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well particular Portions of God's Immenfity or Subftance, and their finite Intelligence particular Portions of God's Intelligence; or, to ufe another Expreffion of Mr. Jackson's, particular Conceptions of his Being, or different Modes of Apprehenfion ?--- What"ever therefore, as he adds, is conceived to exift in this immenfe Subftance, must be Properties of it,

or partial Conceptions of its Being. The relative "Ideas of Motion and Refiftance, Solidity and Un"falidity, are excited in me; but that a merely inert "Subftance, fuch as Matter is imagined to be, fhould "be the Caufe of these Ideas, is a plain Contradic❝tion to its Inactivity; nor can I, from these Ideas, "infer any other Existence, but that of the univerfal "Caufe or Mind, who ftands in no need of fecond

Causes, Inftruments, and Occafions. --- [Two or "more Beings of the fame Prefence is a contradic"tory Suppofition: it is fuppofing them different "Beings; while they are the fame Being. That fome

thing exifts, is evident à pofteriori; and that one "eternal immenfe Subftance exifts, is demonftrable

à priori; therefore as two or more Beings can no "more have the fame Prefence than the fame Exif"tence, no other Subftance exists but the one immense

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Being, and all Things are Modes, or partial Con

ceptions of his Existence or Effence]--- Space being"God's individual Immenfity or Prefence, We are "therefore partial Conceptions of his Prefence and "Subftance, otherwife we have a distinct Prefence or Existence; and there are Parts of Space where God " is not present.

As this Letter gave Mr. Jackson a fuller Underftanding of Mr. Dudgeon's Notion than he had before, he now tells him, he has nothing more to do, than to fhew him the great and evident Abfurdities of it. The Paffage that efpecially contains his Opinion, is that above, which I have comprehended be- . tween Crotchets, and which Mr. Dudgeon, in his Letter, calls demonftrative Reafoning. But Mr. Jack-· fon had fo different an Idea of it, that he ventures to

fay,

fay, nothing can be more unlike real Demonftration. The Premiles have nothing to do with the Conclufion; and the Conclufion, as appears to him, is big with manifeft Abfurdities. He makes the following Obfervations on it; 1. Two Beings of the fame Prefence is indeed a Contradiction; but two Beings, the Mode of whofe Exiftence or Prefence is effentially diftinct, are no Contradiction; and this is the Cafe of us finite contingent Beings, and of God, who is felf-existent we exift in a contingent manner by God's Will; God exifts not contingently, or by any Will, but in a self-existent manner; which makes his Prefence of a Kind and Nature effentially diftinct from ours. 2. If no fecond Caufes exift, as Mr. Dudgeon afferts in the former Part of the foregoing Letter, and there is only one univerfal Cause, all other Things being mere Modifications of it, ic cannot be proved à pofteriori that fomething exists. 3. The Conclufion that nothing exifts, but God and Modes, or partial Conceptions of his Existence, has no Relation to the Premifes from whence Mr. Dudgeon drew it; and is attended with the following plain Abfurdities. First, it follows from hence, that We and Matter are not only eternal but felf-exiftent and immutable, because it is demonftrable, that all the Modes or Properties of God's Subftance are founded on that Neceffity, which is the Ground of his Existence, and are with the Subftance eternal and immutable. Secondly, it follows again, That either we are not Agents diftinct from God, or elfe that as many felf-existent Agents exift as there are intelligent Agents diftinct from God, and all thefe in one Subftance, which cannot be divided fo much as mentally. Thirdly, it follows, That if our Intelligence and Agency are founded in the Divine Subftance, or

*If there are any Beings which can exift in Space without filling Space, this Obfervation is right; but if every Being, which exits, fills up a Portion of it, then I cannot fee what Ground there is for it: Whatever fills Space excludes other Things, merely because of its filling that Space, and not on account of any Mode of Existence. I ufe filling here in a real and physical, not in a loofe and vulgar Sense.

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are only Modifications or Properties of the Divine Subftance, our Intelligence and Agency must be perfect and infinite. There can be no Imperfection of Thinking or Acting, confequently no Sin or Error; which felf-evidently proves that we are not Modes of God's Subftance, but diftinct intelligent Agents, finite and mutable.

All this carried no Conviction with it to Mr. Dudgeon, as is plain by his Anfwer. He ftill looked upon what he had advanced as ftrict Demonftration; and it yet appeared to him true, with the Evidence of a Maxim, That if God exifts always and every where, he is every thing, whether Substance or Properties. And he thinks the Foundation of all Mr. Jackson's Reafoning to the contrary is built upon a bare Suppofition, which ought to be proved, viz. the Existence of material or immaterial Subftance, the Mode of whofe Exiftence or Prefence is effentially diftinct from God's.

Much of this Letter is taken up in proving that material Substance, as, vulgarly conceived, cannot poffibly exift. There runs through it an Air of Paffion not ufual with this Gentleman. It is intended for a full Refutation of the common Notion of Metaphyficians concerning Subftance, or the unknown Subftratum of Properties; which Subftratum he treats as a Chimera. It clofes with these Propofitions, "God is the immediate Supporter or "Cause of Earth, Water, Air, Fire, Vegetables, and "all the various Combinations of fenfible Ideas. "We are his Offspring, and he works in us both to "will and to do of his good Pleasure, and none can "refift bis Will. God exifts neceffarily; his Difpo"fition is neceffarily good; his Will is neceffarily "determin'd by his Difpofition; his Knowledge and "Power are both neceffarily fubfervient to his Will; "and thus the Chain of Neceffity, (not external but

internal) lies in order of Nature, and runs through "all God's neceJary and voluntary Manifeftations of himfelf; and there is no real or abfolute Evil, Sin, ❝or Error, in all Nature; although fome Ideas are

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relatively pleafant or painful, as are the Ideas of "Virtue and Vice."

Mr. Jackson not presently answering this Letter, Mr. Dudgeon wrote to him again, and tells him, That he had own'd spiritual and material Substance to agree in one common Mode of Existence, viz. Extenfion, and fo to fill a part of Space at leaft, and have Dimenfions; as likewise that if Matter, to which the Property of Solidity belong'd, was proved to be immenfe, it would conclude in favour of the Existence of one only Subftance: "For the fame "Reason, he fays, allowing fpiritual Substance to "be immenfe, is as much to his Purpose; for where "can Matter, which hath the fame Mode of Exif"tence with Spirit, viz. Extenfion, exist, unless a "Penetration of Dimenfions is allow'd? which is impoffible; and a Being of no Dimensions, or unextended, not occupying Space, exists no where, or " is a Chimera,”

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In the Reply to this and the foregoing Letter, Mr. Jackfon, after a Recapitulation of what Mr. Dudgeon had hitherto offer'd, fays to him, "You fup

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pofe God to excite Ideas in us; I afk what is "this us, that has Ideas excited in it? If it is a "real exiftent living and intelligent Subftance, the "Difpute is at an end, unless we are the felf-exiftent "Subftance it felf; which is abfurdly fuppofing "Pain, Error, and Imperfection in God: If this "us is diftinct from God, as it muft be, and is not "a Subftance, it is either a mere Idea, or a Connec"tion of Properties; but to fuppofe Ideas excited ❝ in a mere Idea, or a mere Idea to be percipient, is fo "evidently abfurd, as scarce any thing can be equally "fo. If this os be a Connection of Properties, then "they infer a Substance, as plainly and neceffarily "as the Subftance of God is inferred from his Pro

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perties or Attributes; and it is no more intelligible "that Ideas can be excited in mere abstract Properties, without a living percipient Substance in us, than God, or than they can be excited by mere ❝ abstract

"abftract Properties in a mere Idea, or mere Nothing; "which is the abfurdest of all Abfurdities.

At the Close of this Letter Mr. Jackson intimates, that he could add nothing further, either for Mr. Dudgeon's Satisfaction or his own: and in a Postscript, he charges Mr. Dudgeon with a Miftake in faying, as above, that Mr. Jackson owned, that if Matter, &c. was proved to be immenfe, the Existence of one only Subftance would follow from it. *

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In the Letter wrote by Mr. Dudgeon in answer to this, he fhews Mr. Jackfon how far he acquiefces in his Reafonings, and how far he does not. "That "one eternal, infinite, intelligent Subftance exists I own, fays he, to be demonftrated; but tho' you "fay, That we perceive not by our Senfes the Substance "of God, yet I feel that in every Inftance I am fupported by this univerfal Subftance or Being (and confequently all the Qualities or Properties which "I am improperly faid to fupport) who affects me "with Ideas of Pleasure and Pain, independently "of my Will; and this voluntary and at the fame "time neceffary Activity of God and Paffiveness in "me, I think, conftitutes the Diftinction between the "felf Existence of God, and my dependent Existence : "That Ideas exift in the self-existent Mind, and in "the Minds of dependent Beings, without my Mind, "I allow; but that there are material unthinking

Subftances, or Objects exifting without all Minds, "I cannot affent to. I do not at all deny God's "Agency, tho' I think he acts necessarily, and fo in "the perfecleft Manner.--- As to the Neceffity that

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reigns through the Actions of dependent Beings, "it is complicated and imperfect; we are neceffarily "determin'd by the very Frame and Conftitution of "our Nature to purfue what appears to us to be our "Good and Happiness; our Will is neceffarily de"termin'd by our natural Difpofition, or Defire of

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Happiness; and our Knowledge and Power are "both neceffarily determin'd by our Will, as that is by our natural Difpofition. This is called a moral Page 19. Line 8, &c.

"Neceffity,

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