dictment for arson, evidence has been admitted to show that property which had been taken out of the house at the time of the fire, was afterwards discovered in the prisoner's possession. R. v. Rickman, 2 East P. C. 1035. So where upon an indictment for robbing A., there being another indictment against the prisoners for robbing B. of a watch, it appeared that A. and B. were travelling in a gig, when they were stopped and robbed. Littledale, J., held that evidence might be given that B. lost his watch at the same time and place that A. was robbed, but that evidence was not admissible of the violence that was offered to B. One question in the case was, whether the prisoners were at the place in question when A. was robbed, and as proof that they were, evidence was admissible that one of them had got something which was lost there at the time. R. v. Rooney, 7 C. &. P. 517, 32 E. C. L. So upon an indictment for stabbing, in order to identify the instrument, evidence may be adduced of the shape of a wound given to another person by the prisoner at the same time, although such wound be the subject of another indictment. Per Gaselee, J., and Parke, J., R. v. Fursey, 6 C. & P. 81, 25 E. C. L.1

*Evidence to explain motives and intention. Had the mat*94] ter stopped here there would have been little difficulty; but there are cases in which much greater latitude is permitted, and evidence is allowed to be given of the prisoner's conduct on other occasions, where it has no other connection with the charge under inquiry than that it tends to throw light on what were his motives and intention in doing the act complained of. This cannot be done merely with the view of inducing the jury to believe that because the prisoner has committed a crime on one occasion, he is likely to have committed a similar offence on another; R. v. Cole, 1 Phill. Ev. 508, 10th ed.; but only by way of anticipation of an obvious defence; see R. v. Richardson, infra, p. 101; such as that the prisoner did the act of which he was accused, but innocently and without any guilty knowledge; or that he did not do it, because no motive existed in him for the commission of such a crime, or that he did it by mistake. In these cases it is competent for the prosecutor to adduce evidence which, under other circumstances, would not be admissible; such as the conduct of the prisoner on other occasions, his admissions, and other surrounding circumstances, in order to show, as the case may require, either that his ignorance was extremely improbable, or that he had ample motives of advantage or revenge for the commission of the crime, or that it was improbable he should make a mistake,

So testimony that the ground where the deceased was struck was covered with stone or pieces of rock, is admissible on behalf of the defendant where the character of the wound in the skull indicated that it could not have been produced with the fist. Caw v. People, 3 Neb. 357.

2 Testimony of the prisoner's guilt, or participation in the commission of a crime, wholly unconnected with that for which he is put on his trial, cannot, as a general rule, be admitted. Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229; Commonwealth v. Call, 21 Pick. 515. [Sutton v. Johnson, 62 Ill. 209. But see Gossenheimer v. State, 52 Ála. 313. The prosecution has the right to offer any evidence tending to prove a motive for the com

There are three classes of offences in which, from the nature of the offence itself, this species of evidence is so frequently necessary that they will mission of the crime. State v. Larkin, 11 Nev. 314. Such as the fact of a quarrel between the defendant and prosecutor, but not the cause of the quarrel. State v. Hannett, 54 Vt. 83. Evidence of a different offence is admissible to show the intent e. g. that the prisoner altered the marks on a hog, to show that he stole it. State v. Thomas, 30 La. Ân. 600. If evidence of a separate offence is wrongly admitted, without objection by the defendant, the jury cannot consider it. Endaily v. State, 39 Ark. 278. Where an indictment charges several offences of the same nature but there is only evidence of one distinct offence, the proof should be confined thereto. Evidence of one substantive offence cannot be admitted in support of another. Fields v. Wyoming Ter., 1 Wy. Ter. 78.] Where it is shown that a crime has been committed, and the circumstances point to the accused as the perpetrator, facts tending to show a motive, although remote, are admissible in evidence. The jury, however, cannot be too cautious with respect to the importance they attach to this species of testimony. Baalam v. State, 17 Ala. 451; State v. Ford, 3 Strob. 517. [People v. Henssler, 48 Mich. 49. So also facts showing that the act charged is part of a system. Kramer . Commonwealth, 87 Pa. St. 299; Carrol v. Commonwealth, s. c. 4 W. N. C. (Pa.) 109; Somerville v. State, 6 Tex. App. 433.] In cases where the scienter or the quo animo constitutes a necessary part of the crime charged, as in cases of forgery, murder, and the like, testimony of such acts or declarations of the prisoner as tend to prove such knowledge or intent, is admissible, notwithstanding they may constitute in law a distinct crime. Dunn v. State, 2 Ark. 229; Thorp v. State, 15 Ala. 749. [See Goerson v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. St. 388; Curtis v. State, 78 Ala. 12; People v. Gray, 66 Cal. 271; People v. Haver, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 171.] In a case of murder, evidence was offered that the accused, on the same day the deceased was killed, and shortly before the killing, shot a third person; it was held that the evidence was competent, though it went to prove a distinct felony, as it appeared to be connected with the crime charged, as parts of one entire transaction. Heath's Case, 1 Harr. 507; Reynolds v. State, 1 Kelly, 222. But not without such connection. Cole v. Commonwealth, 5 Gratt. 696; Baker v. State, 4 Ark. 56. [Sartin v. State, 7 Lea (Tenn.) 679; Miller v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 15; State v. Vines, 34 La. An. 1079; State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245; State v. Martin, 74 Mo. 547. See Fernandez v. State, 4 Tex. App. 419; Shaffner v. Commonwealth, 72 Pa. St, 60.] Evidence of the state of feeling existing between the prisoner and the accused, or of facts from which such state of feeling may be inferred, is competent on an indictment for murder. State v. Zellers, 2 Hals. 220; People v. Hendrickson, 1 Park. C. R. 406. [Boyd v. State, 4 Baxter (Tenn.), 319.] On the trial of a husband for the murder of his wife, the will of his father-in-law was admitted in evidence, to show that the expectations of property which he might have entertained, had been disappointed. Henrickson v. People, 1 Park. C. R. 406. When a man was indicted for the murder of his wife, evidence that he had been for some time living in adultery with another woman, was admitted. State v. Watkins, 9 Conn. 47. It is never indispensable to a conviction that a motive for the commission of the crime should appear. People v. Robinson, 1 Park. C. R. 644. When aggravating matter is the immediate consequence of the offence for which the defendant is on trial, it may be shown; but if it is a distinct crime, not necessarily connected with that offence, it cannot be received. Baker v. State, 4 Ark. 56. In an action for a conspiracy to defraud A., by falsely representing B. to be a man of credit, evidence that such representations were made to others, in consequence of which such other persons made the same representations to A., is admissible. Gardner v. Preston, 2 Day's Cases, 205. To prove fraud against the defendant, a transaction between him and a third person, of a similar nature to the one in question, may be given in evidence. Snell et al. v. Moses et al., 1 Johns. 99. See also, Rankin v. Blackwell, 2 Johns. Cas. 193. In an indictment for obtaining goods by false pretences, it is allowable to prove that the same pretences were used to another. Collin's Case, 4 Rog. Rec. 143. Where a party is charged with fraud in a particular transaction, evidence may be offered of similar previous fraudulent transactions between him and third persons; and wherever the intent or guilty knowledge of a party is material to the issue of a case, collateral facts tending to establish such intent or knowledge are proper evidence. Bottomley v. United States, 1 Story, 135. [State v. Emery, 76 Mo. 348; Lindsay v. State, 38 O. St. 507.] On the trial of a criminal prosecution, when the facts and circumstances offered in evidence amount to proof of a crime other than that charged, and there is ground to believe that the crime charged grew out of it, or was caused by it, such facts and circumstances may be admitted to show

be considered separately; these are conspiracy, uttering forged instruments and counterfeit coin, and receiving stolen goods. In these the act itself which is the subject of inquiry is almost always of an equivocal kind, and from which malus animus cannot, as in crimes of violence, be presumed; and almost the only evidence which could be adduced to show the guilt of the prisoner would be his conduct on other occasions. Though it must be acknowledged that in the two first of these the crown, being often directly interested, has succeeded in pushing the rules of evidence to their extremest severity against the prisoner. For further illustrations of this subject in reference to arson, see tit. Arson, post.

Evidence to explain motives and intention-Conspiracy. The evidence in conspiracy is wider than, perhaps, in any other case, other principles as well as that under discussion tending to give greater latitude in proving this offence. See tit. Conspiracy, post. Taken by themselves the acts of conspiracy are rarely of an unequivocally guilty character, and they can only be properly estimated when connected with all the surrounding circumstances. Thus, on the trial of an indictment against several persons for a conspiracy in unlawfully assembling for the purpose of exciting discontent or disaffection, as the material points for the consideration of the jury are the general character and intention of the assembly, and the particular case of the defendant as connected with that general character, it is relevant to prove, on the part of the prosecution, that bodies of men came from different parts of the country to attend the meeting, arranged and organized in the same manner and acting in concert. It is relevant also to show, that early on the day of the meeting on a spot at some distance from the place of meeting (from which spot bodies of men came afterwards to the place of meeting), a great number of persons, so organized, had assembled, and had there conducted

*themselves in a riotous, disorderly, or seditious manner. R. v. *95] Hunt, 3 B. & Ald. 566 at pp. 573, 574, 5 E. C. L. Upon the same principle on the trial of a similar indictment, it is relevant to produce in evidence resolutions proposed by one of the defendants at a the quo animo of the accused. Commonwealth v. Ferngan, 8 Wr. 386. [But only for the purpose of showing a motive for the particular act charged in the indictment. Brown v. State, 26 O. St. 176. Or for the purpose of identification. Curtis v. State, 78 Ala. 12. But evidence of defendant's possession of other cattle than the one alleged to have been stolen is admissible to establish the identity of the herd in which the stolen cow was found. Tyler v. State, 13 Tex. App. 205. And where a defendant on trial for stealing a horse, at the time of his arrest, on being questioned told where the saddle was, this fact is competent evidence as tending to establish his guilt. Speights v. State, 1 Tex. App. 551. Where defendant has shown that he acquired certain cattle properly, evidence that another steer in the same herd was stolen is admissible. People v. Cunningham, 66 Cal. 668.] Whatever shows motive is admissible. Flanagan v. State, 46 Ala. 703; McKenzie v. State, 26 Ark. 334; Hunter v. State, 43 Ga. 483; Williams v. People, 54 Ill. 422; Shelton v. State, 34 Tex. 662. S.

On an indictment for obtaining money on false pretences, evidence of having obtained money at other times from other persons by similar pretences held inadmissible. Strong v. State, 86 Ind. 208. Where one is on trial for the commission of a crime, evidence of a harmless intent in going to the place where the alleged offence was committed is irrelevant. Commonwealth v. Blair, 123 Mass. 242.

large assembly in another part of the country for the same professed object and purpose as were avowed at the meeting in question; and also, that the defendant acted at both meetings as president or chairman; for, in a question of intention, it is most clearly relevant to show, against that individual, that at a similar meeting, held for an object professedly similar, snch matters had passed under his immediate auspices. R. v. Hunt, 3 B. & Ald. 573, 5 E. C. L.1

1 Commonwealth v. Crowninshield, 10 Pick. 497; American Fire Co. v. United States, 2 Pet. 364; Snyder v. Lafromboise, 1 Bree. 269; Commonwealth v. Eberle, 3 S. & R. 9; Wilbur v. Strickland, 1 R. 458; Reitenback v. Reitenback, Id. 362; Martin v. Commonwealth, 2 Leigh, 745; Gardner v. Preston, 2 Day's C. 205; Collins v. Commonwealth, 3 S. & R. 220; Ex parte Bollman & Swarowout, Cr. 75; Livermore v. Herschell et al., 3 Pick. 33; Rogers v. Hall, 4 W. 359; Gibbs v. Nedy, 7 W. 305; Colt et al. v. Eves, 12 Conn. 243. Upon the trial of an indictment for conspiracy where evidence has been given which warrants the jury to consider whether the prisoner was engaged in the alleged conspiracy, and had combined with others for the same illegal purpose, any act done or declaration made by one of the party, in pursuance and promotion of the common object, are evidence against the rest; but what one of the party may have said not in pursuance of the plot, cannot be received against the others. State v. Simons, 4 Strob. 266. Where there is evidence of conspiracy, the declarations of any of the parties are evidence against the others. Cornelius v. Commonwealth, 15 B. Mon. 539; Johnson v. State, 29 Ala. 62; Browning v. State, 3 Miss 656; Patton v. Ohio, 6 O. St. 467; Fonts v. State, 7 Id. 471; Hightower v. State, 22 Tex. 605; Clinton v Estes, 20 Ark. 216; State v. Ross, 29 Mo. 32; State v. Nash, 7 Clarke, 347; Draper r. State, 22 Tex. 400; Rice v. State, 7 Ind. 332. [State v. Ford, 37 La. An. 443; Brandt v. Commonwealth, 94 Pa. St. 290; Williams v. State, 47 Ind. 568; Lathrop v. Bramhall, 3 Hun, (N. Y.) 394; Smith v. State, 52 Ala. 407; Kelly. People, 55 N. Y. 565; People v. Estrado, 49 Cal, 171.] The declarations of one man cannot be given in evidence against another until it is proved that they were engaged in a common enterprise. Malone v. State, 8 Ga. 408; Commonwealth v. Eberle, 3 S. &. R. 9; Gardner v. People, 3 Scam. 84; State v. Loper, 4 Shep. 293. [State v. Miller, 35 Kan. 328; O'Neil v. State, 42 Ind. 348; People v. Gorham, 16 Hun, (N. Y.) 93; Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173; Ganor v. State, 60 Miss. 147; Ormsby v. People, 53 N. Y. 472.] To make such declarations competent, it is sufficient that the conspiracy has been testified to by a witness who is competent; the court will not decide on his credibility. Commonwealth v. Crowninshield, 10 Pick. 497; Hunter's Case, 7 Gratt. 641. After the commission of the act is complete, declarations subsequently made by an accomplice are good evidence against himself only, unless made in the presence of his partners in the crime. Hunter's Case, 7 Gratt. 641. [U. S. v. McKee, 3 Dill. 546; State v. Arnold, 48 Ia. 566. But where there was a conspiracy to cause a marriage falsely to appear of record, with intent to prevent another marriage, a letter proved to be written by one of the defendants offering to prove the marriage void for $500, is admissible on the question of motive, and as an admission that there was no legal marriage. Commonwealth v. Waterman, 122 Mass. 43.] When the conduct of several persons shows them to have been joint conspirators, the declarations of one may be given in evidence against another. Glory v. State, 8 Eng. 238. [Even though they be indicted separately. Taylor v. State, 3 Tex. App. 169; State v. Stevens, 67 Ia. 557; Grogan v. State, 63 Miss. 147.] That when evidence has been given of a conspiracy, the acts and declarations of the several conspirators are evidence against each other. See Lee . Lamprey, 43 N. H. 13; Jones v. Hurlburt, 39 Barb. 403; Preston v. Bowers, 13 O. St. 1; Page v, Parker, 43 N. H, 463; State v. Myers, 19 Ia. 517; Hudson v. Commonwealth, 2 Duv. 531; Jones v. Commonwealth, Id. 554; People v. Pitcher, 15 Mich. 397; State v. Dula, 1 Phill. 211; Street v. State, 43 Miss. 1; People v. Trim, 39 Cal. 75; Commonwealth v. Corties, 3 Brews. 575; Mason v. State, 42 Ala. 532; Ake v. State, 30 Tex. 466; Spencer v. State, 31 Tex. 64; Commonwealth v. Thompson, 99 Mass. 444; Sands v. State, 21 Gratt. 871. S. U. S. v. McKee, 3 Dill. 546; Commonwealth r. Scott, 123 Mass. 222.

As to what constitutes prima facie evidence of a conspiracy, see Ormsby v. People, 53 N. Y. 472. Where there is evidence of a conspiracy to extort money by suit against defendant, he may put in evidence the statements of plaintiff's husband, even when made in the absence of the plaintiff. Mawich v. Elsey, 47 Mich 10.

Evidence to explain motives and intention-Uttering forged instruments or counterfeit coin. There is no case in which this kind of proof is more used than in indictments for uttering forged instruments or counterfeit coin, by far the most difficult point being to ascertain whether the prisoner did so innocently or with a guilty knowledge of what he was about. The following cases have been decided under this head.

The prisoner was charged with uttering a bank of England note, knowing it to be forged; evidence was offered for the prosecution that the prisoner had uttered another note forged in the same manner, by the same hand, and with the same materials, three months previously, and that two ten pound notes and thirteen one pound notes of the same fabrication, had been found on the files of the company, on the back of which there was the prisoner's handwriting, but it did not appear when the company received them. This evidence was admitted, but the case was referred to the opinion of the judges, the majority of whom were of opinion that it was admissible, subject to observation, as to the weight of it, which would be more or less considerable, according to the number of the notes, the distance of the time at which they had been put off, and the situation of life of the prisoner, so as to make it more or less probable that so many notes could pass through his hands in the course of business. R. v. Ball, Russ. & Ry. 132; 1 Campb. 324. The prisoners were indicted for uttering bank notes, knowing them to be forged. The trial took place in April, and to prove their guilty knowledge, evidence was given that in February they had uttered, on three several occasions, forged bank notes to three different persons, and that on being asked at each place for their names and places of abode, they gave false names and addresses; and the court was of opinion that this evidence was admissible. Lord Ellenborough said, that it was competent for the court to receive evidence of other transactions, though they amounted to distinct offences, and of the demeanor of the prisoner on other occasions, from which it might fairly be inferred that the prisoner was conscious of his guilt whilst he was doing the act charged upon him in the indictment. Heath, J., said, "The charge in this case puts in proof the knowledge of the person, and as that knowledge cannot be collected from the circumstances of the transaction itself, it must necessarily be collected from other facts and circumstances." R. v. Whiley, 2 Leach, 983; 1 New Rep. 92.

Not only is evidence of the act of passing other forged notes admissible to prove the prisoner's guilty knowledge, but proof of his general demeanor on a former occasion will be received for the same *96] *purpose. The prisoner was indicted for forging and knowingly uttering a bank note, and the question was, whether the prosecutor, in order to show that the prisoner knew it to be forged, might give the conduct of the prisoner in evidence, that is, whether from the conduct of the prisoner upon one occasion, the jury might not infer his knowledge on another, and all the judges were of opinion that such evidence ought to be received. R. v. Tattershall, cited by Lord Ellenborough, 2 Leach, 984.