ther for his fon; to an uncle for his nephew ; to a friend of mine, for a relation or friend of his; then A is the promisee, whose consent I must obtain, to be releafed from the engage

ment.

If I promise a place or vote to B by A, that is, if A be a meffenger to convey the promise, as if I fhould fay, you may tell B, that he "fhall have this place, or may depend upon

my vote;" or if A be employed to introduce B's request, and I answer in any terms which amount to a compliance with it, then B is the promifee.

Promises to one perfon, for the benefit of another, are not released by the death of the promifee. For his death, neither makes the performance impracticable, nor implies any confent to release the promiser from it.

6. Erroneous promises are not binding in certain cafes; as,

1. Where the error proceeds from the mistake or mifreprefentation of the promisee.

Because a promise evidently supposes the truth of the account, which the promisee relates in order to obtain it. A beggar folicits

your charity by a ftory of the moft pitiable distressyou promife to relieve him, if he will call again—

in the interval you discover his story to be made up of lies-this discovery, no doubt, releases you from your promise. One who wants your fervice, defcribes the business or office for which he would engage you-you promise to undertake it when you come to enter upon it, you find the profits less, the labour more, or some material circumftance different from the account he gave you-In fuch cafe you are not bound by your promise.

2. When the promise is understood by the promisee to proceed upon a certain supposition, or when the promiser apprehended he fo understood it, and that fuppofition turns out to be false; then the promise is not binding.

This intricate rule will be beft explained by an example. A father receives an account from abroad of the death of his only fon-foon after which he promises his fortune to his nephew― The account turns out to be falfe-the father, we say, is released from his promise; not merely because he never would have made it, had he known the truth of the cafe-for that alone will not do—but because the nephew also himself understood the promise to proceed upon the suppofition of his coufin's death; or at least his uncle thought he fo understood it; and could not

think otherwise. The promise proceeded upon this fuppofition in the promiser's own apprehenfion, and, as he believed, in the apprehension of both parties; and this belief of his is the precife circumftance which fets him free. The foundation of the rule is plainly this, a man is bound only to fatisfy the expectation which he intended to excite; whatever condition therefore he intended to fubject that expectation to, becomes an effential condition of the promise.

Errors, which come not within this description, do not annul the obligation of a promise. I promise a candidate my vote-presently another candidate appears, for whom I certainly would have reserved it, had I been acquainted with his defign. Here therefore, as before, my promife proceeded from an error; and I never should have given such a promise, had I been aware of the truth of the cafe, as it has turned out-but the promisee did not know this-he did not receive the promise fubject to any fuch condition, or as proceeding from any such supposition-nor did I at the time imagine he fo received it-This error, therefore, of mine, must fall upon my own head, and the promise be obferved notwithstanding. A father promises a certain fortune with his daughter, supposing himself to be worth

fo

fo much-his circumftances turn out, upon examination, worse than he was aware of. Here again the promise was erroneous, but, for the reason affigned in the last case, will nevertheless be obligatory.

The cafe of erroneous promises is attended with fome difficulty; for to allow every mistake, or change of circumftances, to diffolve the obligation of a promife, would be to allow a latitude, which might evacuate the force of almost all promises: and, on the other hand, to gird the obligation fo tight, as to make no allowances for manifest and fundamental errors, would, in many inftances, be productive of great hardship and abfurdity.

It has long been controverted amongst moralifts, whether promises be binding, which are extorted by violence or fear. The obligation of all promises refults, we have feen, from the neceffity or the use of that confidence which mankind repofe in them. The question, therefore, whether these promises are binding, will depend upon this, whether mankind, upon the whole, are benefited by the confidence placed in fuch promises?

promifes? A highwayman attacks you-and being disappointed of his booty, threatens or prepares to murder you-you promise with many folemn affeverations, that, if he will spare your life, he fhall find a purfe of money left for him, at a place appointed-upon the faith of this promife, he forbears from farther violence. Now your life was faved by the confidence reposed in a promise extorted by fear; and the lives of many others may be faved by the fame. This is a good confequence. On the other hand, confidence in promises like these greatly facilitates the perpetration of robberies. They may be made the inftruments of almost unlimited extortion. This is a bad confequence; and in the question between the importance of these opposite consequences refides the doubt concerning the obligation of fuch promifes.

There are other cafes which are plainer; as where a magiftrate confines a difturber of the public peace in jail, till he promise to behave better; or a prisoner of war promises, if set at liberty, to return within a certain time. These promises, fay moralifts, are binding, because the violence or durefs is juft; but, the truth is, because there is the fame use of confidence