the veneration which should always be manifested for the Sacred Name, should lead Christians, and Christian Ministers, to be as sparing in their use of this name, as due regard to the illustration of their subject will admit. "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." This is high authority, and claims regard in a more extensive sense than Christians at first sight might seem to think.

Many persons fancy, if they are speaking on religious subjects, or offering up prayer to the "Most High," they are at liberty to use this name at the beginning, middle, and ending of almost every sentence; and by doing so, they are not aware, though I have frequently observed it to be the case, they make some of their addresses really without meaning. To such I would say, remember the third commandment, and unnecessary repetition is vain. We know that, in common conversation, it is considered very ill bred, and very vulgar, to repeat the name of the person we are addressing in every sentence. Having mentioned the person's name at the commencement of our discourse, the personal pronouns I, thou, he, and you, are quite sufficient in future to make our address to be fully understood. All good orators, I have observed, avoid a too frequent repetition of the name of God, both in their preaching and prayers, and their doing so is admired by all sensible hearers. The late Mr. Newton, in writing to a friend on this subject, said, he did not like Ministers, in their discourses, to "chime on the name of Jesus ;" and he was not sure but in doing so to the extent that some did it, little short of a profanation of the divine name was committed.

The worshippers of Baal called out from morning till noon, "O Baal hear us!" but Elijah's address to the hearer of prayer was simple, and unattended by vain repeti. tion. The form of prayer dictated by our Lord, which he has commanded us in our prayers to imitate, is unaccompa nied with the repetition of the name of God. What, then, are we to think of those preachers, the one half nearly of whose sermons and prayers are made up of repetitions of the Sacred Name? I do not accuse them of intended irreverence; but to me it argues, that such persons either come forth very ill prepared for their work, or that they have fallen into a very inexcusable error, in imagining, that by unceasingly pronouncing the name of God, their

discourses will be better received. I assure such Minis. ters, if they knew the mind of their hearers, such a practice is almost universally disliked. I have heard it condemned both by the religious and irreligious, and I really hope many of our Ministers will alter their general practice on this head. In prayer, the very frequent repetition of the divine name is quite out of place; for in such an exercise it is not required. "Holy and Reverend" is his name, let all his people sanctify it, and pray that it may be so throughout the earth.-Amen.

F.

MEETINGS OF PRESBYTERY.

IT is to be feared there are many who are disposed to look upon Meetings of Presbytery, whether stated or oc casional, as mere matters of form, with which the advance ment of religion is by no means intimately connected. This is an error practically injurious to the vitals of christianity. We admit the importance of forms and rules, which should be strictly observed, so that "all things be done decently, and in order;" but more than outward form and rule is necessary, if we would be instrumental in advancing the cause of Christ. I look upon Ministers, with Elders from the different churches, convened in Presbytery, as assembled to call upon God in prayer, for the aid of his Spirit, to teach them to be wise, to win souls to Christ, to consult concerning the prosperity of the Redeemer's kingdom, and to give each other a word of comfort or admonition, as their varying circumstances may require. In such a meeting, the spirit of the Master, and not of the world, should be manifest. Paul says, "If any man have not the Sprit of Christ, he is none of his." And what is true of any man, is peculiarly true of Ministers and Elders. But the Spirit of Christ is a Spirit of holy awe and solemnity. Therefore, in the meetings of the councils of the church, there is no place for "foolish talking or jesting, which is not convenient." Every meeting of Presbytery should be characterized by the piety and Christian circumspection of its members. We know that the God of our fathers is faithful to his promises; and if Presbyteries, in their meetings, act with a single eye to His glory, the Lord will guide them in all their deliberations, and give them strength to resist the adversary. But if,

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like foolish politicians, they put confidence in their own wisdom, and ask not council of the Lord, they will find that God will leave them to the waywardness of their own imaginings. In this land, the Lord has favoured the Presbyterian Church. She is not now as a moveable tent in the wilderness, but "as a city set on a bill, which cannot be hid." And as her Presbyteries form a distinguished part of her "walls and bulwarks," according as they are manned and defended, so will it be with the safety and prosperity of her citizens. That meetings of Presbytery have, of late years, undergone a vast improvement in the spirituality of their character, is generally acknowledged. For what we have thus attained, let us be thankful; but in what we have attained, let us not rest; but forgetting what is behind, and looking to what is yet before, let us, as church courts, press to the mark, for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. Let a meeting of Presbytery never be a meeting of forms and routine. Let it never be a law court for trial, and register, and recovery of debts. Let it never be an assembly for mirth and worldly enjoyment. Let it never be an arena for speech making or angry collisions. Let it never be a meeting for mere formal hearing and criticising of sermons. Let it never be a meeting where hurry supersedes efficiency, and want of time is pleaded for work half done. Let it never be a meeting where the uncouth and ridiculous "Satis"* cuts short a discourse in the midst of its delivery, as if showing to the people, that Ministers soonest wearied in listening to the word of God. Let it never be a meeting where the business of the church pauses to give time to debate the hour of dinner, as if Ministers and Elders were converted into a mere assembly of Bon Vivants. But let it be a meeting for solemn thoughts, for brotherly encouragement, for faithful exposition, for earnest prayer, for diligent instruetion, for patient examination into the state of the churches, and the impediments or progress of religion,then will the blessing from the Lord descend upon our works, and our hands shall be made strong by the mighty God of Jacob. W. C.

We believe the unseemly custom to what our correspondent alludes, of cutting short an english sermon by a latin word, (“Satis—enough,”) is now almost extinct. The practice of half-hearing the sermons of candidates for the ministry, we care not under what pretence or excuse, we join with our correspondent to denounce; and we are happy to believe, it is nearly or altogether exploded.-EDI?

DEFENCE OF A STUDENT OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

SIR,

TO THE EDITOR OF THE ORTHODOX PRESBYTERIAN.

HAVING already imitated one of your Correspondents, in "answering a fool according to his folly," I wish to take the advice which you give to another Correspondent,-"Answer not a fool according to his folly." Dismissing, therefore, as unworthy of any further attention, all the inquiries which naturally suggest themselves, concerning the character and designs of "A Lover of True Philosophy," on which he is himself throwing much light, I shall confine myself to the explanation and defence of some of my statements on points of general interest, which he has assailed with great violence. As your space is very limited, I shall at present confine myself to two.

1. I said, "all knowledge, if it be genuine, i. e., if it be knowledge at all, is alike certain." A candid critic would at once admit that the term knowledge is here used, not vaguely as my opponent uses it, but with a peculiar restriction and definition. I shall now show that the implied definition is sanctioned by our best writers. The term has been very commonly used in this sense in philosophical writings since the time of Locke, to whom I formerly referred. In the 4th book of his Essay on Human Understanding, we have the following statements, and many others of similar import:-"The mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood; 1st. Knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubtedly satisfied of, the agreement or disagreement of any ideas; 2d. Judgment, which is the putting ideas together, and separating them from one another in the mind, where their certain agreement or disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so; which is, as the word imports, taken to be so before it certainly appears."' "The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is judgment."-(Book 4, ch. 14.) Again it is said, "These two, namely intuition and demonstration, are the degrees of our knowledge: whatever comes short of one of these, with what assurance soever embraced, is but faith or opinion, but not knowledge, at least in all general truths."-He adds to these a third degree of knowledge, which he calls sensitive, derived from perception and consciousness.-(Book 4, chap. 2.) Subsequent writers, though they disapprove of Locke's application of the word knowledge to a faculty of the mind, yet adopt his restrictions of it to perceiving with certainty. Thus Dr. Reid expressly says, "In knowledge, we judge without doubting; in opinions, with some mixture of doubt."-Johnson, in his dictionary, also gives, as the first and leading signification of knowledge, "Certain perception, indubitable apprehension."-Hence the word is often used as equivalent to the kindred term science': and is restricted to intuition and demonstration. To show that this phraseology is still in common use, I shall quote the words of a book praised for its elegant and correct style, published in 1830. "Truths are either known, believed, or probable. Knowledge alone implies certainty, or that concerning which doubt would be absolutely absurd.-Knowledge and belief are commonly confounded, though very different things. Whatever we really know, certainly is; what we merely believe, may possibly [not be."-(Morehead's Dialogues on Natural and Revealed Religion, p. 456.) I cannot

therefore think it very erroneous to say, that "all knowledge, if it be genuine, is alike certain." What else, indeed, can be said of knowledge, as distinguished from mere opinion, judgment, belief, persuasion, &c.? 2. I have also said, "Truth is an attribute of mind.-Nay, that truth is either an attribute of mind, or it is nothing. It is either in mind, or it is no where." Here I use the word truth according to its primary and proper meaning; and not in that loose and shuffling way in which it is often employed by careless writers, but by none more than my self-sufficient opponent. Johnson gives, as its primary meaning, "conformity of notions to things." Here, then, it is a property or attribute of notions. And what are notions, but states of mind? Can that which is an attribute of a notion be any thing but an attribute of mind; or exist any where but in the mind? This view also corresponds to the etymology of the word, as explained by Horne Tooke, with which school-boys are now familiar. "It is," says he, "the third person singular of the indicative TROW. It was formerly written troweth, trowth, trouth, and troth. And it means-that which one troweth, i. e. thinketh or firmly believeth." He adds, "Truth supposes mankind; for whom, and by whom" alone, the word "is formed, and to whom only it is applicable. If no man, no truth.” (Diversions of Purley, part 2, chap. 5.) This etymology is commonly regarded as unquestionable; and it completely justifies my assertion, which you observe is more cautious, and I think more correct, than Horne Tooke's. Instead of saying, "if no man no truth," I would say, and have virtually said, "if no mind no truth." In all the applications of the word, even in the loosest of them, (except in that of my opponent,) there is a pointed reference to acts of mind. Even when it seems to denote, in the first instance, something else-a reality, a fact, an object out of the mind-still what it chiefly expresses is a reality as perceived or perceivable by the mind. The great idea expressed is, the perception, or perceivableness of the thing. Hence it sometimes means a reality viewed, as what may be perceived by mind, or of which mind may have a notion: sometimes it denotes the perception or notion of a reality; and then it comes to have the more general or abstract meaning given by Johnson, Conformity of notions to things."-Now, I ask, does it not in all these ways, and in every correct application of it, express or refer to an attribute of mind? Mind must always be supposed, as that with which truth is connected.

While the common use of the term thus refers to mind, philosophical writers have taken pains to ascertain and express what it is about mind which it denotes. Much is said on this subject in the 2d and 4th books of Locke's Essay, which no one can read without being at once impressed with the views I am now giving. In book 4, chap. 5, sec. 8, in which he brings his speculations to a point, he says, "Real truth is about ideas agreeing with things." He states also, that "what he has said about real knowledge, (in the 4th chap.) applies exactly to real truths."--Now his words in that chapter are, "Our knowledge is real, only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things." Locke's account has been commonly adopted in philosophical writingse. g. Campbell, in his Philosophy of Rhetoric, (book 1, chap. 5,) says, "Logical truth consisteth in the conformity of our conceptions to their archetypes in nature."-Such is generally understood to be the proper meaning of the term in philosophical language: whereas my opponent uses it, with extreme perversity, to denote what correct writers would call