(with the exception of facts which go to prove that the witness is not an impartial one, see p. 104) to prove particular facts in order to dis1 Wheel. C. C. 205; People v. Clarke, Id. 295. [People v. Reavy, 4 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 1; People v. Noelke, Id. 495; People v. Hooghkirk, 2 Id. 204; People v. Eckert, 1 Id. 470; People v. Elmore, 3 Id. 264; People v. Kelly, 3 Id. 35.] A witness who is introduced to prove that another witness is unworthy of credit, should be examined as to the general character of such witness for truth and veracity. The proper inquiry is, whether the witness knows the general character of the witness attempted to be impeached, and if so, what is his general reputation for truth. On the cross-examination the inquiry should be limited to the witness's opportunity for knowing the character of such witness; for how long a time, and how generally such unfavorable reports have prevailed, and from what sources they have been derived. It is not allowable to inquire of the impeacher whether he would believe the witness attempted to be impeached on oath. Phillips v. Kingsfield, 19 Me. 375. [On this subject there seems to be great doubt. See Wharton Crim. Law, 9th ed., 487; Greenleaf on Evid., 461; Hamilton v. People, 13 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 679, where it is discussed. The better opinion seems to be in favor of the English doctrine to allow the question. Keator v. People, 32 Mich. 484; Hamilton v. People, 29 Mich. 173; Marshall v. State, 5 Tex. App. 273. Where a reputation for veracity is established there is a presumption that it continues, even though three years have elapsed. Lum v. State, 11 Tex. App. 483] A witness who is introduced for the purpose of discrediting another witness in the cause, must profess to know the general reputation of the witness sought to be discredited, before he can be heard to speak of his own opinions or of the opinions of others, as to the reliance to be placed on the testimony of the impeached witness. State v. Parker, 3 Ired. Law 296; State v. O'Neal, 4 Id. 88. [If he so professes he is not incompetent because he also says that he has not heard the witness's character canvassed. Childs v. State, 55 Ala. 28. Otherwise if he says only that he knows the individual and does not know his character. Hadley v. State, Id. 31.] When testimony is offered to impeach the general character of a witness for truth, the inquiries are not limited to the character of the witness prior to the suit, but extend to the time of the examination of the witness. State v. Howard, 9 N. H. 485. [In regard to the period over which testimony as to bad character may range. Keator v. People, 32 Mich. 844.] The proper inquiries are, what is the general reputation of the witness as to truth, and whether, from general reputation, the person testifying would believe such witness under oath as soon as men in general. Id. When a witness is sought to be impeached on the ground of his bad character, and the persons called for that purpose testify that they are acquainted with his general character, they may then be asked whether, from such general character, they would believe the witness on oath; and this, though they expressly disclaim all knowledge of the witness's character for truth and veracity. Johnson v. People, 3 Hill, 178. On cross-examination, inquiries as to the means of knowledge of the character of the witness, the origin of reports against him, how generally such reports have prevailed, and from whom and when he heard them, are admissible. State v. Howard, 9 N. H. 485. After an equal number of witnesses have been sworn on each side, in the impeaching or supporting the character of a party or witness, it is in the discretion of the presiding judge whether a greater number of witnesses shall be examined. Bissell v. Cornell, 24 Wend. 354; Bunnell v. Butler, 23 Conn. 65. [The testimony of one impeaching witness will not ordinarily be sufficient. Wafford v. State, 44 Tex. 439.] When a witness called to impeach the character for veracity of another witness, who had given material testimony, swore that the character of the last-mentioned witness was not on a par with that of mankind in general, he was asked, on cross-examination, what individual he had heard speak against the character of that witness, it was held that this question was a proper one. Weeks v. Hall, 19 Conn. 376. When a witness is impeached on the ground of bad character, evidence may be given of previous statements made by the witness, consistent with his testimony on the trial. State v. Dove, 10 Ired. 469; State v. Dennis, 32 Vt. 158. When the character of a witness is impeached, the State may introduce testimony to show that the facts to which the impeached witness testified are true. John v. State, 16 Ga. 200. When the credibility of a witness has been attacked from the nature of his evidence, from his situation, from bad character, from proof of previous inconsistent statements, or from imputations directed against him on cross-examination, the party introducing him may prove other consistent statements for the purpose of corroborating him. March . Harrell, 1 Jones' Law, 329. [It is error for the court to instruct the jury to reject

credit him. R. v. Watson, 2 Stark. N. P. C. 152, 3 E. C. L.; R. v. Layer, 14 How. St. Tr. 285. The proper question is, "From your the testimony of the impeached witness unless so corroborated. Addison v. State, 48 Ala. 478.] As a general rule, it is not competent in support of the testimony of a witness to prove that he has made declarations out of court corresponding with his testimony in court. People v. Finnegan, 1 Park. C. R. 147. But such testimony was allowed where the witness, on cross-examination, had been asked questions tending to discredit his testimony. State v. DeWolf, 8 Conn. 93; Carter v. People, 2 Hill, 317. So where the witness is impeached on the ground of bad character. State . Dove, 10 Ired, 469. In a prosecution for rape, statements made by the prosecutrix, immediately after the transaction, may be given in evidence to corroborate her. Laughlin v. State, 18 O. 99; Johnson v. State, 17 O. 593. Testimony to support the character of a witness cannot be given in evidence unless the credibility of the witness is impeached. Colt v. People, 1 Park. C. R. 611. A witness called to sustain the character of an impeached witness, testifying that he has known him for a number of years, and that he knows his associates, but is not acquainted with his general character for truth and veracity, will be allowed to testify that he would believe him on his oath. People v. Davis, 21 Wend. 309. On the trial of a prisoner for rape, evidence of the good character of the prosecutrix is admissible by way of confirming her credibility. Turney v. State, 8 Smed. & Marsh. 104; State v. De Wolf, 8 Conn. 93. On the trial of an indictment for adultery, if one act of adultery committed by the defendant with the woman named in the indictment, is proved by the testimony of a witness whose credit is impeached, other instances of improper familiarity between the defendant and the same woman, not long before, may be given in evidence to corroborate the witness. Commonwealth v. Merriam, 14 Pick. 518. It is not necessary that a man's character should have been matter of discussion amongst his neighbors to enable a witness to speak of his reputation for truth. Crabtree v. Rile, 21 Ill. 180; Boon v. Weathered, 23 Tex. 675. Witnesses in his neighborhood acquainted with the character of the impeached witness, although they had never heard anything for or against his veracity, may testify that they would believe him on oath. Taylor v. Smith, 16 Ga. 7. A witness called to impeach the character of another witness should be asked, in the first instance, whether he has the means of knowing the general character of the witness impeached. State v. O'Neal, 4 Ired. 88. The questions are not confined to the character of the witness prior to the suit, but extend to the time of the examination. State v. Howard, 9 N. H, 485. [But see Rawles v. State, 56 Ind. 433; Lawson v. State, 32 Ark. 220; Robinson v. State, 16 Fla. 835; Brown v. Luehrs, 1 Ill. App. 74; State v. Lanier, 79 N. C. 622.] The proper inquiries are, what is the general reputation of the witness as to truth, and whether, from such general reputation, the person giving testimony would believe such witness under oath. Id. The general character of a witness, at his place of business, cannot be shown by evidence of what rumor said of it before he came to that place. Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 44.

As to the proper mode of inquiry in impeaching the character of a witness: State v. Randolph, 24 Conn. 363; Hooper v. Moore, 3 Jones' Law, 428; Wilson v. State, 3 Wis. 798; Stokes v. State, 18 Ga. 17; Holmes v. Stateler, 17 Ill. 453; Teese v. Huntingdon, 23 How. 2; Pierce v. Newton, 13 Gray, 528; Mash v. State, 36 Miss. 77; Macdonald v. Garrison, 2 Hilt. 510; Boon v. Weathered, 23 Tex. 675; Crabtree v. Rile, 21 Ill. 180; Gilliam v. State, 1 Head, 38; Henderson v. Hayne, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 342; Eason v. Chapman, 21 Ill. 33; State v. Sater, 8 Clarke, 420; Boswell v. Blackman, 12 Ga. 592; Kelley v. Proctor, 41 N. H. 139; Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595; Cook v. Hunt, 24 Ill. 535; Wright v. Page, 36 Barb. 438; Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392; Crabtree v. Hagenbaugh, 25 Ill. 233; Shaw v. Emery, 42 Me. 59; Ward v. State, 28 Ala. 53; Thurman v. Virgin, 18 B. Mon. 785; Craig v. Ohio, 5 0. St. 605; Ruche v. Beaty, 3 Ind. 70; Webber v. Hanke, 4 Mich. 198; Willard v. Goodenough, 30 Vt. 393; Pleasant v. State, 15 Ark. 624. [Majors v. State, 29 Ark. 112; on cross-examination a witness can only be asked as to convictions that effect credits; State v. Huff, 11 Nev. 17; Brown v. People, 8 Hun, (N. Y.) 562; People v. Chin, 51 Cal. 597.]

A party cannot give evidence to confirm the good character of a witness, unless his general character had been previously impugned by the other party. Braddee v. Brownfield, 9 W. 124; Werte v. May, 21 Pa. St. 274. When, on the trial of an inindictment, a material witness for the prisoner, on his cross-examination by the counsel for the prosecution, admitted that he had been complained of and bound over

knowledge of his general character, would you believe him on his oath? Mawson v. Hartsink, 4 Esp. 102, per Lord Ellenborough, C. J. See also, R. v. Brown, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 70; 36 L. J., M. C. 59. There is, however, another exception to the above rule, for by the 28 Vict. c. 18, s. 8, a witness may be questioned as to whether he has upon a charge of passing counterfeit money: held, that in answer the prisoner was entitled to give evidence of the witness's good character for truth. Carter v. People, 2 Hill, 317. [See State v. Ezell, 41 Tex. 35.] An admission by a witness that he had been prosecuted, but not tried for perjury, does not authorize the party calling him to give evidence of his general good character. People v. Gay, 1 Park. C. R. 308. On the trial of an indictment for rape alleged to have been committed on board a vessel, the prisoner attempted to discredit the testimony of the complainant: 1. By showing, on cross-examination, that her story was improbable in itself. 2. By disproving some of the facts to which she testified. 3. By evidence that her conduct, while on board the vessel and afterwards, was inconsistent with the idea of the offence having been committed; and 4. By calling witnesses to show that the account which she had given of the matter out of court did not correspond with the statements under oath: held, evidence of her good character inadmissible in reply. People v. Hulsa, 3 Hill, 309. Proof of contradictory statements will not warrant admission of character. Frost v. McCargar, 29 Barb. 617; Chapman v. Cooley, 12 Rich, Law, 654; Vance v. Vance, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 581; Newton v. Jackson, 23 Ala. 335. Contra, Burrel v. State, 18 Tex. 713; Stamper v. Griffin, 12 Ga. 450. The testimony of a witness, upon cross-examination, that he had been tried for a crime in another State, and acquitted, does not authorize the party calling him to introduce evidence of his general character. Harrington v. Lincoln, 4 Gray, 563. Nor will evidence tending to contradict him. Haywood v. Reed, Id. 574. [But evidence that he has been guilty of an infamous crime will. Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St. 351.] An attempt to impeach a witness by asking another witness what was his character for truth, warrants the introduction of evidence to support his character, though the answer to the question was that his character was good. Commonwealth v. Ingraham, 7 Gray, 46. When a witness, on cross-examination, admitted that he had been bound over for perjury: held, that it did not let in evidence to sustain his general character. People v. Gay, 3 Seld. 378.

As to evidence to impeach the character of a witness generally: See Taylor v. Commonwealth, 3 Busk, 508; Taylor v. Clendening, 4 Kan. 524; Boles v. State, 46 Ala. 204; Ford v. Jones, 62 Barb. 484; People v. Yslas, 27 Cal. 630; Rogers v. Lewis, 19 Ind. 405. [When the defendant is a witness, his credibility may be impeached by evidence of his character, but this cannot be put in to show his guilt, unless he first introduces it. Adams r. People, 9 Hun, (N. Y.) 89. That the verdict is supported by the testimony of a single witness concerning whose credit and good character, contradictory evidence was introduced is not ground to set it aside. Anderson v. State, 6 Lea, (Tenn.) 602.] An impeaching witness may be impeached by proof of general character, or in cross-examination; and when that is done, the impeaching witness may be supported by proof of general character. State v. Cherry, 63 N. C. 493; State v. Moon, 25 Ia. 128; State v. Brunt, 14 Id. 180. [To show that the witness has been convicted of a felony is such impeachment of his character as to entitle the party calling him to show his good character in rebuttal; People v. Amanacus, 50 Cal. 233; People v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61.] It is not essential to the successful impeachment of a witness's character for truth, that the impeaching witness should state that he would not believe him under oath. People v. Tyler, 35 Cal. 553. It is improper to ask a witness on cross-examination, if he was not successfully impeached as a witness on the trial of another case. State v. Wooderd, 20 Ia. 541. [And whether he had during the same term of court pleaded guilty to a criminal offence. The record is the best evidence. Johnson v. State, 48 Ga. 116. But see Lights r. State, 21 Tex. App. 308.] If a question put to a witness is an imputation on his character, and is calculated to degrade him before the jury, evidence as to his character is admissible. State v. Cherry, 63 N. C. 493. They may discredit a witness though no evidence has been given to impeach his character. George v. State, 39 Minn. 570. Evidence to corroborate a witness may be excluded if his testimony has not been attacked in any manner. State v. Rorabacker, 19 Ia. 154. S.

Under the Oregon code a witness may be discredited by asking him if he has been convicted of a crime. State v. Bacon, 8 Crim. Law Mag. 81.

been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor, and upon being so questioned, if he either denies or does not admit the fact or refuses to answer, it shall be lawful for the cross-examining party to prove such conviction. (As to the method of proving the conviction, see the same section, post, tit. Documentary Evidence.) But the person who calls a witness is always supposed to put him forward as a person worthy of belief; he cannot, therefore, if his testimony should turn out unfavorably, or even if the witness should assume a position of hostility, give general evidence to discredit him. Bull. Ñ. P. 297. How far a party may contradict his own witness, we shall see presently, p. 105. And if the character of any witness for credibility be impeached either by direct evidence or upon cross-examination, his testimony may be supported by general evidence that his character is such that he is worthy of credit. Evidence cannot be given of a prisoner's bad character for the purpose of showing that a policeman *had good cause to suspect him of a crime, and was therefore acting in the execution of his duty when he arrested him under [*104 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 104, post, tit. Apprehension of Offenders, R. v. Tuberfield, L. & C. 495. There is a provision in the Prevention of Crimes Act, by which, in proving the intent to commit a felony by a rogue and vagabond under the 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, amended by 36 & 37 Vict. c. 38, it is not necessary to show any particular acts; but the intent may be gathered from the circumstances and the known character of the prisoner. See 34 & 35 Vict. c. 112, s. 15.1

1 Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. 301; Jackson v. Varick, 7 Cow 238; DeLisle v. Priestman, 1 Browne, 176; Cowder v. Reynolds, 12 S. & R. 281; Queen v. State, 5 H. & J. 232; Perry v. Massey, 1 Bail. 32; Winslow v. Mosely, 2 Stew. 137; Webster v. Lee, 5 Mass. 334; Steinback v. Columbian Ins. Co., 2 Caines, 129; Stockton v. Dernutt, 7 W. 39. [It is error to reject evidence offered by defendant of the acts and words of certain witnesses for the purpose of contradicting them. Mixon v. State, 35 Miss, 525,] But an attesting witness is a witness of the law, and may be discredited by any one who examines him. Crowell v. Kirk, 3 Dev. 355; see Jackson v. Varick, 7 Cow. 238. Contra, Whitaker v. Salisbury, 15 Pick. 534; Patterson v. Schenck, 3 Gr. 434; Booker v. Bowles, 2 Blackf. 90. [A defendant examined for his co-defendant is liable to impeachment just as if he were not upon trial himself. State v. Hardin, 46 Ia. 623.] It has been held in North Carolina, that the Attorney-General may produce evidence to discredit a witness for the Commonwealth. State v. Morris, 1 Hayw, 438. But see Brown's Case, 2 Rog. Rec. 151, and Queen v. State, 5 H. & J. 232. A witness subphonaed by the plaintiff, but not examined by him, but by defendant, may be impeached by the plaintiff. Beebe v. Sinker, 2 Root, 160; Commonwealth . Boyer, 2 Wheel, C. C. 151. Although a party calling a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his general character, yet he may show that he has told a different story at another time. Cowder v. Reynolds, 12 S. & R. 281. [Especially where he shows that he was entrapped to introduce the witness by such different story. McDaniel v. State, 53 Ga. 253.] But a party cannot, after examining a witness, give in evidence his former testimony and declarations ostensibly to discredit him, but, in truth, to operate as independent evidence. Smith v. Price, 8 W. 447. Where a witness gives evidence against the party calling him, and is an unwilling witness, or in the interest of the opposite party, he may be asked by the party calling him, at the discretion of the court, whether he has not, on a former occasion, given different testimony as to a particular fact. Bank Northern Liberties v. Davis, 6 W. & S. 285. [Brubaker v. Taylor, 76 Pa. St. 83. But a mere failure on the part of a witness to testify as expected by the party calling him will not enable said party to show otherwise alleged statements made by the witness to others tending to prove the case. People v. Jacobs, 49 Cal. 384.] A party may prove the fact to be different from what one of his own witnesses has stated it to be. That is not discrediting his witness. Spencer v. White,

These are the only cases in which evidence of character can be given in chief; as to the cross-examination of witnesses upon their character, see infra, and tit. Practice.

Evidence used for the purpose of contradiction only. Any fact material to the issue which has been proved by one side, may be contradicted by the other. The only fact material to the issue, with reference to which there is any peculiarity in this respect is the credibility of a witness. As has already been said, that is a point upon which a witness may be impeached by direct evidence, showing generally his want of credibility; and, as we shall hereafter see, a witness may also be cross-examined as to particular facts which go to discredit him. But whether it be to contradict the direct evidence which impeaches the witness's credit, or to contradict the suggestions thrown out by the line of cross-examination, it is clear that, in order to reinstate the witness, no evidence can be used but general evidence that he is worthy of credit, in the same way as he may be impeached by general evidence that he is not so.1

In a precisely similar manner if a witness, on cross-examination, refuses to admit facts which damage his credit, he cannot be contradicted on these points, if they are not otherwise material to the issue. Spenceley v. De Willott, 7 East, 108; R. v. Yewin, 2 Campb. 638. And after much discussion, the same rule now holds with respect to the evidence of the woman in charges of rape; see post, Rape. Except in the case of proof of previous conviction under the 28 Vict. c. 18, s. 8, see supra.

The two last-mentioned rules are founded on the necessity which

1 Ired. 236. [State v. Simon, 37 La An. 569.] The rule that a party cannot discredit his own witness by proving that he had made contradictory statements at other times, does not apply to those cases where the party is under the necessity of calling the subscribing witness to an instrument. Dennett v. Dow, 17 Me. 19. [Nor to those cases in which the witness is called also by the other side and he desires to contradict the testimony given by him for that other side. Jones v. People, 2 Col. T. 351.] A party cannot discredit his own witness or show his incompetency, though he may call other witnesses to contradict him as to a fact material to the issue, in order to show how the fact really is. Franklin Bank v. Steam Nav. Co., 11 G. & J. 28. [Coulter r. Am. Express Co., 56 N. Y. 585.] A party cannot be allowed to insist that his own witness is not to be believed. He has the right, if surprised by his testimony, to show by other witnesses that the facts testified to are otherwise. But he cannot impeach him directly or indirectly. Hunt v, Fish, 4 Barb. 324; Burkhalter v. Edwards, 16 Ga, 593. A party cannot impeach his own witness by proof of statements contradictory to his evidence in court, although he may prove a fact to be otherwise than his own witness states it. Commonwealth v. Starkweather, 10 Cush. 59; Brolley v. Lapham, 13 Gray, 294; Champ r. Commonwealth, 2 Metc. (Ky.) 17. Party cannot discredit his own witness by asking him if he had not made contradictory statements. Sanchez v. People, 22 N. Y. 147. The State cannot impeach her own witness. Quinn v. State, 14 Ind. 589. Proof that a witness had made material false statements, which are relied on as proving him unworthy of credit, will not authorize the party calling him to introduce evidence of his general reputation for truth. Brown v. Mooers, 6 Gray, 451. S.

Proof that a witness called by defendant has testified falsely is not to be regarded as corroborative of defendant's guilt. State v. Brown, 76 N. C. 222.

A witness cannot be impeached by proof of particular acts. Barbour v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 287.