Injustice tends to diffolve fociety, by destroying that peace and concord, that love and unity, which are the band and cement of it. Who can have any affection for, or maintain any friendship with a person who will not fuffer him to poffefs that which is his own, but fome how or other deprives him of the ufe and enjoyment of it? Such a conduct muft at leaft create a coldness and shyness, if not downright ftrife and contention. A man to be fure will shun fuch a perfon, and keep at a distance from him, if he does not declare open war and hoftility against him. Now if acts of injuftice are fo injurious to fociety; it must certainly be highly reafonable to abstain from them, and to practise the contrary virtue of justice, which naturally tends to produce a good understanding, and to preferve peace and concord amongst men.

But I need not enlarge upon the proof of the righteousness of this virtue, for it derives its very name from the equity of the thing. To render to every one what is his, and permit him quietly to enjoy it, are things in themfelves fo juft and right, that mankind hath agreed to give the name of justice

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or righteousness to that temper of mind which difpofes to the practice of

them.

I proceed now to prove the righteouf ness of thofe precepts which enjoin truth and fidelity, and gratitude to our benefactors, which are parts of justice as much as that which is ftrictly fo called. Truth is twofold, logical and moral. Logical truth is the conformity of our words to the reality of things. Moral truth is only the conformity of our words to our thoughts, or a speaking according to the perfuafion of our own minds, whether that be conformable to the reality of things or no. We are not under the fame obligation to the former as to the latter, because to fpeak according to the reality of things may not always be within our power. Inafmuch as we are fallible. creatures, and liable to error, we often receive falfe notions of things; and then we cannot (with integrity at least) fpeak of them as they really are. With integrity, I fay; because it is indeed poffible for us to fpeak according to the reality of things, when we ourfelves have entertained, falfe notions about them. For example: I may fay that

which is really true, when at the fame time I believe it to be falfe: but in that cafe my fpeaking the truth is no virtue in me, because it is accidental only, and not defigned: nay, it is fo far from being a virtue, that it is indeed a vice; because it is fpeaking contrary to what I believe to be true, and doing what I can towards leading people into a miftake.

But tho logical truth be not always within our power, upon account of our, fallibility; yet moral truth always is. We need never fpeak contrary to our. thoughts, tho we cannot always fpeak according to the reality of things. Now this is all that virtue obligeth us to; viz. to speak as we think, or not to speak otherwife than we think. And is not this fit and decent?. What were words. defigned for? were they not to be the figns of our ideas? Shall we then pervert them from their original intention; and instead of communicating our real fentiments by them, make use of them to convey fomething contrary thereto ? This would be unnatural, and therefore indecent but to fpeak as we think, and to make our words the real images of our minds, this is to follow nature, R 2 and

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and confequently to do that which is comely and fit to be done.

The fame may be faid concerning fidelity, which confifts in the performance of our promifes and contracts. As truth is a conformity of our words to our thoughts, fo fidelity is a conformity of our actions to our words. And is it not as fit that our actions fhould correfpond to our words, as that our words fhould correfpond to our thoughts? Nature directs us to the one as much as to the other; and therefore the one is as. decent as the other. Not to fulfil our promises is in effect to deny that we made any fuch promises; which is to be guilty of a lye; the indecency whereof hath been fhewn already.

We shall be still more convinced of the righteousness of thofe precepts which enjoin truth and fidelity, if we confider how useful thefe virtues are in fociety, and how neceffary to the fupport of it. They are useful both to the perfons who practise them, and to those with whom they converfe. "Tis certain that truth and faithfulness are useful to the perfons who practise them. I am fpeaking of the ordinary courfe of things and here it is eafy to obferve, that how much foever men neglect these

these virtues themselves, they cannot forbear applauding and commending them in others. A ftrict regard to truth hath a natural tendency to procure à man credit and reputation in the world: if men are false and deceitful themselves, they love to deal with perfons of a contrary character: as bad as the world is, it is not yet come to that pafs, as to prefer liars and knaves before fincere and honeft men. We naturally fhun the correfpondence of the former, but feek that of the latter. What man is there who chufes to have converfation with a liar? who will repofe any confidence in a man who makes no confcience of his word? When we want advice in any cafe, or have occafion to lodge any thing belonging to us in the hands of others, or to commit the management of our affairs to them, we apply ourselves not to falfe and deceitful, but to fincere and faithful men, who speak their real fentiments of things, and fulfil their engagements. From hence it follows, that the virtues of truth and faithfulnefs are useful to the perfons who practise them; because the practice of them advances their character in the world, R 3 makes