but if he deny that he had been so previously convicted, or stand mute of malice, or will not answer directly to such question, the jury shall then be charged to inquire concerning such previous conviction or convictions, and in such case it shall not be necessary to swear the jury again, but the oath already taken by them shall for all purposes be deemed to extend to such last-mentioned inquiry: provided that if upon the trial of any person for any such subsequent offence, such person shall give evidence of his good character, it shall be lawful for the prosecutor in answer thereto, to give evidence of the conviction of such person for the previous offence or offences, before such verdict of guilty shall be returned, and the jury shall inquire concerning such previous conviction or convictions at the same time that they inquire concerning such subsequent offence.

The above section applies to indictments under s. 12. In the former editions of Archbold's Criminal Pleading, the form of indictment under sect. 12 used to commence with charging the previous conviction, and it was the usual custom at the trial to prove the *previous conviction first, in order to show that the offence *417] amounted to a "felony." This has now been altered, and it has been held that the mode of proceeding provided by the above section must in all cases be followed. R. v. Martin, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 214; 39 L. J., M. C. 31; ante, p. 194. But in an indictment under s. 12, for the felony of uttering counterfeit coin after a previous conviction for a like offence, if the jury find the prisoner guilty of the uttering, but negative the previous conviction, he cannot be convicted of the misdemeanor of uttering. R. v. Thomas, L. R. 2 C. C. 141; 44 L. J., M. C. 42 (ante, p. 84).

Offences relating to coining tools. The prisoner employed a diesinker to make, for a pretended innocent purpose, a die, calculated to make shillings; the die-sinker suspecting fraud, informed the commissioners of the Mint, and under their directions made the die for the purpose of detecting the prisoner. On a case reserved, it was held that the die-sinker was an innocent agent, and that the prisoner was rightly convicted as a principal, under the 2 Will. 4, c. 34, s. 10. R. v. Bannen, 2 Moody, C. C. R. 309; 1 C. & K. 295, 47 E. C. L.; R, v. Harvey, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 284; 40 L. J., M. C. 63, infra. The particular tool specified must be proved. With regard to all the tools mentioned in the new statute, it should be observed that they are described to be such as will impress "any part or parts of both or either of the sides" of any of the king's current gold or silver coin; a description of tool not included in the former acts. The new statute, like the former, divides the coining instruments into those upon which there shall be "made or impressed," and those "which will make and impress" the figure, etc., of both or either of the sides of the lawful coin. The following case therefore is still applicable: The prisoner

1 If one pass counterfeit money, and another in any way aids and abets its passage, knowing it to be counterfeit, an intent to defraud may be inferred, and both are guilty. State v. Mix, 15 Mo. 153. S.

was indicted for having in his custody a mould upon which there was made and impressed, etc., the figure of a shilling. The mould bore the resemblance of a shilling inverted, viz., the convex parts being concave in the mould; and it was objected that it should have been described as an instrument which would make or impress, etc., and not as one on which was made and impressed, etc.; but a great majority of the judges were of opinion that the evidence maintained the indictment, because the stamp of the current coin was impressed upon the mould. They agreed, however, that it would have been more accurate had the instrument been described as one "which would make or impress." R. v. Lennard, 1 Leach, 92; 1 East, P. C. 170.

To convict a prisoner upon an indictment under the repealed statute, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 34, s. 10, charging him with having in his possession "one mould upon which was impressed the figure and apparent resemblance" of the obverse side of a shilling, Patteson, J., held that the jury must be satisfied that, at the time the prisoner had it in his possession, the whole of the obverse side of a shilling was impressed on the mould. R. v. Foster, 7 C. & P. 494, 32 E. C. L. But on a second indictment against the same prisoner, under the above section, for making a mould "intended to make and impress the figure and apparent resemblance" of the obverse side of a shilling, the same learned judge ruled that it was sufficient to prove that the prisoner made the mould, and a part of the impression, though he had not completed the entire impression. Id. 495. An indictment alleging that the prisoner had in his possession a mould, "upon which said mould was made and impressed the figure and apparent resemblance" of the obverse side of *a sixpence, was held bad, on demurrer; as not sufficiently [*418 showing that the impression was on the mould at the time it was in the prisoner's possession. A fresh indictment, with the words "then and there" before the words "made and impressed" was held good. R. v. Richmond, 1 C. & K. 240, 47 E. C. L.

Upon the repealed statute of 8 & 9 Will. 3, c. 26, it was held that it was not confined to such instruments as, used by the hand, unconnected with any other power, will produce the effect. produce the effect. A collar marking the edge, by having the coin forced through it by machinery, is an instrument within the act, though this mode of marking the edges is of modern invention. R. v. Moore, 1 Moody, C. C. 122.

The words "figure, stamp, or apparent resemblance," do not mean an exact resemblance; but if the instrument will impress a resemblance in point of fact such as will impose upon the world, it is sufficient. R. v. Ridgely, 1 East, P. C. 171; 1 Leach, 189. See R. v. Richmond, as to how the indictment should be framed, where a coining mould is made and impressed to resemble the obverse of a coin which is partly defaced by wear. 1 C. & K. 240, 47 E. C. L.

The section (s. 24) says, "whosoever without lawful authority or excuse (the proof whereof shall lie on the party accused), etc." An indictment charged that the prisoner "without lawful excuse, etc." It was held that the indictment must negative the excuse although the burden of proof is cast upon the accused, but that it need only nega

tive the "lawful excuse" (which included lawful authority). R. v. Harvey, L. R., 1 C. C. R. 284; 40 L. J., M. C. 63.

The prisoner's intention as to the use he intends to make of dies of current coin need not be inquired into; if he is knowingly in possession of them without lawful authority or excuse, that is a felony.

supra.

Id.

Compounding felonies. Though the bare taking again of a man's own goods which have been stolen (without favor shown to the thief) is no offence, Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 59, s. 7; yet where a man either takes back the goods, or receives other amends, on condition of not prosecuting, this is a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment. Id. s. 5. And so in any other felony an agreement not to prosecute an indictment for reward is punishable as a misdemeanor; though nearly all the precedents of indictments for this species of offence seem to be confined to theft-bote, or that kind of composition of felony which has reference to the recovery of property of which the owner has been deprived. Where, in an indictment for compounding a felony, it was averred that the defendant did desist, and from that time hitherto had desisted from all further prosecution, and it appeared that after the alleged compounding he prosecuted the offender to conviction, Bosanquet, J., directed an acquittal. R. v. Stone, 4 C. & P. 379, 19 E. C. L.; see 1 Rus. Cri. 293 (k) 5th ed.

Compounding misdemeanors. Whether, at common law, the compounding of misdemeanor is in any case a misdemeanor, is perhaps doubtful. Such agreements, when not made under the permission of a court of justice, are clearly, in many cases, illegal. Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 341; 4 Bl. Comm. 363; Beeley v. Wingfield, 11 East, 46; R. v. Hardey, 14 Q. B. 529, 68 E. C. L. And even when made with the permission of the court, Keir v. Leeman, 9 Q. B. 371, 58 E. C. L.

Compounding informations on penal statutes. By 18 Eliz. c. 5, s. 4, if any informer, by color or pretence of process, or without process upon color or pretence of any manner of offence against any penal law, make any composition, or take any money, reward, or promise of reward, without the order or consent of the court, he shall stand two hours in the pillory, be forever disabled to sue on any popular or penal statute, and shall forfeit ten pounds. This statute does not

1 Taking a promissory note as a consideration for not prosecuting a larceny, is sufficient to constitute the offence. Commonwealth v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91. See Commonwealth v. Corry, 2 Mass. 524. S.

extend to penalties only recoverable by information before justices. R. v. Crisp, 1 B. & Ald. 282. But it is not necessary, to bring the case within the statute, that there should be an action or other proceeding pending. R. v. Gotley, Russ. & Ry. 84. A mere threat to prosecute for the recovery of penalties, not amounting to an indictable offence at common law, is yet, it seems, within the above statute. R. v. Southerton, 6 East, 126. A person may be convicted, under this *420] *statute, of taking money, though no offence liable to a penalty has been committed by the person from whom the money is taken. R. v. Best, 2 Moo. C. C. 124; 9 C. & P. 868, 38 E. C. L.

Misprision of felony. Somewhat analogous to the offence of compounding felony is that of misprision of felony. Misprision of felony is the concealment or procuring the concealment of felony, whether such felonies be at common law or by statute. Hawk. P. C. b. 1, c. 59, s. 2. Silently to observe the commission of a felony, without using any endeavor to apprehend the offender, is a misprision. Id. (n); 1 Hale, P. C. 431, 448, 533. If to the knowledge there be added assent, the party will become an accessory. 4 Bl. Comm. 121. The punishment for this offence is fine and imprisonment, and provision against the commission of it by sheriffs, coroners, and other officers, are contained in the 3 Edw. 1, c. 9.

Taking rewards for helping to recover stolen goods-advertising rewards, etc. Similar to the offence of compounding a felony is that of taking a reward for the return of stolen property, and advertising a reward for the same purpose. These offences were formerly provided against by the statute, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, ss. 58, 59 (E.), and the 9 Geo. 4, c. 55, ss. 51, 52 (I.), which are repealed; and now by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 101, "whosoever shall corruptly take any money or reward, directly or indirectly, under pretence, or upon account of helping any person to any chattel, money, valuable security, or other property whatsoever, which shall by any felony or misdemeanor have been stolen, taken, obtained, extorted, embezzled, converted, or disposed of as in this act before mentioned, shall, unless he shall have used all due diligence to cause the offender to be brought to trial for the same, be guilty of felony, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding seven years, and not less than three [now five] years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor, and with or without solitary confinement, and, if a male under the age of eighteen years, with or without whipping." Upon an indictment under this statute, it is not necessary to show that the prisoner had any connection with the commission of the previous felony; it is sufficient if the evidence satisfies the jury that the prisoner had some corrupt and improper design when he received the money, and did not bona fide intend to use such means as he could for the detection and punishment of the offender. R. v. King, 1 Cox, C. C. 36. Where A. was charged under