our knowledge extends, we see everywhere proofs of design: no branch of knowledge is improved without adding to those proofs; innumerable phenomena which at first seemed insignificant, have since been shown to have an useful tendency; and hence we are warranted in concluding in other cases that there is a purpose, even where it has not been discovered. Indeed this inference is so natural to the human mind, that we cannot well believe anything to be absolutely useless, but are irresistibly led to think that it was made for something, and are constantly trying to find out what that object may be. If an anatomist perceive an unknown organ in some newly discovered animal, does he not instantly begin to speculate on its functions? Does he ever imagine that it was there for no purpose? Can we then suppose that the mind, so much more excellent than the body, affords less proof of design?

When we consider the universality and general uniformity of moral sentiment among mankind in different ages and nations, it is impossible not to believe that we were made susceptible of such sentiment for

some wise and useful purpose. Nor can this belief be at all affected by the consideration whether moral sentiment be originally implanted in us, as some assert, or be necessarily derived from other known principles of our nature, as we have seen reason to conclude. In either case, the universality and general uniformity must be admitted, and these are all that is important for our present argument. Reasoning, then, from the analogy of nature, there is a strong probability in favour of the utility of moral sentiment, previous to all inquiry into its particular purpose, and, in the want of more definite evidence, that presumption ought to decide us to cultivate such sentiment in ourselves and others. But in the present case we are at no loss to discover what is the final

cause.

In order to perceive the final cause or design of moral approbation and disapprobation, it is necessary to attend to three indisputable facts.

1. That all dispositions and actions are not the same in their tendency.

2. That men are susceptible of pleasure from selfapprobation or from the approbation of others, and of pain from disapprobation.

3. That dispositions and actions are more or less subject to the will.

Unless these three facts be admitted, the purpose of moral sentiment is a perfect mystery; but if they be granted, then all is clear.

Were we to suppose that there was no real difference between dispositions or actions, but that the tendency of all was the same, then we could not

understand why we should wish to encourage or discourage one more than another. Again, were

we unsusceptible of pleasure or pain, joy or grief, from acting well or ill, or were we indifferent to the praise or blame of others, then approbation or disapprobation could create no motive to conduct, and therefore they would be quite thrown away. Lastly, were dispositions and actions in no degree voluntary, the pleasure or pain of approval or disapproval would serve no purpose, since they could not change action or disposition. But supposing all the three facts, as above stated, to be true, then we see at once that some dispositions and actions may reasonably be encouraged in preference to others, that the susceptibility of men to praise and blame creates in them a motive to change their dispositions and actions, while the dependence of these on the will allows that motive to be effectual. What those actions are which we ought to encourage or discourage, and what is the proper object of moral approbation, will be seen more particularly afterwards; but for the present it is enough to know, as common sense informs us, that we should promote all that is useful and check all that is injurious, either to the agent himself, or to those with whom he is connected.

This seems the proper place to consider an objection, raised by some who think themselves philosophers, against all expression of praise or blame, as applied to human actions. And this objection, it is the more natural to advert to at the present time, when a system has been industriously propagated, and is even said to have spread its roots widely if not

deeply in some parts of England, founded upon the irresponsibility of man, and the notion that approbation and disapprobation are alike senseless and unjust. This system, which attacks audaciously all the previous opinions and feelings of mankind, on morals, politics, and religion, owes its origin to an enthusiast of unwearied perseverance, and probably unfeigned philanthropy, but of shallow judgment, with a head impervious to argument. The individual in question, apparently with the best intentions, has constructed a scheme the most monstrous the world ever saw, if we can call that a scheme which consists in destroying all that men in every age have considered useful and venerable, and levelling the barrier which separates man from the brute. To such a system I should not have thought it worth while to draw the reader's attention, had not this immoral miracle seduced the minds of some, while its fundamental dogma has been advocated by others, who might not be inclined to adopt the whole of the plan.

We are told that man is entirely the creature of circumstances, and not a free agent; that therefore he is not responsible for his actions, and consequently that all praise or blame bestowed upon him on account of those actions is utterly senseless and unjust. Now the fundamental assertion that man is entirely the creature of circumstances, that is of outward circumstances, is contradicted by the widest experience. Let any one attend to the families with whom he is best acquainted; let him mark the characters of children, brought up as far as can be traced, exactly under the same circumstances, and then let him say whether

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