for the sake of a trifle, will risk an object of great and undoubted importance; nor will the charge be at all extenuated, however by their dexterity to assume the spirit and manners of those who are necessary to their purpose, and to shape themselves to all occasions, they may pass in vulgar opinion as masters of life.

The principal scope of what has been delivered in this chapter may thus briefly be stated. The true knowledge of the world does not consist chiefly in the knowledge of its manners, its occupations, or its amusements; or of the interior views and principles by which it is governed; for the former of these is merely superficial, and the latter is no more than philosophical; but it consists in that knowledge which may be called moral and religious, or that teaches us to set a due rate on every thing around us; by which is not meant its price in the market, but its real use to the possessor.

>

Now, as the everlasting perfection and happiness of our nature is, next to the glory of God, our chief end, every thing here below is to be estimated in reference to it; so far as it is conducive to this end, it is useful, and to be chosen; and so far as it is contrary, it is injurious, and to be rejected; if indifferent, (supposing any thing in this respect can be so,) it should be treated accordingly, and either chosen or rejected at pleasure.

When this principle is applied to the objects of time and sense, their true rate will be found very different from that at which they are held in vulgar estimation. Of the amusements and pleasures which the world pursues with such avidity, many will be condemned for their inherent criminality; and all, even the most innocent, will be deemed of little worth, as well on account of their transitory nature, as of their dangerous tendency to divert the mind from it greatest concerns. In like

manner, the honours and riches of the world will suffer a repulse upon a fair encounter with this principle, and be found unworthy either to be sought or entertained, except as they may be converted into instruments of usefulness.

If, then, the knowledge of which we have been speaking is such as we have stated, if it consists chiefly in a just view of the relation which this world bears to another, how few are there whose pretensions to it are solidly founded! Does he thus know the world, who thinks he has no other business in it than to eat and drink and rise up to play? Or he whose entire occupation is to join house to house, and field to field, till he is placed alone in the midst of the earth *! Does that politician thus know the world, who imagines that nothing is wanting to complete its felicity but liberty and equality, peace and plenty? Or that philosopher

* Isaiah, v. 8.

who knows every thing under the sun as well as Solomon himself, except that the whole is vanity? No: these are merely novices in the science in which they fancy themselves proficients, and may go for lessons to the simplest hermit, who is piously studious of the Bible, and of his own heart.

And though we were to consider the world in a manner less serious or theological, and should view it even in the most favourable light in which it can be placed by its fondest admirer, what is it but a great fair, in which a prodigious diversity of articles is exposed to sale, some for amusement, some for ostentation, and some for use? Now suppose a wise man to go round the fair, and to note carefully its various commodities; what would be the result of his survey? Among the first class of objects above specified, should he pick up a rattle, it will be one cheap and innocent, and such as may recreate his spirits when exhausted with more serious

affairs. The second class he would leave to the vain and prodigal. From the third he would collect such articles as might suit his wants or his reasonable convenience, at the same time taking heed that he paid down for them no more than their just value. This is the man who knows the world, and how to draw from it all the real advantage it is capable of yielding,