Yet

to it, or how much, are not afcertained. these points must be afcertained, before a claim to relief can be profecuted by force. For to allow the poor to ascertain them for themselves, would be to expofe property to fo many of these claims, that it would lofe its value, or ceafe indeed to be property. The fame observation holds of all other cafes of imperfect rights; not to mention, that in the inftances of gratitude, affection, reverence, and the like, force is excluded by the very idea of the duty, which muft be voluntary, or not at all.

Wherever the right is imperfect, the correfponding obligation is fo too. I am obliged to prefer the beft candidate, to relieve the poor, be grateful to my benefactors, take care of my children, and reverence my parents; but in all thefe cafes, my obligation, like their right, is imperfect.

I call these obligations "imperfect," in conformity to the established language of writers upon the fubject. The term however seems ill chofen on this account, that it leads many to imagine, that there is lefs guilt in the violation of an imperfect obligation, than of a perfect one. Which is a groundless notion. For an obligation being perfect or imperfect, determines only whe

ther

ther violence inay or may not be employed to enforce it; and determines nothing else. The degree of guilt incurred by violating the obligation is a different thing, and is determined by circumstances altogether independent of this diftinction. A man, who by a partial, prejudiced, or corrupt vote, disappoints a worthy candidate of a ftation in life, upon which his hopes, poffibly, or livelihood depends, and who thereby grievously discourages merit and emulation in others, commits, I am perfuaded, a much greater crime, than if he filched a book out of a library, or picked a pocket of a handkerchief; though in the one case, he violates only an imperfect right, in the other a perfect

one.

As pofitive precepts are often indeterminate in their extent, and as the indeterminatenefs of an obligation is that which makes it imperfect; it comes to pass, that pofitive precepts commonly produce an imperfect obligation.

Negative precepts or prohibitions, being generally precife, constitute accordingly a perfect obligation.

The fifth commandment is positive, and the duty which refults from it is imperfect.

The

The fixth commandment is negative, and imposes a perfect obligation.

Religion and virtue find their principal exercife amongst the imperfect obligations; the laws of civil fociety taking pretty good care of the reft.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

THE GENERAL RIGHTS OF MANKIND.

Y the general Rights of Mankind, I mean

BY

the rights which belong to the fpecies collectively; the original ftock, as I may say, which they have fince diftributed among themfelves.

These are,

I. A right to the fruits or vegetable produce of the earth.

The infenfible parts of the creation are incapable of injury; and it is nugatory to inquire into the right, where the ufe can be attended with no injury. But it may be worth observing, for the fake of an inference which will appear below, that, as God has created us with a want and defire of food, and provided things fuited by their nature to fuftain and fatisfy us, we may fairly prefume, that he intended we should apply these things to that purpose.

II. A right to the flesh of animals.

This is a very different claim from the former. Some excufe feems neceffary for the pain and lofs which we occafion to brutes, by reftraining them of their liberty, mutilating their bodies, and, at last, putting an end to their lives, which we suppose to be the whole of their existence, for our pleasure or conveniency.

The reasons alleged in vindication of this practice, are the following: that the several species of brutes being created to prey upon one another, affords a kind of analogy to prove, that the human fpecies were intended to feed upon them; that, if let alone, they would overrun the earth, and exclude mankind from the occupation of it; that they are requited for what they fuffer at our hands, by our care and protection.

Upon which reafons I would obferve, that the analogy contended for is extremely lame; fince brutes have no power to support life by any other means, and fince we have: for the whole human fpecies might fubfift entirely upon fruit, pulfe, herbs and roots, as many tribes of Hindoos actually do. The two other reasons may be valid reafons, as far as they go; for, no doubt, if man had been fupported entirely by vegetable food, a great part of those animals