CHAP. XII.

SLANDER.

SPEA

CAKING is acting, both in philosophical ftrictness, and as to all moral purposes; for, if the mischief and motive of our conduct be the fame, the means which we use make no difference.

And this is in effect what our Saviour declares, Matt. xii. 37. "By thy words thou "fhalt be justified, and by thy words thou "fhalt be condemned:" by thy words, as well, that is, as by thy actions; the one shall be taken into the account, as well as the other, for they both poffefs the same property of voluntarily producing good or evil.

1

Slander may be distinguished into two kinds, malicious flander, and inconfiderate slander.

Malicious flander, is the relating of either truth or falfehood, for the purpose of creating mifery. I acknowledge that the truth or falfehood of what is related varies the degree of guilt confiderably;

derably; and that flander, in the ordinary acceptation of the term, fignifies the circulation of mischievous falsehoods: but truth may be made inftrumental to the fuccefs of malicious designs as well as falfehood; and if the end be bad, the means cannot be innocent.

I think the idea of flander ought to be confined to the production of gratuitous mischief. When we have an end or intereft of our own to ferve, if we attempt to compafs it by falsehood, it is fraud; if by a publication of the truth, it is not without fome additional circumstance of breach of promise, betraying of confidence, or the like, to be deemed criminal.

Sometimes the pain is intended for the perfon to whom we are speaking; at other times an enmity is to be gratified by the prejudice or difquiet of a third person. To infufe fufpicions, to kindle or continue disputes, to avert the favour and efteem of benefactors from their dependants, to render fome one whom we diflike contemptible or obnoxious in the public opinion, are all offices of flander; of which the guilt must be measured by the intensity and extent of the mifery produced.

The disguises under which flander is conveyed, whether in a whisper, with injunctions of fecrefy,

by way of caution, or with affected reluctance, are alfo many aggravations of the offence, as they indicate more deliberation and defign.

Inconfiderate flander is a different offence, although the fame mischief actually follow, and although the mischief might have been foreseen. The not being confcious of that defign, which we have hitherto attributed to the flanderer, makes the difference.

The guilt here confifts in the want of that regard to the confequences of our conduct, which a just affection for human happiness and concern for our duty would not have failed to have produced in us. And it is no anfwer to this crimination to say, that we entertained no evil defign. A fervant may be a very bad fervant, and yet feldom or never defign to act in oppofition to his master's intereft or will; and his mafter may juftly punish fuch fervant for a thoughtleffness and neglect nearly as prejudicial as deliberate difobedience. I accufe you not, he may fay, of any exprefs intention to hurt me; but had not the fear of my difpleasure, the care of my intereft, and indeed all the qualities which conftitute the merit of a good fervant, been wanting in you, they would not only have excluded every direct purpose of giving me uneasi

nefs,

nefs, but have been fo far present to your thoughts, as to have checked that unguarded licentiousness, by which I have fuffered so much, and infpired you in its place with an habitual folicitude about the effects and tendency of what you did or faid. This very much resembles the cafe of all fins of inconfideration; and, amongst the foremost of thefe, that of inconfiderate flander.

Information communicated for the real purpofe of warning or cautioning is not flander.

it

Indifcriminate praise is the opposite of flander, but it is the oppofite extreme; and, however may affect to be thought excefs of candour, is commonly the effusion of a frivolous understanding, or proceeds from a fettled contempt of all moral diftinctions.

VOL. I.

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MORAL