his fubjects; of a General over his foldiers; of a Judge over the life and liberty of a prisoner; a right to elect or appoint magiftrates, to impose taxes, decide difputes, direct the defcent or difpofition of property; a right, in a word, in any one man, or particular body of men, to make laws and regulations for the reft. For none of these rights would exift in the newly inhabited ifland. And here it will be afked how adventitious rights are created; or, which is the fame thing, how any new rights can accrue, from the eftablishment of civil fociety; as rights of all kinds, we remember, depend upon the will of God, and civil fociety is but the ordinance and inftitution of man. For the folution of this difficulty, we must return to our first principles. God wills the happiness of mankind, and the existence of civil fociety, as conducive to that happiness. Confequently, many things, which are useful for the fupport of civil fociety in general, or for the conduct and confervation of particular fo-cieties already established, are, for that reafon, "confiftent with the will of God," or (6 right," which, without that reafon, i. e. without the establishment of civil fociety, would not have been fo. From From whence alfo it appears, that adventitious rights, though immediately derived from human appointment, are not, for that reason, lefs facred than natural rights, nor the obligation to refpect them lefs cogent. They both ultimately rely upon the same authority, the will of God. Such a man claims a right to a particular estate. He can fhew, it is true, nothing for his right, but a rule of the civil community to which he belongs; and this rule may be arbitrary, capricious, and abfurd. Notwithstanding all this, there would be the fame fin in difpoffeffing the man of his estate by craft or violence, as if it had been affigned to him, like the partition of the country amongst the twelve tribes, by the immediate designation and appointment of heaven, II. Rights are alienable or unalienable. Which terms explain themselves. The right we have to most of those things, which we call property, as houses, lands, money, &c. is alienable. The right of a prince over his people, of a husband over his wife, of a mafter over his fervant, is generally and naturally unalienable. The distinction depends upon the mode of acquiring the right. If the right originate from limited to the person by the a contract; and be exprefs terms of the contract, or by the common interpretation of fuch contracts (which is equivalent to an express stipulation), or by a perfonal condition annexed to the right, then it is unalienable. In all other cafes it is alienable. The right to civil liberty is alienable; though in the vehemence of men's zeal for it, and in the language of some political remonftrances, it has often been pronounced to be an unalienable right. The true reason why mankind hold in deteftation the memory of those who have fold their liberty to a tyrant, is, that together with their own, they fold commonly, or endangered, the liberty of others; which certainly they had no right to dispose of. III. Rights are perfect or imperfect. Perfect rights may be afferted by force, or, what in civil fociety comes into the place of private force, by course of law. Imperfect rights may not. Examples of perfect rights. A man's right to his life, person, house; for if these be attacked, he may repel the attack by inftant violence, or punish the aggreffor by law; a man's right to his eftate, furniture, clothes, money, and to all ordinary articles of property; for if they be injuriously taken from him, he may compel the author author of the injury to make restitution or fatisfaction. Examples of imperfect rights. In elections or appointments to offices, where the qualifications are prescribed, the best qualified candidate has a right to success; yet, if he be rejected, he has no remedy. He can neither feize the office by force, nor obtain redress at law; his right therefore is imperfect. A poor neighbour has a right to relief; yet if it be refused him, he must not extort it. A benefactor has a right to returns of gratitude from the person he has obliged; yet if he meet with none, he must acquiefce. Children have a right to affection and education from their parents; and parents on their part, to duty and reverence from their children; yet if these rights be on either fide withholden, there is no compulfion to enforce them. It may be at first view difficult to apprehend, how a person should have a right to a thing, and yet have no right to use the means necessary to obtain it. This difficulty, like most others in morality, is refolvable into the neceffity of general rules. The reader recollects, that a perfon is faid to have a right" to a thing, when it is "confiftent with the will of God" that he fhould fhould poffefs it. his So that the queftion is reduced to this; how it comes to pafs, that it should be confiftent with the will of God, that a perfon fhould poffefs a thing, and yet not be confiftent with the fame will that he should use force to obtain it? The answer is, that by reafon of the indeterminatenefs, either of the object, or of the circumftances of the right, the permiffion of force in this cafe, would, in its confequence, lead to the permiffion of force in other cafes, where there exifted no right at all. The candidate above described has, no doubt, a right to fuccefs; but his right depends upon qualifications, for inftance, upon his comparative virtue, learning, &c; there must be somebody therefore to compare them. The existence, degree, and refpective importance of these qualifications are all indeterminate; there must be fomebody therefore to determine them. To allow the candidate to demand fuccefs by force, is to make him the judge of his own qualifications. You cannot do this, but you must make all other candidates the fame; which would a door to demands without number, reafon, or right. In like manner, a poor man has a right to relief from the rich; but the mode, feafon, and quantum of that relief, who shall contribute open to |