of their comfort; and, what is more, much of the favourable attention they afford to religion and virtue; which are seldom received with kindness, when introduced in a manner either rude or impertinent.

3. We may next observe, that there is the like tendency in a just moral philosophy, as in the study of nature, to reduce

us to humility; the one on account of our imperfect virtue, and the other (as we have before remarked) on account of the indistinctness and limitation of our knowledge. While we consider our duties grossly, we may easily be satisfied with ourselves; but not so when we view them clearly and distinctly in all their appropriate and discriminating circumstances: for every action has its particular congruities, which if not attended to, the action itself is so far vitiated. It is not enough to be respectful to a superior, unless we pay him that peculiar respect which is due to his age, his station, his character, and the relation he stands in to us. So the more familiar

regard we owe to an equal, or an inferior, ought to be qualified by the particular circumstances. When in this manner we examine our most laudable conduct, we shall find it maimed and imperfect; and that if in some respects it deserves praise, in others it needs pardon. Thus, as we grow in a critical acquaintance with those fitnesses and proprieties which must give to our actions their full integrity and beauty, and make virtue look like itself, we shall be taught, under a consciousness of our innumerable deficiencies, the need we have to cultivate that humility of temper, which so much becomes the best man in his best performances.

4. To expose the general vanity of the world, the fallacy of its hopes, and the certainty of its evils, is another mode in which philosophy may conduce to the interest of virtue; as it may thus serve to regulate our desires and expectations, to abate our envy on account of the superior fortune of others, and to render us con

In this branch of

tented with our own. moral wisdom there has never, I presume, been a greater proficient in any age or nation than the ancient author of the book of Ecclesiastes, who, after he had set his heart to seek and search out concerning all things that are done under heaven, thus declares the result: I have seen all the works that are done under the sun; and behold, all is vanity and vexation of spirit: that which is crooked cannot be made straight, and that which is wanting cannot be numbered*. And these evils have afforded topics to almost every eminent moralist, since his time, for much eloquent description and pathetic complaint. Of this kind of composition we have excellent specimens in many of our sermons, and in many of those periodical essays which have appeared amongst us within the last hundred years; and in none has the condition of human life been more justly or elegantly deplored than in the more se

Eccles, i, 13-15.

rious numbers of the Rambler, and in some other productions of the same great author. Lastly, besides a conviction of the vanity of the world, we may derive from philosophy many particular directions for our proper behaviour in it. It was to draw out these instructive counsels for the use of all succeeding generations, that the wise prince above named composed his book of proverbs; of which the design was, as he tells us in his preface, To know wisdom and instruction, to perceive the words of understanding; to receive the instruction of wisdom, justice, and judgment, and equity; to give subtilty to the simple, to the young man knowledge and discretion*, Nor is there perhaps a moral writer, ancient or modern, from whom a prudent man may not collect some usful hint for the better regulation of his conduct, both in public and in private.

And thus may appear the utility of moral philosophy, and how much it deserves

* Prov. i. 2-4.

to be admitted into our studious retirements, while it acts its own part, and keeps within its proper bounds; while it endeavours modestly to trace out the equity and goodness of the divine laws and dispensations, to mark with more precision the nature and extent of our social duties, to shew us the imperfection of our virtue, and the vanity of this world when separated from the next. But when it once presumes to transgress these limits, and instead of the hand-maid would become the rival of religion; especially when it would substitute the doctrine of manners for the doctrine which is according to godliness, and thus intercept the progress of the mind from morality to piety; it is then corrupted by the elements of this world, and degenerates into vain deceit *. And here lies the main charge against our popular moral doctrine, whether contained in sermons or otherwise, that it generally tends to supplant those great principles of Christianity, by which alone we can be

Coloss. ii. 8.