cause they were not at the same time honefta, they were by no means to be deemed just or right.

From the principles delivered in this and the two preceding chapters, a maxim may be explained, which is in every man's mouth, and in moft men's without meaning, viz. "not to do evil, that good may come:" that is, let us not violate a general rule, for the fake of any particular good confequence we may expect. Which is for the most part a falutary caution, the advantage feldom compenfating for the violation of the rule. Strictly speaking, that cannot be evil," from which "good comes;" but in this way, and with a view to the distinction between particular and general confequences, it'

may.

We will conclude this fubject of confequences with the following reflection. A man may imagine, that any action of his, with refpect to the public, must be inconfiderable: fo alfo is the agent. If his crime produce but a small effect upon the universal intereft, his punishment or destruction bears a small proportion to the fum of happiness and mifery in the creation.

VOL. I.

G

CHAP.

CHA P. IX.

OF RIGHT.

R

IGHT and obligation are reciprocal; that is, wherever there is a right in one perfon, there is a correfponding obligation upon others. If one man has a "right" to an estate; others are 66 obliged" to abftain from it:-If

parents have a right" to reverence from their children; children are

obliged" to reverence their parents; and fo in all other inftances. Now, because moral obligation depends, as

we have seen, upon the will of God, right, which is correlative to it, muft depend upon the fame. Right therefore fignifies, confiftency with the will of God.

But if the divine will determine the diftinction of right and wrong, what else is it but an identical propofition, to fay of God, that he acts right, or how is it poffible even to conceive that he should act wrong? yet these affertions are intelligible and fignificant. The cafe is this:

by virtue of the two principles, that God wills the happiness of his creatures, and that the will of God is the measure of right and wrong, we arrive at certain conclufions; which conclufions become rules; and we foon learn to pronounce actions right or wrong, according as they agree or disagree with our rules, without looking any farther and when the habit is once established of stopping at the rules, we can go back and compare with these rules even the divine conduct itself, and yet it may be true (only not observed by us at the time) that the rules themselves are deduced from the divine will.

Right is a quality of perfons or of actions.

Of perfons; as when we fay, fuch a one has a "right" to this eftate; parents have a "right" to reverence from their children; the king to allegiance from his subjects; masters have a "right" to their fervants labour; a man has not a right" over his own life.

Of actions; as in fuch expreffions as the following: it is "right" to punifh murder with death; his behaviour on that occafion was "right;" it is not "right" to fend an unfortunate debtor to jail; he did or acted " right," who gave up his place, rather than vote against

his judgment.

In this latter fet of expreffions, you may fubftitute the definition of right above given for the term itself, v. g. it is "confiftent with the will "of God" to punish murder with death-his behaviour on that occafion, was "confiftent "with the will of God"-it is not "confiftent "with the will of God" to fend an unfortunate debtor to jail-he did, or acted "confiftently "with the will of God," who gave up his place, rather than vote against his judgment.

In the former set, you muft vary the phrase a little, when you introduce the definition inftead of the term. to this eftate, that is, "will of God," that it-parents have a

Such a one has a right" it is "confiftent with the fuch a one should have right" to reverence from

their children, that is, it is "confiftent with "the will of God," that children fhould reverence their parents; and the fame of the rest.

CHAP.

СНАР. Х.

THE DIVISION OF RIGHTS.

RIGHTS, when applied to persons, are

Natural or adventitious.

Alienable or unalienable.

Perfect or imperfect.

I. Rights are natural or adventitious.

Natural rights are fuch as would belong to a man, although there fubfifted in the world no civil government whatever.

Adventitious rights are fuch as would not. Natural rights are, a man's right to his life, limbs, and liberty; his right to the produce of his perfonal labour; to the use, in common with others, of air, light, water. If a thousand different perfons, from a thousand different corners of the world, were caft together upon a defert ifland, they would from the firft be every one entitled to these rights,

Adventitious rights are, the right of a King over G 3

his