MONTHLY REVIEW,

For OCTOBER, 1769.

The Light of Nature purfued. By Edward Search, Efq. Continued":

WE

E clofed our laft account of this work with a quotation from the chapter upon the Divine Goodnefs. In the fequel of his difcourfe on the subject, the Author justly infers, from the preponderancy of good over evil, obfervable in this part of the creation lying within our view, that there is a character of goodness in the Creator and Difpofer of all things; and, confequently, that the proportion of good muft greatly furpafs that of evil in the univerfe, and that good is given for its own fake, but evil never fent unless as a means productive of fome greater good. In the mean time, the evil we experience cannot imply an opposite character in the Author of Nature, because our cleareft judgment informs us that contradictory characters cannot fubfift in the fame fubject; nor yet a defect of goodness, because the attributes of the firft caufe must be perfect and infinite. The concluding fection of this chapter is comprised in the following words:

Since then we find the eftates of happiness in this fublunary kingdom fubject to taxes, we must take the whole together, the rents and profits together with the difbursements. Or, fince evil is fo interwoven with good, that one cannot be had without the other, we muft not pick out fingle threads, but regard the whole contexture as one piece; and in this light it will appear, that every difpenfation is good, and worthy Divine Bounty to beftow. As to the existence of evil, and its being fo interwoven into the fortunes of creatures, we can do no otherwife than refer this to fome unknown attribute. For, as has been obferved before, the little we know of God being drawn from those few of his works lying within our cognizance, we cannot expect they fhould discover the whole of his nature, but there may probably be other attributes belonging to him of which we can enSee Review for Auguft, p. 126. R

VOL. XLI.

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tertain no conception. We have already found the neceffity of fome fuch in the article of omniscience: for though wisdom may difcern what capacities and ftations are requifite for completing the grand defign in view, it cannot determine what particular fubflances fhall have fuch or fuch capacities, or occupy fuch or fuch ftations, preferable to any others. So, upon the prefent article, we have found it repugnant to our notions to fuppofe, either that Infinite Bounty could ftop until there was nothing further to beftow, or yet that creatures fhould be raised to the perfection and ineffable happiness of the Creator. Therefore we must neceffarily conclude there is fome other attribute to moderate between goodness and omnipotence, to set the proper limits of imperfection, afcertaining how near it may approach towards perfection, and what diftance it must always keep therefrom, and to be the origin of evil: with all which we need not perplex our thoughts, either to raise doubts or attempt difcoveries concerning them, fince they fpring from a fource whereof we can have no comprehenfion.'

We have quoted this paragraph on account of the peculiar notions it contains refpecting fome unknown attributes of deity which the Author thinks neceffary both to determine the capacitics and ftations of particular fubftances, and to moderate between goodness and omnipotence. It has been generally ima gined that unlimited power and perfect goodness, under the direction of infinite wildom, were fufficient for every conceivable purpose in the formation and government of the universe. In our view of the matter, to refer any appearance in nature to fome unknown attribute, is little more than to confefs our total inability to account for it. But though we, with our limited faculties, may be unable to affign the reafons of any particular appointment, it is no proof, either that no reafons are to be affigned for it, or that the matter in debate is not an object of wildom. The fame witdom, which is able to difcern what capacities and ftations are requifite for effecting fuch and such purpofes, is alfo able to direct in the production of fubitances peculiarly adapted to them. Wifdom is, in our opinion, the perfection which moderates between goodnefs and omnipotence, and which fets the proper limits of imperfection, afcertaining how near it may approach towards pertection, and what diftance it must always keep from it. In regard to the origin of evil, if, as Mr. Search himfelf allows, upon a view of good and evil as interwoven with each other in the prefent flate of things, it will appear, that every difpenfation is good, and worthy Divine Bounty to beftow; and if we have reafon to conclude, from the little we know of him from thofe few of his works lying within our cognizance, that there is a character of goodness in the Author of Nature, and confequently that evil is never fent

but

but as a mean productive of fome greater good, what occafion is there to fuppofe fome unknown attribute neceffary in order to account for it? Again, the fuppofed unknown attributes of the Deity muft either be confonant with wifdom and goodness, or repugnant to them. They cannot be repugnant to them, becaufe, as our Author juftly obferves, contradictory characters cannot fubfift in the fame fubject. But if they are confonant with them, we fhall ftill be equally at a lofs to account for those things which appear to us inconfiftent either with the one or the other. To account for particular appearances in the moral world, is, to fhew that they are the refult of infinite wisdom and goodness. So far as any valuable end is anfwered by them, fo far they are the dictates of wisdom; fo far as they are productive of happiness, they are the effects of goodness. If no valuable end be answered by them, if happiness do not refult from them, if neither wifdom nor goodnefs be concerned in them, furely they are unworthy of that perfect intelligence which we juftly afcribe to the First Caufe of all.

The laft attribute of Deity which our Author confiders is, Equity.' We shall defer our remarks upon what he hath advanced in relation to this perfection till we come to the conclufions which he hath drawn from it in a subsequent chapter, entitled, Equality.'

The eighteenth chapter has this title, Two Characters in God.' The characters intended by the Author are thofe of Creator, and Governor. As Creator he gave exiftence to all fubftances by his almighty power, determined their number, properties, and ftations; and eftablifhed that conftitution of things, to which the difficulties ftarting up in our minds concerning abfolute impoffibilities, the neceffity of previous objects to ferve as materials for wifdom to work upon, the limitation of goodness, and the origin of evil, must be ultimately referred. As Governor of the Univerfe, he works upon that nature of things, which, as Creator, he hath established; difpofing and giving motions to fubftances according to the properties affigned them, ordering the laws of nature, and directing all events falling under our cognizance, providing all the happiness for the creatures which their capacities can receive, or the pre established nature of things will admit, and allotting a juft proportion of good and evil among fentient beings, fo as that none may have caufe to complain of being unequally or arbitrarily dealt with.

We do not fee the advantage of this diftinction of characters in the Supreme Being, in regard to the fatisfying of our minds as to the exiftence of evil, or its admiflion into the works of God. It is the fame Being who created, that now governs the world; and we may reasonably imagine, that the fame wifdem and goodnefs were concerned in the first confti

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tution of things, as may be obferved in their fubfequent direc tion. The fame difpofition which engages an intelligent being to remedy an evil, would lead him to prevent it, if it were in his power. Therefore the only method by which we can reconcile, the admiffion of evil to the wisdom and goodness of God, is, by having recourfe to this maxim;-that evil is never fent, unless as a mean productive of fome preponderating good, which could not otherwise be produced.

The Author proceeds, in his next chapter, to confider External Nature. By Nature,' faith he, I understand here that difpofition and order of things wherein we are likely to have any concern. We know that this body of ours fhall be diffolved, when whatever was of use or folace to it fhall be no longer ferviceable; yet the fpirit fhall remain entire with her two faculties of perceptivity and activity, but what organs, what inftruments, what materials fhe hall have to exercife them, experience informs us nothing of: nevertheless, our curiofity and concern for the future naturally incline us to look forward, but we find nothing affording any glimpse of light, unlefs in the Character of that Power which difpofes of things vifible and invifible.' From this character Mr. Search infers, in the fequel of the chapter, that the univerfe is one immenfe kingdom, governed and adminiftered by the fame legislative and executive power, and, confequently, that there is probably a complication or connection of interests running through the w whole that every provifion terminates in good, worthy the largenefs and extent of it; that whatever brings evil, or little advantage or none at all to man, redounds to the greater benefit of fomething elfe; and whatever appears unaccountable, either in the works of nature or courfes of fortune, has purpofe which it does not fail to answer; that evil extends no farther than the welfare and good order of the whole creation require; and, confequently, that we may reafonably expect to exchange our prefent condition for a better, provided we do not, by our own ill conduct, prevent it. But in what our fu→

ture happiness will confift, or by what inftruments or channels we fhall receive it, we know not. Our fenfations and reflections in another ftate may be totally diffimilar from what we now experience, and our occupations and enjoyments, as well in kind as degree, fuch as eye hath not fen, not ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive.

The four next chapters compofe, according to our Author's divifion of his work, the fecond part of the fecond volume, in which he hath framed and illuftrated an ingenious, but very fanciful fyftem, in regard to our manner of exiftence in another ftate, the flages through which we may expect to pafs, the occupations in which we may be employed, &c. In the first of

thefe

these chapters, entitled, Hypothefes, he hath given us fome very juft and pertinent obfervations upon the nature and usefulnefs of figure, allegory, fable, and parable, and on the nature of hypothefes, the manner in which they fhould be formed, and the ufe which may be made of them in his prefent inquiries. The two next chapters contain the fyftem that he has framed. He supposes that when death puts an end to the animal circulation, and the fpirit quits her prefent manfion, it carries away with it an integument from among those wherewith it was be fore invested: this integument, or vehicle, is fo small, and of fo fine a contexture, that the niceft eye cannot difcern it when going, nor the finest fcales difcover an abatement of weight in what remains after it is gone, yet may be fuppofed to contain an organization capable of exhibiting a greater variety of ideas than we now experience. In a fubfequent chapter he defcribes it as a kind of fack, or bag, filled out like a bladder with air; which the indwelling spirit hath the power of forming into the different organs of fenfation as it pleafes, and the infide of which is lined with little hairs like the nap of velvet, which are the inftruments for the mind to act upon, and by which it receives all its ideas. Befides the language which the inhabitants of the vehicular ftate hold with each other, by means of the organs of fpeech which they have the power to form, they have another called the Sentient, that is carried on by applying their vehicles close to one another, and raifing certain figures or motions on their outfides, which communicate the like to their neighbour, and thereby excite in him the fame ideas that gave rife to them in themselves, making him as it were feel their thoughts. This vehicle lying fo long inclofed in the human body, cannot fail of receiving fome little changes in its texture from the continual play of our fenfitive organs, and action of our animal circulation thereupon: fo that every man goes out of the world with a differently modelled vehicle, according as he has been a foldier or a scholar, a merchant or a mechanic, a gentleman or a labourer, according to the purfuits and expectations that have taken up his thoughts, the fuccefles and disappointments, the joys and afflictions that have hung upon his mind, the occupations and amufements that have filled up his time.' Above all, our manner of conduct may be fuppofed to have an influence upon our vehicle, which may be confidered as a little foetus, continually forming and fashioning by the grofs body wherein it lies inclofed. The practice of virtue invigorates and fupples the little limbs, ftrenghthens the fenfes, quickens the faculties, and improves that fmail mixture of unfibrous matter, which may ferve as an integument or inArument for the ufes of the foul. Whereas vice debilitates, diftorts, overclouds and benumbs the foul, and fixes too much