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liver upon dubious cafes the fame determina

tions.

SECONDLY, it is to be obferved, that these anfwers all leave the matter fhort; for the inquirer may turn round upon his teacher with a fecond question, in which he will expect to be satisfied, namely, why am I obliged to do what is right; to act agreeably to the fitness of things; to conform to reason, nature, or truth; to promote the public good, or to obey the will of God?

The proper method of conducting the inquiry is, FIRST, to examine what we mean, when we fay a man is obliged to do any thing, and THEN to fhew why he is obliged to do the thing which we have propofed as an example, namely,

to

66

keep his word."

CHAP.

CHA P. II.

WHAT WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY A MAN IS OBLIGED TO DO A THING.

A

MAN is faid to be obliged, "when he is urged by a violent motive refulting from "the command of another."

I. "The motive must be violent." If a perfon, who has done me fome little fervice, or has a small place in his disposal, ask me upon fome occasion for my vote, I may poffibly give it him, from a motive of gratitude or expectation; but I should hardly say, that I was obliged to give it him, because the inducement does not rise high enough. Whereas, if a father or a master, any great benefactor, or one on whom my fortune depends, require my vote, I give it him of course; and my answer to all who ask me why I voted fo and fo, is, that my father or master obliged me; that I had received fo

or my

many favours

from, or had fo great a dependence upon fuch a

one,

one, that I was obliged to vote as he directed

me.

SECONDLY," It must refult from the com"mand of another." Offer a man a gratuity for doing any thing, for feizing, for example, an offender, he is not obliged by your offer to do it; nor would he fay he is; though he may be induced, perfuaded, prevailed upon, tempted. If a magistrate, or the man's immediate fuperior command it, he confiders himself as obliged to comply, though poffibly he would lofe less by a refufal in this cafe, than in the former.

I will not undertake to fay that the words obligation and obliged are used uniformly in this sense, or always with this distinction; nor is it poffible to tie down popular phrases to any conftant fignification: but, wherever the motive is violent enough, and coupled with the idea of command, authority, law, or the will of a superior, there, I take it, we always reckon ourselves to be obliged.

And from this account of obligation it follows, that we can be obliged to nothing, but what we ourselves are to gain or lofe fomething by; for nothing else can be a "violent motive" to us. As we should not be obliged to obey the laws, or the magiftrate, unless rewards or punishments,

ments, pleasure or pain, fome how or other depended upon our obedience; fo neither fhould we, without the fame reason, be obliged to do what is right, to practife virtue, or to obey the commands of God.

CHA P. III.

THE QUESTION, WHY I AM OBLIGED TO KEEP MY WORD? RESUMED.

ET it be remembered, that to be obliged,

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"is to be urged by a violent motive, refulting from the command of another.' And then let it be afked, Why am I obliged to keep my word? and the answer will be, because I am 66 urged to do fo by a violent motive," (namely, the expectation of being after this life rewarded, if I do, or punished for it, if I do not) "refulting from the command of another” (namely, of God).

This folution goes to the bottom of the fubject, as no farther question can reasonably be asked.

There

Therefore, private happiness is our motive, and the will of God our rule.

When I first turned my thoughts to moral speculations, an air of mystery seemed to hang over the whole subject; which arose, I believe, from hence that I fuppofed, with many authors whom I had read, that to be obliged to do a thing, was very different from being induced only to do it; and that the obligation to practise virtue, to do what is right, juft, &c. was quite another thing, and of another kind, than the obligation which a foldier is under to obey his officer, a fervant his master, or any of the civil and ordinary obligations of human life. Whereas, from what has been faid it appears, that moral obligation is like all other obligations; and that all obligation is nothing more than an inducement of fufficient ftrength, and refulting, in fome way, from the command of another.

There is always understood to be a difference between an act of prudence and an act of duty. Thus, if I diftrufted a man who owed me a fum of money, I fhould reckon it an act of pru dence to get another person bound with him but I should hardly call it an act of duty. On the other hand, it would be thought a very unusual and loose kind of language, to say, that,

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