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£300, J. bonds, at 112, £336;" and the contract note ran, "sold to Mrs. S. (the prosecutrix) £300, J., at 112, £336," and was signed by the prisoner. The prosecutrix wrote in reply, "I have just received your note and contract note for three J. shares, and inclose a cheque for £336 in payment." The prisoner never paid for the bonds, but in violation of good faith appropriated to his own use the proceeds of the cheque. It was held that the letter of the prosecutrix was a direction in writing to apply the proceeds of the cheque to pay for the bonds, if they still had to be paid for, within the meaning of s. 75 of 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96. R. o. Christian, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 94; 43 L. J., M. C. 25.

Misappropriation under the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882.

The provisions of the above act are applied to persons misappropriating money arising from the sale of annuities or securities purchased or transferred under the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 60, s. 117).

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At common law 284

By statute 285

Churches and chapels , , 285

Dwelling-house, any person being therein 285

House, outhouse, manufactory, farm, etc 285

Railway stations and buildings belonging to ports, harbors, docks,

etc 285

Public buildings 286

Other buildings 286

Goods in buildings 286

Attempting to set fire to buildings ....... 286

Crops of corn, woods, plantations, gorse, etc 286

Stacks of corn, straw, wood, coals, etc 287

Attempting to set fire to crops, stacks, woods, etc 287

Coal mines 287

Attempting to set fire to coal mines 287

Ships or vessels , 287

with intent to prejudice owner or underwriter . . 288

Ships of war 288

Ships in the port of London 288

Attempting to set fire to ships or vessels 289

Malice against owner of property unnecessary 289

Where person committing the offence is in possession of the property

injured 289

Intent to injure or defraud a particular person need not be stated . 289

Proof of the setting fire 289

Proof of property set fire to 290

house 290

chapel 291

outhouse 291

Bhed 293

stacks 294

wood 294

ships and vessels 294

Setting fire to goods in a house 294

When persons are considered as being in the house when set fire to. 296

Possession, how to be described 296

Proof of malice and wilfulness 296

the intent 297

What constitutes an attempt to set fire ...... 299

At common law. The offence of arson, which is a felony at common law, is defined by Lord Coke to be the malicious and voluntary burning the house of another, by night or by day.1 3 Inst. 66; 1 Hale, C. P. 566.

The setting fire to the house of another, maliciously to burn it, is *not at common law a felony, if either by accident or timely r*9j>e prevention the fire does not take place.2 1 Hale, P. C. 568.

1 Overetreet v. State, 46 Ala. 30; McGary t>. People, 46 N. Y. 153. 8.

•Commonwealth t>. Van Schaack, 16 Mass. 105; People v. Butler, 16 Johns. 203. See Ball's Case, 5 Rog. Rec. 85. To attempt to fire a house is a misdemeanor at common law. Git's Case, 5 Id. 181. The least burning of the house is sufficient to constitute the crime. The charring of the floor to the depth of half an inch is certainly

By statute. The various offences of burning have been long provided for by the 9 Geo. 1, c. 22, the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 30, and the 7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 89. These statutes are all now repealed, and the offence is regulated for the most part by the 24 & 25 \ ict. c. 97.

Churches and chapels. By s. 1, "whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously set lire to any church, chapel, meeting-house or other place of divine worship, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for life or for any term not less than three [now five] years,—or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor, and with or without solitary confinement, and, if a male under the age of sixteen years, with or without whipping."

Dwelling-house, any person being therein. By 8. 2, "whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously set fire to any dwelling-house, any person being therein, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discret ion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for life or for any term not less than three [now five] years,—or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor, and with or without solitary confinement, and, if a male under the age of sixteen years, with or without whipping."1

House, outhouse, manufactory, farm, etc By s. 3, "whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously set fire to any house, stable, coachhouse, outhouse, warehouse, office, shop, mill, malthouse, hop-oast, barn, store-house, granary, hovel, shed, or fold, or to any farm building, or to any building or erection used in farming land, or in carrying on any trade or manufacture or any branch thereof, whether the same shall then be in the possession of the offender or in the possession of any other person, with intent thereby to injure or defraud any person, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for life or for any term not less than three [now five] years,—or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor, and with or without solitary confinement, and, if a male under the age of sixteen years, with or without whipping." 2

Railway stations and buildings belonging to ports, docks, and harbors. By s. 4, "whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously set fire to any station, engine house, warehouse, or other building belong

sufficient. State v. Sandy, 3 Ired. 570. An indictment for arson merely charging that the defendant set fire to a house with intent to injure the owner, without charging the burning is totally defective. Mary v. State, 24 Ark. 44. S.

1 The State statute concerning arson of a dwelling-house or barn, does not include unfinished structures which have never been actually occupied for such uses. State e. Wolfenberger, 20 Ind. 242. 8.

* A banking-house is a store, shop, or warehouse. Wilson v. State, 24 Conn. 57. 8. liave any such interest, or which shall come to her as such heiress, coheiress, or next of kin as aforesaid; and if any such marriage as aforesaid shall have taken place, such property shall, upon such conviction, be settled in such manner as the Court of Chancery in England or Ireland shall upon any information at the suit of the AttorneyGeneral appoint."

Taking away a woman by force, with intent to marry or carnally know her. By section 54, "Whosoever shall by force take away or detain against her will any woman, of any age, with intent to marry or carnally know her, or to cause her to be married or carnally known by any other person, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding fourteen years and not less than three [now five] years, or be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor."

Abduction of a girl under sixteen years of age. By section 55, "Whosoever shall unlawfully take or cause to be taken any unmarried girl, being undertheageof sixteen years, out of the possession and against the will of her father or mother, or of any other person having the lawful care or charge of her, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor." 1

Taking or enticing away children under fourteen years of age.

By section 56, "Whosoever shall unlawfully, either by force or fraud, lead or take away, or decoy or entice away or detain, any child under the age of fourteen years, with intent to deprive any parent, guardian, or other person having the lawful care or charge of such child of the possession of such child, or with intent to steal any article upon or about the person of such child, to whomsoever such article may belong, and whosoeveu shall, with any such intent, receive or harbor any such child, knowing the same to have been by force or fraud led, *taken, decoyed, enticed away or detained as in this section be- i-*r>/»q fore mentioned, shall be guilty of felony, and being convicted L thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding seven years and not less than three [now five] years—or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor, and, if a male under the age of sixteen years, with or without whipping; provided that no person who shall have claimed any right to the possession of such child, or shall be the mother, or shall have claimed to be the father of an illegitimate child shall be liable to be prosecuted by virtue hereof

1 One who forcibly assists a mother to remove an infant child from one to whom the father has intrusted it, is criminally liable for assault and battery. State v. Barney, 14 K. I. 62. In an indictment for abducting a female under the statutory age the question of her chaste character k immaterial. People v. Stott 4, N. I. Crim. Rep. 306.

on account of the getting possession of such child, or taking such child out of the possession of any person having the lawful charge thereof."

What constitutes a taking or detaining. There are so many different kinds of taking and detaining mentioned in the statute, that it is necessary to attend very carefully to the words used. The first part of s. 53 says, whoever shall "take away or detain against her will;" s. 54 says, whosoever shall "by force take away or detain against her will;" but the words "by force" can liardly make any diflerence.

Even under the old statute of Hen. 7, which did not contain the words " or detain," detaining a person who originally came with her own consent, was considered to be within the statute. R. v. Brown, 1 Ventr. 243; Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 41, s. 7; 1 East, P. C. 454; 1 Russ. on Cri., 5th cd., 884.

In the latter part of s. 53, the words are, " whosoever shall fraudulently allure, take or detain such woman out of the possession and against the will of her father or mother." It is clear that these words are intended to include the case of a woman herself consenting. They are taken from a repealed statute which formerly related to Ireland only (10 Geo. 4, c. 34, s. 23V The decisions on ss. 55 and 56 may perhaps throw some light on their meaning.

In s. 55, which applies to girls under sixteen years of age, the words are, "whosoever shall take or cause to be taken out of the possession and against the will of her father or mother, etc." Here also any violation of the girl's will is unnecessary. Thus it is said by Herbert, C. J., that the statute of 4 & 5 P. & M., which was to the same effect, was made to prevent children from being seduced from their parents or guardians by flattering or enticing words, promises or gifts, and married in a secret way to their disparagement. Hicks v. Gore, 3 Mod. 84. So upon the same statute it was held that it is no excuse that the defendant, being related to the girl's father, and frequently invited to the house, made use of no other seduction than the common blandishments of a lover to induce the girl secretly to elope and marry him, if it appear that it was against thexxmsent of the father. R. v. Twistleton, 1 Lev. 257; 1 Sid. 387 ; 2 Keb. 432; Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 41, s. 10; 1 Russ. on Cri., 5th ed., 892. If the same latitude of construction were applied to s. 53, which relates to women of any age, it might be rather dangerous. It has been argued that, though by the statute a taking by force is not necessary, still that a person cannot in any sense be said to be taken who goes willingly, and that the word take in itself imports the use of some coercion. But this view has not been adopted; thus where A. went in the night to the house of B. and placed a ladder against the window, and held it for F., the daughter of B., to descend, which she did, and then eloped *o"rfl *witn A.; F. being a girl fifteen years old; this was held to "' J be a "taking" of F. out of the possession of her father within the statute, although F. had herself proposed to A. to bring the ladder and elope with him. R. v. Robins, 1 C. & K. 456, 47 E. C. L.

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