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No objection that other offences are disclosed. The notion that it is in itself an objection to the admission of evidence that it discloses other offences, especially where they are the subject of indictment, R. v. Smith, 2 C. & P. 633, 12 E. C. L., is now exploded. R. v. Salisbury, 5 C. & P. 155, 24 E. C. L.; R. v. Clewes, 4 C. & P. 221, 19 E. C. L.; R. v. Richardson, 2 F. & F. 343; and also, R. v. Rearden, 4 F. & F. 76; R. v. Cobdcn, 3 F. & F. 833; R. v. Proud, 1 L. & C. 97; and numerous other cases. If the evidence is admissible on general grounds, it cannot be resisted on this ground.1

What evidence is admissible a3 referable to the point in issue,

Of course all evidence bearing directly on any offence which cau be, and is, under the indictment before the jury, made the subject of inquiry, is admissible.2 So, also, and almost equally as a matter of course, evidence may be given, not only of the actual guilty act itself, but of other acts so closely connected therewith, as to form part of one chain of facts, which could not be excluded without rendering the evidence unintelligible. Thus in a case cited by Lord Ellenborough, in R. t?. Whiley, 2 Lea, 985; 1 New Rep. 92, where a man committed three burglaries in one night, and stole a shirt at one place and left it at another, and they were all so connected that the court heard the history of all

1 On an indictment for a conspiracy in inveigling a young girl from her mother's house, and reciting the marriage ceremony between her and one of the defendants, a subsequent carrying her off, with force and threats, after she had been released on habeas corpus, was allowed to be given in evidence. Commonwealth v. Hevice et al., 2 Y. 144. So on an indictment against a man for killing his wife, the prosecutor lias been allowed to prove an adulterous intercourse between the prisoner and another woman, not to prove the corpus delicti, but to repel the presumption of innocence arising from the conjugal relation. State v. Watkins, 9 Conn. 47. S. [See State r. Folwell, 14 Kan. 105; State v. Underwood, 75 Mo. 230. But the prosecution cannot draw out by cross-examination of a witness for the defence, that the accused stands indicted for other offences. Hamilton v. State, 34 Ohio St. 82. Nor can it put in evidence the commission of any other offence in order to prove the corpus delicti. Sutton v. Johnson, 62 111. 209; People r. Justice of Special Sessions, 10 Hun, (N. Y.) 158. Where the accused in conversation has admitted the crime, and another offence, the whole conversation is admissible. State r. Underwood, 75 Mo. 230.]

s On the trial of an indictment for burning a stable, evidence that the measurement of certain tracks which led from the stable towards defendant's house, had been applied to the foot of the brother of the defendant, who had been first arrested for the olience, and that the measurement did not correspond, is not admissible. State r. England, 78 N. C. 552. Nor is evidence admissible that the accused had been previously imprisoned as a pickpocket. Cesure r. State, 1 Tex. App. 19; Loza r. State, Id. 488. Evidence that another committed the offence for which the defendant is tried is inadmissible. State v. Beverly, 88 N. C. 632; State v. Baxter, 82 Id. 602. Even when admissions of that other. State v. Smith, 35 Kan. 618. .So on a trial for assault on A., with intent to murder, where the defence was that B., not the prisoner, made the assault, evidence of threats of B. against A. are inadmissible. Boothe v. State, 4 Tex. 202; Crookham v. Stete, 5 W. Va. 510; State v. Beaudet, 53 Conn. 536. The fact that the insured had been tried and acquitted on a criminal charge of arson, is of no weight in a suit on the policy where the defence is arson. Sibley v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co, 9 Bissell, C. Ct. 31. Upon the trial of a person jointly indicted with another, the prosecution will not be permitted to show that the latter is in the penitentiary of another State. State v. English, 67 Mo. 136. On atrial for larceny, evidence of the bad character of those who frequent a warehouse from which the property was stolen, but who are unconnected with the case, either as defendants or witnesses, is foreign to the issue and immaterial, Bennett v. State, 52 Ala. 370.

three burglaries; Lord Ellenborough remarked that "if crimes do so intermix, the court must go through the detail." So where the prisoner was charged with setting fire to a rick, evidence was allowed to be given that he had set fire to two other ricks, belonging to different persons, at the same time and place. Per Gurnev, B., R. v. Long, 6 C. & P. 178, 25 E. C. L. The prisoner, who had been in the employ of the prosecutrix, was indicted for stealing six shillings; the sou of the prosecutrix, suspecting the prisoner, had marked a quantity of money, and put it into the till, and the prisoner was •watched by him; on the first examination of the till it con- r*gg tained lis. 6cZ. The prosecutrix's son having received another L shilling from a customsr, put it into the till; and another person having paid a shilling to the prisoner, he was observed to go to the till, to put in his hand and to withdraw it clenched. He then left the counter, and was seen to raise his clenched hand to his waisteoat pocket. The prosecutrix was proceeding to prove other acts of the prisoner, in goin^ to the till and taking money, when it was objected that this would be to prove several felonies. The objection being overruled, the prosecutrix's son proved that, upon each of the several inspections of the till, after the prisoner had opened it, he found a smaller sum than ought to have been there. The prisoner having been convicted, the Court of King's Bench, on an application for staying the judgment, were of opinion that it was in the discretion of the judge to confine the prosecutor to the proof of one felony, or to allow him to give evidence of other acts which were all part of one entire transaction, R. v. Ellis, 6 B. & C. 145, 13 E. C. L. In R. v. Firth, 38 L. J., M. C. 54, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 172, the abstraction of gas from a pipe for several years was considered to be one transaction; and it seems that even if there were separate takings yet they would afford evidence of the felonious nature of one separate taking.

In some cases the offence itself consists of a series of transactions, as on indictments for barratry, keeping a common bawdy-house, being a common utterer, conspiracy, and other cases. In all these cases, of course, evidence of anv act is admissible which goes to make up the offence.1 In R. v. Welman, Dears, C. C. 188; 22 L. J., M. C. 118, a case of false pretences, the evidence showed that the prisoner in July, 1850, called upon the prosecutrix and made false representations relative to a benefit club, but failed on this occasion to obtain any money. In August of the same year the prisoner again called relative to the club, and referred to the previous conversation. It was held, on a case reserved, that it was for the jury to say whether these conversations were so connected as to form one continuing representation; and that if so, they might connect them.

Sometimes evidence which would be otherwise inadmissible becomes so either as serving to identify the prisoner, or some article in his possession, connected with the commission of the crime. Thus, in an in

1 An interval between two successive entrances of the same house on the same night by the same burglar does not prevent proof of what took place at the second visit. The two vkits form one continuous burglary. People v. Gibson, 58 Mich. 368.

dictment for arson, evidence has been admitted to show that property which had been taken out of the house at the time of the fire, was afterwards discovered in the prisoner's possession. R. v. Rickman, 2 East P. C. 1035. So where upon an indictment for robbing A., there being another indictment against the prisoners for robbing B. of a watch, it appeared that A. and B. were travelling in a gig, when they were stopped and robbed. Littledale, J., held that evidence might be given that B. lost his watch at the same time and place that A. was robbed, but that evidence was not admissible of the violence that was offered to B. One question in the case was, whether the prisoners were at the place in question when A. was robbed, and as proof that they were, evidence was admissible that one of them had got something which was lost there at the time. R. v. Rooney, 7 C. &. P. 517, 32 E. C. L. So upon an indictment for stabbing, in order to identify the instrument, evidence may be adduced of the shape of a wound given to another person by the prisoner at the same time, although such wound be the subject of another indictment. Per Gaselee, J., and Parke, J., R. v. Fursey, 6 C. & P. 81, 25 E. C. L.1

♦g^-i *Evidence to explain motives and intention. Had the mat

J ter stopped here there would have been little difficulty; but there are cases in which much greater latitude is permitted, and evidence is allowed to be given of the prisoner's conduct on other occasions, where it has no other connection with the charge under inquiry than that it tends to throw light on what were his motives and intention in doing the act complained of. This cannot be done merely with the view of inducing the jury to believe that because the prisoner has committed a crime on one occasion, he is likely to have committed a similar offence on another; R. v. Cole, 1 Phill. Ev. 508, 10th ed.; but only by way of anticipation of an obvious defence; see R. v. Richardson, infra, p. 101; such as that the prisoner did the act of which he was accused, but innocently and without any guilty knowledge; or that he did not do it, because no motive existed in him for the commission of such a crime, or that he did it by mistake. In these cases it is competent for the prosecutor to adduce evidence which, under other circumstances, would not be admissible; such as the conduct of the prisoner on other occasions, his admissions, and other surrounding circumstances, in order to show, as the case may require, either that his ignorance was extremely improbable, or that he had ample motives of advantage or revenge for the commission of the crime, or that it was improbable he should make a mistake.

1 So testimony that the ground where the deceased was struck was covered with stone or pieces of rock, is admissible on behalf of the defendant where the character of the wound in the skull indicated that it could not have been produced with the fist Caw v. People, 3 Neb. 357.

* Testimony of the prisoner's guilt, or participation in the commission of a crime, wholly unconnected with that for which he is put on his trial, cannot, as a general rule, be admitted. Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229; Commonwealth r. Call, 21 Pick. 515. [Sutton t>. Johnson, 62 111. 209. But see Gossenheimer r. State, 52 Ala. 313. The prosecution has the right to offer any evidence tending to prove a motive for the com

There are three classes of offences in which, from the nature of the offence iteel f, this species of evidence is so frequently necessary that they will

mission of the crime. State v. Larkin, 11 Nev. 314 8uch as the fact of a quarrel between the defendant and prosecutor, but not the cause of the quarrel. State t>. Hannett, 54 Vt. 83. Evidence of a different offence is admissible to show the intent e. g. that the prisoner altered the marks on a hog, to show that he stole it. State v. Thomas, 30 La. An. 600. If evidence of a separate offence is wrongly admitted, without objection by the defendant, the jury cannot consider it. Endaily v. State, 39 Ark. 278. Where an indictment charges several offences of the same nature but there is only evidence of one distinct offence, the proof should be confined thereto. Evidence of one substantive offence cannot be admitted in support of another. Fields c. Wyoming Ter., 1 Wy. Ter. 78.] Where it is shown that a crime has been committed, and the circumstances point to the accused as the perpetrator, facts tending to show a motive, although remote, are admissible in evidence. The jury, however, cannot be too cautious with respect to the importance they attach to this species of testimony. Baalam v. State, 17 Ala. 451; State t'. Ford, 3 Strob. 517. [People t>. Henssler, 48 Mich. 49. So also facta showing that the act charged is part of a system. Kramer r. Commonwealth, 87 Pa. St. 299; Carrol v. Commonwealth, s. c. 4 W. N. C. (Pa.) 109; Somerville v. State, 6Tex. App. 433.] Incases where the scienter or the quo animo constitutes a necessary part of the crime charged, as in cases of forgery, murder, and the like, testimony of such acts or declarations of the prisoner as tend to prove such knowledge or intent, is admissible, notwithstanding they may constitute in law a distinct crime. Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229; Thorp v. State, 15' Ala. 749. [See Goerson v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. St 388; Curtis v. State, 78 Ala. 12; People v. Gray, 66 Cal. 271; People v. Haver, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 171.] In a case of murder, evidence was offered that the accused, on the same dav the deceased was killed, and shortly before the killing, shot a third person; it was held that the evidence was competent, though it went to prove a distinct felony, as it appeared to be connected with the crime charged, as parts of one entire transaction. J Ieath's Case, 1 Harr. 507; Reynolds v. State, 1 Kelly, 222. But not without such connection. Cole v. Commonwealth, 5 Gratt. 696; Baker v. State, 4 Ark. 56. [Sartin v. State, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 679; Miller v. Common wealth, 78 Ky. 15; State v. \ ines, 34 La. An. 1079; State v. La page, 57 N. H. 245; State t>. Martin, 74 Mo. 547. See Fernandez v. State, 4 Tex. App. 419; Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. St, 60.] Evidence of the state of feeling existing between the prisoner and the accused, or of facta from which such state of feeling mav be inferred, is competent on an indictment for murder. State i'. Tellers, 2 Hals. 220; People v. Hendnckson, 1 Park. C. R. 406. [Boyd v. State, 4 Baxter (Tenn.), 319.] On the trial of a husband for the murder of his wife, the will of his father-in-law was admitted in evidence, to show that the expectations of property which he might have entertained, had been disappointed. Henrickson r. People, 1 Park. C. R. 40ti. When a man was indicted for the murder of his wife, evidence that he had been for some time living in adultery with another woman, was admitted. State v. Watkins, 9 Conn. 47. It is never indispensable to a conviction that a motive for the commission of the crime should appear. People v. Robinson, 1 Park. C. R. 644. When aggravating matter is the immediate consequence of the offence for which the defendant is on trial, it may be shown; but if it is a distinct crime, not necessarily connected with that offence, it cannot be received. Baker v. State, 4 Ark. 56. In an action for a conspiracy to defraud A., by falsely representing B. to be a man of credit, evidence that such representations were made to others, in consequence of which such other persons made the same representations to A., is admissible. Gardner v. Preston, 2 Day's Cases, 205. To prove fraud against the defendant, a transaction between him and a third person, of a similar nature to the one in question, may be given in evidence. Snell et aL v. Moses et al., 1 Johns. 99. See also, Rankin v. Blackwell, 2 Johns. Cas. 193. In an indictment for obtaining goods by false pretences, it is allowable to prove that the same pretences were used to another. Collin's Case, 4 Rog. Rec. 143. Where a party is charged with fraud in a particular transaction, evidence may be offered of similar previous fraudulent transactions between him and third persons; and wherever the intent or guilty knowledge of a party is material to the issue of a case, collateral facts tending to establish such intent or knowledge are proper evidence. Bottomley r. United States, 1 Story, 135. [State v. Emery, 76 Mo. 348; Lindsay v. State, 38 O. St 507.] On the trial of a criminal prosecution, when the facts and circumstances offered in evidence amount to proof of a crime other than that charged, and there is ground to believe that the crime charged grew out of it, or was caused by it, such facts and circumstances may be admitted to show dictment for arson, evidence lias been admitted to show that property which had been taken out of the house at the time of the fire, was afterwards discovered in the prisoner's possession. R. v. Rickman, 2 East P. C. 1035. So where upon an indictment for robbing A., there being another indictment against the prisoners for robbing B. of a watch, it appeared that A. and B. were travelling in a gig, when they were stopped and robbed. Littledale, J., held that evidence might be given that B. lost his watch at the same time and place that A. was robbed, but that evidence was not admissible of the violence that was offered to B. One question in the case was, whether the prisoners were at the place in question when A. was robbed, and as proof that they were, evidence was admissible that one of them had got something which was lost there at the time. R. v. Rooney, 7 C. &. P. 517, 32 E. C. L. So upon an indictment for stabbing, in order to identify the instrument, evidence may be adduced of the shape of a wound given to another person by the prisoner at the same time, although such wound be the subject of auother indictment. Per Gaselee, J., and Parke, J., R. v. Fuisey, 6 C. & P. 81, 25 E. C. L.1

*Q4-i *Evidence to explain motives and intention. Had the matJ ter stopped here there would have been little difficulty; but there are cases in which much greater latitude is permitted, and evidence is allowed to be given of the prisoner's conduct on other occasions, where it has no other connection with the charge under inquiry than that it tends to throw light on what were his motives and intention in doing the act complained of. This cannot be done merely with the view of inducing the jury to believe that because the prisoner has committed a crime on one occasion, he is likely to have committed a similar offence on another; R. v. Cole, 1 Phill. Ev. 508, 10th ed.; but only by way of anticipation of an obvious defence; see R. v. Richardson, infra, p. 101; such as that the prisoner did the act of which he was accused, but innocently and without any guilty knowledge; or that he did not do it, because no motive existed in him for the commission of such a crime, or that he did it by mistake. In these cases it is competent for the prosecutor to adduce evidence which, under other circumstances, would not be admissible; such as the conduct of the prisoner on other occasions, his admissions, and other surrounding circumstances, in order to show, as the case may require, either that his ignorance was extremely improbable, or that he had ample motives of advantage or revenge for the commission of the crime, or that it was improbable he should make a mistake.

1 So testimony that the ground where the deceased was struck was covered with stone or pieces of rock, is admissible on behalf of the defendant where the character of the wound in the skull indicated that it could not have been produced with the fist Caw t>. People, 3 Neb. 357.

* Testimony of the prisoner's guilt, or participation in the commission of a crime, wholly unconnected with that for which he is put on his trial, cannot, as a general rule, be admitted. Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229; Commonwealth i>. Call, 21 Pick. 515. [Sutton i>. Johnson, 62 111. 209. But see Gossenheimer r. State, 52 Ala. 313. The prosecution has the right to offer any evidence tending to prove a motive for the com

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