tice and mercy, may yet be very defective with regard to the duties of mortification and felf-government. Now fuch a refolution as refpects only fome parts of religion, exclufive of the reft, is not genuine and of the right fort: for the fame reafons which should induce a man to refrain from any one fin, are as cogent to perfuade him to refrain from every fin; and the fame motives which fhould excite him to the practice of any one duty of religion, are as forcible to ftir him up to the practice of all. What are the reafons which should induce a man to abstain from any one fin? Are they not the deformity of the thing itself, the pain and uneafinefs which it will create in his own mind upon the commiffion of it, the affront which it carries in it to the fupreme being, to whom he is under the highest obligations of love and gratitude, and the danger to which it will expofe him, of future mifery? Well: and are not thefe reafons as powerful to reftrain a man from every fin? Certainly they are. For there is no fin that you can name but what hath fome deformity in it, fomething which is base and fordid, and unworthy of a man P 2 con confider'd as a man: there is no fin but what will occafion trouble and forrow in the réflexion upon it: there is no fin but what is an offence to the divine being, and tends to caft a man out of his favour; and there is no fin but what, if it is perfifted in, will damn a man for ever. Therefore there is as much reafon why we should abandon every fin as any one; for all fin is fatal. Again what are the reasons which fhould excite a man to the practice of any one duty of religion? Are they not fuch as these? that there is a fitness and decency in the thing itself, and it becomes us as we are rational creatures ; that it will promote the peace and tranquility of our own minds; that it is a grateful acknowledgment of the favours which we receive from God, and a teftimony of the fense we have of his dominion over us; and that it hath the promise of a reward. Now these reafons are as cogent to perfuade a man to the practice of every duty of religion as of any one: for there is a fitnefs and decency in them all: they are all fuited to our make, and become us, confidered as men: the practice of every one of them tends to administer peace peace and fatisfaction to the mind; nei ther indeed can they be obtained without it; for whilft we discharge but one or a few duties only, neglecting the reft, the pleasure which would other wife refult from the performance of them, will now be quite loft and fwallowed up in the pain and uneafinefs which we fhall feel from the neglect of the rest. All the duties of religion are enjoined by the fame divine authority; and therefore we do not teftify a sense of our fubjection to God, and of our obligations, to him, except we comply with them all. For if we were duly fenfible of the right which he hath to our obedience, we fhould be as much concerned to obey all his laws as any one; because the very fame things which gave him a right of impofing any one law upon us, gave him a right of impofing all the reft: and moreover, if we were duly affected with the goodnefs of God towards us, we should think that we could never exceed in expreffions of gratitude for the many and great favours' which we receive from him. Finally, if it is the profpect of a re ward which excites us to the practice of any one virtue; this also should ex P 3 cite cite us to the practice of every virtue; because without this, it is to be feared, that we shall mifs of our end, and not obtain any reward at all. For how can it be expected, that God fhould reward a man for yielding obedience to but one of his laws, or a few only? for such an obedience as that cannot fpring from a fenfe of duty to God, which would have constrained him to an univerfal obedience as much as to a partial one, but from humour and caprice, and a particular affection for fome precepts above the rest. Now it fhould feem as if that obedience alone was capable of a reward, which proceeds from a conviction of the authority of the lawgiver, and a sense of duty to him: and then it will follow that a partial obedience, which doth not spring from these motives, cannot be acceptable to God, and confequently will not be rewarded by him. Which notion feems to be juftified by that paffage in the epistle of James, chap. II. from the 8th verse to the 11th: If ye fulfil the royal law, according to the fcripture, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy felf, ye do well; but if ye have respect to perfons, ye commit fin, and are convinced of the law as tranf greffors, greffors. For whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all. For he who faid, Do not commit adultery, faid alfo, do not kill. Now if thou commit no adultery, yet if thou kill, thou art become a tranfgreffor of the law. This text seems to represent a partial obedience as ineffectual to any good purpose, inasmuch as it makes it equal to, and brings it under the fame condemnation with a total difobedience. But, for argument fake, fuppofe it fhould be granted, that the practice of one, or a few virtues only, doth entitle a man to a reward; yet it is certain that this reward cannot be fo full and perfect, fo eminent and illuftrious as if he practifed them all. There will at least be fome defect of happiness, if not an utter exclufion from it. Our Saviour, fpeaking of the precepts of the moral law, declares that whosoever shall break one of these leaft commandments, and fhall teach men fo, be shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven, Mat. V.19. Which phrase, in the opinion of fome of the best expofitors, imports that he shall be accounted unworthy to be a member of that kingdom, and shall have no part or share in the P 4 |