it at the time he contracted the second marriage. R. v. Curgerwen, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 1; 35 L. J., M. C. 58. R. v. Jones, 11 Cox, C. C. R. 358. But the law laid down in R. v. Curgerwen does not apply in the absence of evidence that the parties were continually absent. R. v. Jones, 11 Q. B. D. 118; 52 L. J., M. C. 96.

Venue. The 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 57, supra, p. 327, like the 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, and the 1 Jac. 1, c. 11, enacts that the prisoner may be tried in the county in which he is apprehended.2

Upon the latter statute, it was held that the prisoner, having been apprehended for larceny in the county of W., and a true bill having been found against him while in custody under that charge for bigamy, he might be tried for the latter offence in the county of W. R. v. Jordan, Russ. & Ry. 48. The second marriage was at Manchester, and a warrant was issued by a magistrate there to apprehend the prisoner. He having removed to London, surrendered to one of the police magistrates there, who admitted him to bail. On his trial at the Old Bailey, the court, on an objection taken by his counsel, were of opinion, that as the warrant had not been produced, and as it had not been proved that the prisoner was apprehended in the county of Middlesex, the court had no jurisdiction to try him. R. v. Forsyth, 2 Leach, 826. But now the prisoner may be tried in the county in which he is in custody. See the statute, supra, p. 327.

But on a crown case reserved, eleven of the judges being present, it was decided (Parke, B., Alderson, B., and Maule, B., diss.), that an indictment for bigamy, found in a different county from that where the offence was committed, need not allege that the prisoner was in custody in the county where the indictment was found. R. v. Whiley, 1 C. & K. 150, 47 E. C. L.; 2 Moo. C. C. 186. In the marginal note of this case, given in 2 Moo. C. C. the word "not" is omitted, and it is in other respects erroneously reported. Per Parke, B., in R. v. Smythies, 1 Den. C. C. R. 499.

Under the former law the offence of bigamy was not committed if the second marriage took place out of the jurisdiction of the criminal courts of this country; 1 Hale, P. C. 692; 1 East, P. C. 645. But by the present statute this is specially provided for.

A British subject resident in England married a second wife in the lifetime of the first; both marriages took place in Scotland; it was held that he might be indicted and convicted of bigamy in England. R. v. Topping, 25 L. J., M. C. 72.

Proof in defence under the exceptions. The prisoner may prove

A man who in good faith marries and cohabits with a woman whose husband has remained absent for more than seven years together, without being heard from, and is believed by both parties to be dead, cannot be convicted of the crime of adultery therefor, although in fact her husband is still living. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 6 Allen, 591. S.

Bigamy is not punishable as an offence when the second marriage took place out of the State, though the husband brought his second wife here and lived with her. People v. Mosher, 2 Park. C. R. 195. S.

*under the first exception in the statute that he or she is not a subject of her majesty, and that the second marriage was not contracted in England or Ireland.

[*341

Secondly, the prisoner may prove that the other party to the first marriage has been continually absent from home for the space of seven years last past, and was not known to be living within that time. The question, whether a prisoner, setting up this defence, ought to show that he has used reasonable diligence to inform himself, as to the other party being alive, and whether, if he neglects the palpable means of availing himself of such information, he will stand excused, was, until lately, an undecided point. (See R. v. Cullen, 9 C. & P. 681, 38 E. C. L.; R. v. Jones, Carr. & M. 614, 41 E. C. L.; R. v. Briggs, Dears. & B. C. C. 98.) But where the wife was absent for seven years, it was decided that the burden of proving that the prisoner did know that his wife was alive within the seven years is on the prosecution, and that in the absence of evidence to that effect, he must be acquitted. R. v. Curgerwen, ante, p. 340. The mere fact that there are no circumstances leading to the inference that the absent party has died, does not raise a presumption of law that such party is alive. The prosecution must satisfy the jury that as a matter of fact such party is alive, and it is a question entirely for them. Where the only evidence is that the party was alive more than seven years ago, then there is no question for the jury, and it is a presumption of law that he is dead. R. v. Lumley, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 196; 38 L. J., M. C. 86.

It is submitted that it is good defence that the prisoner at the time of the second marriage honestly and bond fide believed that his first wife was dead, and had reasonable grounds for so believing. Per Cleasby, B., in R. v. Hoxton, 11 Cox, C. C. 670, following Martin, B., in R. v. Turner, 9 Cox, C. C. 145; but although these two decisions were cited, Brett, J., after consulting Willes, J., decided the contrary in R. v. Gibbons, 12 Cox, C. C. 237; and see R. v. Jones, 11 Cox, C. C. R. 358. In the case of R. v. Moore, reported in 13 Cox, C. C. 544, tried at Lincoln before Mr. Justice Denman, the learned judge, after taking time to consider the above authorities, and after consulting Amphlett, J. A., said, that if he had intended to inflict any punishment he should reserve a case; and that he and his brother judge were of opinion that a reasonable belief was a good defence. In this case evidence was given of a letter having been received announcing the death of the prisoner's first husband. In a still more recent case (Reg. v. Bennett, 14 Cox, C. C. 45), Bramwell, L. J., ruled the other way; but it should be noticed that the case Reg. v. Moore, supra, was not cited, and the prisoner was also found guilty of forgery and false pretences, so that no doubt his belief on the subject of his first wife's death did not appear to be very material. It is immaterial for how long or how short a time the first wife has been absent, except in so far as length of absence may tend to show the reasonableness of the belief. It is remarkable that in the elaborate judgment of Brett, J. A., in R. v. Prince (ante, tit. "Abduction"), in which he maintained the doctrine actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, that learned judge does not

allude to his reported ruling in R. v. Gibbons, supra. The doctrine would seem to be even more applicable in the latter case, because the act of marriage is in itself innocent, but in abduction the act itself is wrong. It has been suggested, however, that in R. v. Gibbons it was not clearly shown that the prisoner reasonably believed in the *death, but it seems she was simply ignorant on the subject. See Dig. of Crim. Law, p. 21, Sir J. F. Stephen.

*342] The third exception is, where the party, at the time of the second marriage, has been divorced from the bond of the first marriage. The words of the 1 Jac. 1, c. 11 (repealed), were "divorced by the sentence of any ecclesiastical court," and were held to extend to a divorce à menså et thoro. 1 Hale, P. C. 694; 4 Bl. Com. 164; 1 East, P. C. 467. But now a divorce à vinculo matrimonii must be proved. It is not always sufficient to prove a divorce out of England, where the first marriage was in this country. The prisoner was indicted for bigamy under the statute of 1 Jac. 1, c. 11 (repealed). It appeared that he had been married in England, and that he went to Scotland, and procured there a divorce à vinculo matrimonii, on the ground of adultery, before his second marriage. This, it was insisted, for the prisoner, was a good defence under the third exception in the statute of 1 Jac. 1; but, on a case reserved, the judges were unanimously of opinion that no sentence or Act of any foreign country could dissolve an English marriage à vinculo matrimonii, for ground on which it was not liable to be dissolved à vinculo matrimonii in England, and that no divorce of an ecclesiastical court was within the exception in sect. 3 of 1 Jac. 1, unless it was the divorce of a court within the limits to which the 1 Jac. 1 extends. R. v. Lolley, Russ. & Ry. 237.

The fourth exception is, where the former marriage has been declared void by the sentence of any court of competent jurisdiction. The words in the statute of 1 Jac. 1, c. 11 (repealed), were, "by sentence in the ecclesiastical court ;" and under these it was held that a sentence of the spiritual court against marriage, in a suit of jactitation of marriage, was not conclusive evidence, so as to stop the counsel for the crown from proving the marriage, the sentence having decided on the validity of the marriage only collaterally, and not directly. Duchess of Kingston's case, 11 St. Tr. 262, fo. ed.; 20 How. St. Tr. 355; 1 Leach, 146.1

1 On an indictment for bigamy, evidence that the defendant's marriage with the second wife had not been consummated by carnal knowledge of her body, is irrelevant. State v. Patterson, 2 Ired. 346, S.

Nature of the offence. Bribery is a misdemeanor punishable at common law. Bribery in strict sense, says Hawkins, is taken for a great misprision of one in a judicial place, taking any valuable thing except meat and drink of small value of any man who has to do before him in any way, for doing his office, or by color of his office. In a large sense, it is taken for the receiving or offering of any undue reward by or to any person whomsoever, whose ordinary profession or business relates to the administration of justice, in order to incline him to do a thing against the known rules of honesty and integrity. Also bribery sometimes signifies the taking or giving a reward for offices of a public nature. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 67, ss. 1, 2, 3.

An attempt to bribe is a misdemeanor, as much as the act of successful bribery, as where a bribe is offered to a judge, and refused by him. 3 Inst. 147. So it has been held, that an attempt to bribe a cabinet minister, for the purpose of procuring an office, is a misdemeanor. Vaughan's case, 4 Burr. 2494. So an attempt to bribe, in the case of an election to a corporate office, is punishable. Plumpton's case, 2 Ld. Raym. 1377.

Bribery at elections for members of parliament. By the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 51, s. 1) :— (1.) Any person who corruptly by himself or by any other person, either before, during, or after an election, directly or indirectly gives or provides, or pays wholly or in part the expense of giving or providing, any meat, drink, entertainment or provision to or for any person, for the purpose of corruptly influencing that person or any other person to give or refrain from giving his vote at the election, or on account of such person or any other person having voted or refrained from voting, or being about to vote or refrain from voting at such election, shall be guilty of treating.

(2.) And every elector who corruptly accepts or takes any such meat, drink, entertainment or provision shall also be guilty of treating.

Sect. 2. Every person who shall directly or indirectly, by himself, or by any other person on his behalf, make use of or threaten to make use of any force, violence, or restraint, or inflict or threaten to inflict, by himself or by any other person, any temporal or spiritual injury, damage, harm, or loss upon or against any person in order to induce or compel such person to vote or refrain from voting, or on account

of such person having voted or refrained from voting at any election, or who shall by abduction, duress, or any fraudulent device or contrivance impede or prevent the free exercise of the franchise of any *elector, or shall thereby compel, induce, or prevail upon any *344] elector either to give or to refrain from giving his vote at any election, shall be guilty of undue influence.

Sect. 3. The expression "corrupt practice," as used in this Act, means any of the following offences, namely, treating and undue influence as defined by this Act, and bribery, and personation, as defined by the enactments set forth in Part III. of the Third Schedule to this Act, and aiding, abetting, counselling, and procuring the commission of the offence of personation, and every offence which is a corrupt practice within the meaning of this Act shall be a corrupt practice within the meaning of the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868. The principal enactment referred to in the above section as being contained in Part III. of the Third Schedule is the 17 & 18 Vict. c. 102, which by sect. 2 defines the offence of bribery, and enacts that the following persons shall be deemed guilty of bribery. 1. Every person who shall, directly or indirectly, by himself, or by any other person on his behalf, give, lend, or agree to give or lend, or shall offer, promise, or promise to procure, any money or valuable consideration, to or for any voter, or to or for any person on behalf of any voter, to or for any other person, in order to induce any voter to vote, or refrain from voting, or shall corruptly do any such act as aforesaid, on account of such voter having voted or refrained from voting at any election; 2. Every person who shall, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf, give or procure, or agree to give or procure, or offer, promise, or promise to procure or to endeavor to procure, any office, place, or employment to or for any voter, or to or for any person on behalf of any voter, or to or for any other person in order to induce such voter to vote, or refrain from voting, or shall corruptly do any such act as aforesaid, on account of any voter having voted or refrained from voting at any election; 3. Every person who shall, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person on his behalf, make any such gift, loan, offer, promise, procurement, or agreement, as aforesaid, to or for any person, in order to induce such person to procure, or endeavor to procure, the return of any person to serve in parliament, or the vote of any voter at any election; 4. Every person who shall, upon or in consequence of any such gift, loan, offer, promise, procurement, or agreement, procure or engage, promise, or endeavor to procure, the return of any person to serve in parliament, or the vote of any voter at any election; 5. Every person who shall advance or pay, or cause to be paid, any money to or to the use of any other person, with the intent that such money or any part thereof shall be expended in bribery at any election, or who shall knowingly pay or cause to be paid any money to any person in discharge or repayment of any money wholly or in part expended in bribery at any election. (The concluding portion of the above section provided for the punishment of persons guilty of any of the above offences. This portion of the section has been repealed,