amongst mankind, we have mentioned imitation. The efficacy of this principle is most obfervable in children; indeed, if there be any thing in them, which deserves the name of an instinct, it is their propenfity to imitation. Now there is nothing which children imitate or apply more readily than expreffions of affection and averfion,' of approbation, hatred, resentment, and the like; and when these paffions and expreffions are once connected, which they foon will be by the fame affociation which unites words with their ideas, the paffion will follow the expreffion, and attach upon the object to which the child has been accustomed to apply the epithet. In a word, when almost every thing else is learned by imitation, can we wonder to find the fame cause concerned in the generation of our moral fentiments?

Another confiderable objection to the system of moral inftincts is this, that there are no maxims in the science, which can well be deemed innate, as none perhaps can be affigned, which are abfolutely and univerfally true; in other words, which do not bend to circumftances. Veracity, which seems, if any be, a natural duty, is excufed in many cafes towards an enemy, a thief, or a madman. The obligation of promifes, which is a firft principle in morality, de

pends

pends upon the circumstances under which they were made: they may have been unlawful, or become fo fince, or inconfiftent with former promifes, or erroneous, or extorted; under all which cafes, inftances may be fuggefted, where the obligation to perform the promise would be very dubious, and fo of most other general rules, when they come to be actually applied.

An argument has been alfo proposed on the fame fide of the question of this kind. Together with the inftinct, there must have been implanted, it is said, a clear and precise idea of the object upon which it was to attach. The inftinct and the idea of the object are infeparable even in imagination, and as neceffarily accompany each other as any correlative ideas whatever: that is, in plainer terms, if we be prompted by nature to the approbation of particular actions, we must have received alfo from nature a distinct conception of the action we are thus prompted to approve; which we certainly have not received.

But as this argument bears alike against all inftincts, and against their existence in brutes as well as in men, it will hardly, I suppose, produce conviction, though it may be difficult to find an answer to it.

VOL. I.

C

Upon

Upon the whole, it seems to me, either that there exist no fuch instincts as compose what is called the moral fenfe, or that they are not now to be distinguished from prejudices and habits; on which account they cannot be depended upon in moral reasoning: I mean that it is not a fafe of arguing, to affume certain principles as fo many dictates, impulfes, and instincts of nature, and then to draw conclufions from these principles, as to the rectitude or wrongness of actions, independent of the tendency of fuch actions, or of any other confideration whatever.

way

Ariftotle lays down, as a fundamental and felf-evident maxim, that nature intended barbarians to be slaves; and proceeds to deduce from this maxim a train of conclufions, calculated to justify the policy which then prevailed. And I queftion whether the fame maxim be not ftill felf-evident to the company of merchants trading to the coaft of Africa.

Nothing is fo foon made as a maxim; and it appears from the example of Ariftotle, that authority and convenience, education, prejudice, and general practice, have no small share in the making of them; and that the laws of custom are very apt to be mistaken for the order of na

ture.

For which reafon, I fufpect, that a system of morality, built upon inftincts, will only find out reafons and excufes for opinions and practices already eftablished-will feldom correct or reform either.

But farther, fuppofe we admit the existence of these instincts, what, it may be asked, is their authority? No man, you say, can act in deliberate oppofition to them, without a fecret remorse of confcience.-But this remorse may be borne with-and if the finner choose to bear with it, for the fake of the pleasure or profit which he expects from his wickednefs; or finds the pleafure of the fin to exceed the remorfe of conscience, of which he alone is the judge, and concerning which, when he feels them both together, he can hardly be miftaken, the moral-inftinct-man, so far as I can understand, has nothing more to offer.

many

For, if he alledge, that thefe inftincts are fo indications of the will of God, and confequently prefages of what we are to look for hereafter, this, I anfwer, is to refort to a rule and a motive, ulterior to the inftincts themselves, and at which rule and motive we fhall by and by arrive by a furer road-I fay furer, so long as there remains a controverfy whether there be

any instinctive maxims at all; or any difficulty in afcertaining what maxims are instinctive.

This celebrated question therefore becomes in our system a question of pure curiofity; and as fuch we difmifs it to the determination of those who are more inquifitive, than we are concerned to be, about the natural history and conftitution of the human fpecies.

T

HE word happy is a relative term; that is, when we call a man happy, we mean that he is happier than fome others, with whom we compare him; than the generality of others or than he himself was in fome other situation: thus, fpeaking of one who has just compaffed the object of a long purfuit, "now," we fay, "he is happy;" and in a like comparative sense, compared, that is, with the general lot of mankind, we call a man happy who poffeffes health and competency.

In ftrictness, any condition may be denominated