Statute. The offence of concealing the birth of a child was first provided against by the 21 Jac. 1, c. 27, which was repealed by the 43 Geo. 3, c. 58. The latter statute was also repealed and the offence provided for by the 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 14. This is also repealed; and now by the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 60, "if any woman shall be delivered of a child, every person who shall, by any secret disposition of the dead body of the said child, whether such child die before, at, or after its birth, endeavor to conceal the birth thereof, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor: provided, that if any person tried for the murder of any child shall be acquitted thereof, it shall be lawful for the jury by whose verdict such person shall be acquitted, to find, in case it shall so appear in evidence, that the child had recently been born, and that such person did, by some secret disposition of the dead body of such child, endeavor to conceal the birth thereof, and thereupon the court may pass such sentence, as if such person had been convicted upon an indictment for the concealment of the birth." 1 Upon a prosecution for this offence, the prosecutor, after establishing the birth of the child, must prove the secret burying or other disposal of a dead body, the identity of the body with that of the child so born, and the endeavor to conceal the birth. In general, the evidence to prove the first point will also tend to establish the last. Secret disposition of the body. What has been a sufficient disposal of the body has hitherto been a matter of doubt. Where the evidence was, that the prisoner had been delivered of a child, and had placed it in a drawer, where it was found locked up, the drawer being opened by a key taken from the prisoner's pocket, Maule, J., directed an acquittal, being of opinion that the former statute by the words, "buried or otherwise disposed of," contemplated a final disposing of the body. R. v. Ash, 2 Moo. & R. 294. So where the prisoner had placed the child in a box in her bed-room, Rolfe, B., held that the disposing of the body must be in some place intended for its final 'See Pennsylvania v. McKee, Addison, 1; Boyles v. Commonwealth, 2 S. & R. 50. If the child is proved to have been born dead, though the mother concealed its birth, she cannot be convicted. State v. Kirby, 57 Me. 30. S. deposit. R. v. Bell, MS. 2 Moo. & R. 294. These authorities have since been overruled. R. v. Goldthorpe, 2 Moo. C. C. R. 244. There the prisoner had been suspected of being with child, but always denied it, and after her delivery persisted in denying that she had been delivered, but on being pressed by the surgeon who examined *her, she confessed that the child was between the bed and the mattress, where it was discovered. The case having been re- [*401 served, was considered at a meeting of the judges in Michaelmas term, 1841, at which all the judges, except Alderson, B., Patteson, Erskine, and Bosanquet, JJ., were present, when Lord Abinger, C. B., Maule, J., and Ralfe, B., thought the conviction bad; the other judges held it good, and the conviction was affirmed. The point was again reserved in R. v. Perry, Dears. C. C. R. 473; 24 L. J., M. C. 137. There the prisoner placed the dead body of the child under the bolster, with the intention of endeavoring, as far as she could, to conceal the body from the surgeon, but with the intention of removing it elsewhere when an opportunity offered. This was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal (Pollock, C. B., dissentiente) to be disposing of a dead body within the statute. And it appears from the case of R. v. Opie, 8 Cox, C. C. 332, that Martin, B., took the same view as the Lord Chief Baron. Where the prisoner denied to her mistress that she was in the family way, but told the doctor she had been confined and the child was in a box in her bed-room, and the child was found in a box with the lid open in her bed-room, Byles, J., left it to the jury to say if they thought this was a secret disposition of the body. In his opinion it was not. R. v. Sleep, 9 Cox, C. C. 559. Where the prisoner put the dead body of her child over a wall into a field where there was no path, this was held to be a secret disposition. R. v. Brown, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 244; 39 L. J., M. C. 94. Where the prisoner was stopped going across a yard, in the direction of a privy, with a bundle, which on examination was found to be a cloth sewed up, containing the body of a child; it was held by Gurney, B., that the prisoner could not be convicted, the offence not having been completed. R. v. Snell, 2 Moo. & R. 44. Evidence was given that the prisoner denied her pregnancy, and also, after the birth of the child, denied that also; but she afterwards confessed to a surgeon that she had borne a child. The body of the child was, on the same day, found among the soil in the privy. Patteson, J., held it to be essential to the commission of the offence, that the prisoner should have done some act of disposal of the body after the child was dead; therefore if she had gone to the privy for another purpose and the child came from her unawares, and fell into the soil, and was suffocated, she must be acquitted of the charge, notwithstanding her denial of the birth of the child. The prisoner was acquitted. R. v. Turner, 8 C. & P. 755, 34 E. C. L. See also R. v. Coxhead, 1 C. &. K. 623, 47 E. C. L. Frances Douglas and one Robert Hall were indicted for the murder of a female child, of which they were acquitted; whereupon the jury were desired to inquire whether the female was guilty of endeavoring to conceal the birth. The prisoners had been living together for some time, and in the night, or rather about four in the morning, she was delivered of the child, in the presence of the male prisoner, who was the father of it, and who, with his two sons, aged fourteen and ten, all slept on the same pallet with her, up four pairs of stairs. The male prisoner very soon afterwards put the child (which had not been separated from the after-birth) into a pan, carried it down stairs into the cellar, and threw the whole into the privy, the female prisoner remaining in bed up stairs. She was proved to have said she knew it was to be done. The fact of her being with child was, some time before her delivery, known by her mother, who lived at some distance, and was apparent to other women. No female was present at the *delivery; one had been sent for at the commencement of the *402] labor, about twelve at night, but was so ill that she could not attend. There were no clothes prepared, or other provision made, but the parties were in a state of the most abject poverty and destitution. The jury found her guilty of endeavoring to conceal the birth, and two points were reserved for the opinion of the judges: 1st, Whether there was evidence to convict the prisoner as a principal? 2ndly, whether, in point of law, the conviction was good? The case was argued before all the judges (except Park, J.), who were of opinion that the communication made to other persons was only evidence, but no bar, and that the conviction was good; but they recommended a pardon. R. v. Douglas, 1 Moo. C. Č. 480. So in R. v. Skelton, 3 C. & K. 119, Vaughan Williams, J., directed the jury, that if a woman be delivered of a child which is dead, and a man take the body and secretly bury it, she was indictable for the concealment by secret burying under s. 14 of the former statute, and he for aiding and abetting under s. 31, if there was a common purpose in both in thus endeavoring to conceal the birth of the child; but that the jury must be satisfied, not only that she wished to conceal the birth, but was a party to the carrying that wish into effect by the secret burial by the hand of the man, in pursuance of a common design between them. Platt, B., had ruled in a similar way in R. v. Bird, 2 C. & K. 817, 61 E. C. L. An indictment for endeavoring to conceal the birth of a child need not state whether the child died before, at, or after the birth. R. v. Coxhead, 1 C. & K. 623, 47 E. C. L. It seems, per Martin, B., that a foetus not bigger than a man's finger, but having the shape of a child, is "a child" within the statute. R. v. Colmer, 9 Cox, C. C. 506; but in R. v. Hewitt, 4 F. & F. 1101, Smith, J., left it to the jury to say whether what the prisoner had concealed was a child or was only a fœtus. The words of the statute are 66 any secret disposition of the dead body;" and, where a woman deposited a child while alive in a field, and there left it to die, and the dead body of the child was afterwards found, it was held that the woman could not be convicted under the statute. R. v. Jane May, 10 Cox, C. C. R. 448. Upon an indictment for the murder of a child, any person, on failure of the proof as to the murder, may be now convicted by the statute of endeavoring to conceal the birth. Formerly no person but the mother could be so convicted. R. v. Wright, 9 C. & P. 754, 38 E. C. L. Where the bill for murder was not found by the grand jury, and the prisoner was tried for murder on the coroner's inquisition; it was held, that she might be found guilty of the concealment, the words of the stat. 43 Geo. 3, c. 58 (repealed), being, that "it shall be lawful for the jury, by whose verdict any person charged with such murder shall be acquitted, to find," and the judges holding that the coroner's inquisition was a charge, so as to justify the finding of the concealment. R. v. Maynard, Russ. & Ry. 240; R. v. Cole, 2 Leach, 1095; 3 Camp. 371. It may be observed, that the word charge does not occur in the statute 9 Geo. 4, c. 31 (repealed); yet there seems no doubt that the prisoner might be so convicted under the new statute, for she is "tried for the murder of her child," as much on the inquisition as the indictment. 1 Russ. Cri. 807 (n), 5th ed. note by Greaves. *OTHER OFFENCES AGAINST CHILDREN. [*403 The offences of concealment of birth and of abandonment and neglect of children are offences which relate to children only, but additional provisions have been made for the protection of children in many cases where the act done would be an offence if done against an adult. These will be found treated of under the titles of those offences in their general character. For child-stealing and abduction, see "Abduction." For assaults upon children, see "Assaults." For rape of children, see "Rape." For manslaughter of children, see "Manslaughter." For illtreating helpless persons, see "Illtreating Apprentices." For matters of defence with respect to children, see tit. "General Matters of Defence-Infancy." *COIN-OFFENCES RELATING TO. *404] Interpretation clause Counterfeiting gold and silver coin Coloring coin or metal with intent to make it pass as gold or silver coin 405 Uttering base copper coin Counterfeiting foreign gold and silver coin Impairing or diminishing gold or silver coin Possession of filings or clippings of gold or silver coin Buying or selling counterfeit gold or silver coin Importing counterfeit gold or silver coin Exporting counterfeit coin Uttering counterfeit gold or silver coin' 406 406 406 407 407 407 Uttering counterfeit gold or silver coin, having possession of other Having possession of counterfeit gold or silver coin Uttering or having possession of counterfeit gold or silver coin after Uttering foreign coin, medals, etc., as current gold and silver coin Defacing coin uttering 413 415 415 416 417 Importing foreign counterfeit gold and silver coin Uttering foreign counterfeit gold and silver coin Second offence of uttering foreign counterfeit gold and silver coin Third offence of uttering foreign counterfeit gold and silver coin Counterfeiting foreign coin other than gold and silver coin Venue Proof of coin being counterfeit When offence of counterfeiting is complete Punishment of principals in the second degree, and accessories Counterfeit medals Proof of counterfeiting possession of counterfeit coin Proceedings for twice uttering Proceedings after a previous conviction Offences with regard to coining tools THE laws against coining and other similar offences were consolidated by the 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 34, by which the former statutes were repealed. This statute has been now repealed, and the provisions against these offences are now contained in the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 99. Interpretation of terms. By s. 1, "in the interpretation of and for *the purposes of this act, the expression 'the queen's current *405] gold or silver coin,' shall include any gold or silver coined in any of her Majesty's mints, or lawfully current by virtue of any proclamation or otherwise in any part of her Majesty's dominions, whether within the United Kingdom or otherwise; and the expression 'the queen's copper coin,' shall include any copper coin and any coin of bronze or mixed metal coined in any part of her Majesty's mints, or lawfully current by virtue of any proclamation or otherwise, in any |