But to all this there feems a plain objection, viz. that many actions are useful, which no man in his fenfes will allow to be right. There are occafions, in which the hand of the affaffin would be very useful. The present poffeffor of fome great eftate employs his influence and fortune, to annoy, corrupt, or opprefs all about him. His eftate would devolve, by his death, to a fucceffor of an oppofite character. It is useful, therefore, to dispatch fuch a one as foon as poffible out of the way; as the neighbourhood will exchange thereby a pernicious tyrant for a wife and generous benefactor. It may be useful to rob a mifer, and give the money to the poor; as the money, no doubt, would produce more happiness, by being laid out in food and clothing for half a dozen diftreffed families, than by continuing locked up in a mifer's cheft. It may be useful to get poffeffion of a place, a piece of preferment, or of a feat in parliament, by bribery or false swearing; as by means of them we may serve the public more effectually than in our private station. What then shall we say? Must we admit these actions to be right, which would be to juftify affaffination, plunder, and perjury; or must we give up our principle, that the criterion of right is utility?

It is not neceffary to do either.

The true answer is this; that these actions, after all, are not ufeful, and for that reason, and that alone, are not right.

To fee this point perfectly, it must be observed, that the bad confequences of actions are twofold, particular and general.

The particular bad consequence of an action, is the mischief which that fingle action directly and immediately occafions.

The general bad confequence is, the violation of fome neceffary or useful general rule.

Thus the particular bad consequence of the affaffination above described, is the fright and pain which the deceased underwent; the lofs he fuffered of life, which is as valuable to a bad man, as to a good one, or more fo; the prejudice and affliction, of which his death was the occafion, to his family, friends, and dependants. thority.

The general bad confequence is the violation of this neceffary general rule, that no man be put to death for his crimes, but by public authority.

Although, therefore, fuch an action have no particular bad confequence, or greater particular good confequences, yet it is not useful, by reafon of the general confequence, which is of

more

more importance, and which is evil. And the fame of the other two instances, and of a million more, which might be mentioned.

But as this folution fuppofes, that the moral government of the world muft proceed by general rules, it remains that we fhew the neceffity of this.

CHAP. VII.

THE NECESSITY OF GENERAL RULES.

OU cannot permit one action and forbid

You

another, without fhewing a difference between them. Confequently, the fsame sort of actions must be generally permitted or generally forbidden. Where, therefore, the general permiffion of them would be pernicious, it becomes neceffary to lay down and fupport the rule which generally forbids them.

Thus, to return once more to the cafe of the affaffin. The affaffin knocked the rich villain on the head, because he thought him better out of the way than in it. If you allow this excuse in the present inftance, you must allow it

to

(

74 THE NECESSITY OF GENERAL RULES. to all, who act in the fame manner, and from the fame motive; that is, you must allow every man to kill any one he meets, whom he thinks noxious or useless; which, in the event, would be to commit every man's life and fafety to the fpleen, fury, and fanaticism of his neighbour— a disposition of affairs which would foon fill the world with mifery and confufion; and ere long put an end to human fociety, if not to the human fpecies.

The neceffity of general rules in human governments is apparent : but whether the same neceffity fubfift in the divine œconomy, in that diftribution of rewards and punishments, to which a moralift looks forward, may be doubted.

I answer, that general rules are neceffary to every moral government; and by moral government I mean any difpenfation, whose object is to influence the conduct of reasonable creatures.

For if, of two actions perfectly fimilar, one be punished, and the other be rewarded or forgiven, which is the confequence of rejecting general rules, the fubjects of fuch a difpenfation would no longer know, either what to expect or how to act. Rewards and punishments would ceafe to be fuch-would become accidents. Like the ftroke of a thunderbolt, or the discovery of

4

a mine,

a mine, like a blank or a benefit ticket in a lottery, they would occafion pain or pleasure when they happened; but following in no known order, from any particular courfe of action, they could have no previous influence or effect upon

the conduct.

An attention to general rules, therefore, is included in the very idea of reward and punishment. Confequently whatever reason there is to expect future reward and punishment at the hand of God, there is the fame reafon to believe, that he will proceed in the diftribution of it by general rules.

Before we profecute the confideration of general confequences any farther, it may be proper to anticipate a reflection, which will be apt enough to fuggeft itself in the progress of our argument.

As the general confequence of an action, upon which fo much of the guilt of a bad action depends, confifts in the example; it should seem, that, if the action be done with perfect fecrecy, fo as to furnish no bad example, that part of the guilt drops off. In the cafe of fuicide, for inftance, if a man can fo manage matters, as to

take