beginning to the end *. Both the first principles and the ultimate results of all things are alike concealed from us in impenetrable obscurity; and all that a sober philosophy can intend, in order to relieve our ignorance, is to seek out and to prosecute those methods which may gradually lessen our distance from the two extremities. The light of experience presupposed, the true engine for the erection of natural sci * Eccles. iii, 11. + Let me be permitted here farther to observe, for the sake of the young enquirer, that even within the limits above stated, he will be in constant danger of running into error, unless his understanding be well reclaimed and disciplined, and made willing patiently to follow the slow steps of experience. Without this preparation, the first flattering hypothesis, which promises to expedite his progress, will be sufficient to captivate his attention, till its fallacy is exposed by some untoward phænomena, or till it is supplanted by some other theory of greater plausibility, or of later invention. Nor can it too much be regretted, that, by a fond pursuit of such illusory phantoms, the vigour of so many great geniuses has been wasted, and those days and years of retreat idly consumed, which, under a right direction, might have led to valuable discoveries. ence, as the present age has been convinced by the example of Newton, is not hypothesis, but geometry; which, besides its instrumental use, is in itself so transporting a study, that, probably, Homer felt less rapture in his fictions, than Archimides. in his demonstrations; for, as the intellect is the highest faculty, of the soul, a sublimer emotion may be supposed to arise from its contact with truth, though of the lowest order, than any which can be produced by the exercise of our imaginative powers. Yet here, as in other specula tions, the understanding must observe a measure, or its exertions will be lost in those elaborate trifles, which are properly denominated, by one of our poets, Tricks to shew the stretch of human brain, 2. Moral Philosophy. From natural and mathematical philosophy, let us pass on to moral, which, to a prepared enquirer, is more delightful than either, as may appear from the following reasons: First, because it is nobler. That the in vestigation of the noblest subjects is, to a capable mind, the most pleasing, is a position which cannot justly be disputed; nor that what is moral stands highest in the scale of excellence. Whence it follows, that enquiries into the moral world are suited to yield a more sublime satisfaction than those that relate only to the inanimate or merely sensitive parts of the creation, both of which occupy inferior degrees in the scale now mentioned. Nay, it is some faint reflection of the Creator's moral glory, from these his lowest works, that constitutes their chief lustre and beauty; which further evinces the superiority, here asserted, of moral to natural philosophy, and consequently to any speculations, however curious, upon mere abstract quantity, as these can only be considered as instrumental to the knowledge of nature. Secondly, the same may be argued from the superior importance of moral science, That subject which involves our greatest interests cannot fail, to a well-constituted mind, to afford the noblest pleasure. Hence, to such a mind, it must be more satisfactory to understand the measures of right and wrong, of just and unjust, of good and evil, than to be acquainted with the laws of matter and motion, or the properties of fines and figures; a knowledge which, at most, can only contribute to our present convenience or amusement, whereas the former immediately relates to our duty and final happiness. And, lastly, the same inference may be drawn from the congruity of moral science with our mental faculties. As man was formed to be a subject of the moral kingdom of God, the law of this kingdom was originally interwoven with his very being; and, notwithstanding his apostacy, still retains so much influence, even among the Gentiles, that they are said to be a law to themselves, and to have the work of the law written in their hearts *. This will hardly * Rom. ii. 14, 15. be affirmed of those laws whose discovery is the object of natural and mathematical philosophy, laws which, in general, bear much less affinity, and are attended with much less evidence, to the human mind; and to whose investigation, a laborious process of reason, together with a slow and gradual experience, is often necessary: so that, unless they can be proved either more excellent in their own nature, or more interesting to us, (neither of which, I presume, can be done,) their inferiority, as a source of contemplative pleasure, cannot be disputed. 3. Metaphysics. Of metaphysical enquiries we may observe, in the words of Tacitus, when speaking of the crafty counsels of worldly policy, that, however flattering in promise, they are generally dif ficult in the prosecution, and unhappy in the issue * When a man retires into himself to consult his own ideas, without pay * Consilia callida, primâ specie læta, tractatu dura, eventu tristia. |