fo long therefore as we keep within the design and intention of a law, that law will justify us, as well in foro confcientiæ, as in foro humano, whatever be the equity or expediency of the law itfelf. But when we convert to one purpose, a rule or expreffion of law, which is intended for another purpofe; then, we plead in our juftification, not the intention of the law, but the words; that is, we plead a dead letter, which can fignify nothing: for words without meaning or intention have no force or effect in juftice, much less words taken contrary to the meaning and intention of the speaker or writer. To apply this distinction to the examples just now proposed in order to protect men against antiquated demands, from which it is not probable they should have preferved the evidence of their discharge, the law prefcribes a limited time to certain fpecies of private fecurities, beyond which, it will not enforce them, or lend its affiftance to the recovery of the debt. If a man be ignorant, or dubious of the juftice of the demand made upon him, he may confcientiously plead this limitation; because he applies the rule of law to the purpose for which it was intended. But when he refuses to pay a debt, of the reality of which he is confcious, he cannot, as before, plead plead the intention of the ftatute, and the fupreme authority of law, unless he could fhew, that the law intended to interpofe its fupreme authority, to acquit men of debts, of the exiftence and juftice of which they were themselves fenfible. Again, to preferve youth from the practices and impofitions, to which their inexperience expofes them, the law compels the payment of no debts incurred within a certain age, nor the performance of any engagements, except` for fuch neceffaries as are fuited to their condition and fortunes. If a young person therefore perceive that he has been practised or imposed upon, he may honestly avail himself of the privilege of his non-age to defeat the circumvention. But, if he shelter himself under this privilege, to avoid a fair obligation, or an equitable contract, he extends the privilege to a cafe, in which it is not allowed by intention of law, and in which confequently it does not, in natural justice, exift. As property is the principal fubject of Justice, or" of the determinate relative duties," we have put down what we had to fay upon it in the firft place: we now proceed to ftate these duties in the beft order we can. CHAP. CHA P. V. PROMISE S. I. 1. FROM whence the obligation to perform promifes arifes. II. In what fenfe promifes are to be interpreted. III. In what cafes promises are not binding. I. From whence the obligation to perform promifes arifes. They who argue from innate moral principles, suppose a sense of the obligation of promises to be one of them; but without affuming this, or any thing elfe, without proof, the obligation to perform promises may be deduced from the neceffity of fuch a conduct, to the well-being, or the existence, indeed, of human fociety. Men act from expectation. Expectation is in most cases determined by the affurances and engagements which we receive from others. If no dependance could be placed upon these as furances, furances, it would be impoffible to know what judgment to form of many future events, or how to regulate our conduct with respect to them. Confidence therefore in promifes is effential to the intercourse of human life; because, without it, the greatest part of our conduct would proceed upon chance. But there could be no confidence in promifes, if men were not obliged to perform them the obligation therefore to perform promises is effential, to the fame end, and in the fame degree. Some may imagine, that, if this obligation were fufpended, a general caution and mutual diftruft would enfue, which might do as well; but this is imagined, without confidering, how every hour of our lives we truft to, and depend upon others; and how impoffible it is, to ftir a ftep, or, what is worse, to fit ftill a moment, without fuch truft and dependance. I am now writing at my cafe, not doubting (or rather never diftrusting, and therefore never thinking about it) but that the butcher will send in the joint of meat, which I ordered; that his fervant will bring it; that my cook will dress it; that my footman will ferve it up; and that I fhall find it upon table at one o'clock. Yet have I nothing for all this, but the promise of the butcher, and mine. butcher, and the implied promise of his fervant And the fame holds of the most important, as well as the most familiar occurrences of focial life. In the one the intervention of promifes is formal, and is feen and acknowledged; our inftance, therefore, is intended to show it in the other, where it is not fo distinctly obferved. II. In what fenfe promifes are to be interpreted. Where the terms of a promise admit of more fenfes than one, the promife is to be performed "in that fense in which the promiser appre"hended at the time that the promisee re"ceived it." It is not the fenfe in which the promiser actually intended it, that always governs the interpretation of an equivocal promife; because, at that rate, you might excite expectations, which you never meant, nor would be obliged, to fatisfy. Much less is it the sense, in which the promisee actually received the promise; for according to that rule, you might be drawn into engagements which you never defigned to undertake. It must therefore be the sense (for there is no other remaining) in which the promifer believed that the promisee accepted his pro mife. |