the life which now is, and of that which is to come *.

He who is properly convinced of this, will never dream of happiness without a primary regard to morals; he will not say, as the multitude has always said, Give me riches first, and virtue afterwards; he will seek it in the first place, and estiinate the various conditions of human life only as they afford means and instruments for its acquisition and advancement.

Every just survey of men and their pursuits will come in aid of this principle. It will teach us that, however enviable the successes of the votarics of fortune or pleasure may appear, they are generally accompanied with inward anguish and bitter disappointment, and at the best never yield a pure and heart-felt satisfaction. The ancient burden of the

world's most triumphant song is still the same, All is vanity and vexation of spirit.

Let it then, in every deliberation upon the choice of life, be established as an undoubted maxim, that virtue is the only road to true happiness, and that it would be every man's interest to take this road, though his object was no more than present enjoyment; and that neither the pomp of greatness, the splendour of wealth, nor the allurement of pleasure, ought to draw his regard for a moment, when they come in competition with the humblest station which supplies more efficacious helps to his moral improvement.

Secondly: In the choice of life every one ought to prefer that condition which is most favourable to virtue, as the surest way to be useful to others, as well as to be happy himself. The better any man is, the more he is likely to improve his circumstances, whatever they may be, to the

benefit of others; and the more his circumstances supply him with moral and religious advantages, the more he is likely to become a better man. Hence we may infer, that the most certain way to be useful is to pitch upon that condition, which among those presented to our choice is best adapted to further our moral progress,

If to lessen the connection betwixt virtue and utility, it should be objected, that men by no means correct in their manners, and neither endowed with superior talents, nor placed in more advantageous circumstances, often appear to exceed in usefulness others much better than themselves; let it be considered, that this is generally little more than appearance; and that whatever such men nay add to the stock of worldly enjoyments, they seldom contribute any thing to the interests of virtue or virtuous happiness, which are the only objects of a certain and durable value; and that what occasionally

they may thus contribute is commonly more than balanced by the contagion of their example. Indeed it is fairly questionable, whether, on the whole, every bad man is not a public evil; at least, whenever it is otherwise, it is an exception to the general rule, and must be ascribed to an extraordinary dispensation of that providence, which can over-rule even the sins of men to the accomplishment of its own purposes.

But though the connection, as above stated, between virtue and utility, cannot reasonably be disputed, it must be acknowledged that the latter may easily be pretended, and what is more, may seriously be designed and prosecuted, to the injury of the former. The plea of usefulness may be no better than a convenient cloak to an interested and ambitious spirit, under which it conceals itself in order to the attainment of its own ends; and even to a virtuous mind, unless well acquainted with itself, and

endued with much prudent circumspection, it is a plea that will often prove delusive. A good man naturally desires to do good, and is apt to imagine, that, were he in possession of greater power and wealth, his usefulness would in proportion be more extended. The poor; he is ready to suppose, would find in him a more liberal benefactor, and the deserving a more generous patron; and hence he is led to engage in situations to which his virtue is not always equal. By such a conduct it is probable, according to the principle we have established, that both his usefulness and virtue will de cline together. The illusion in this case arises from a supposition, that the mind will remain unaltered with a change of circumstances, and that, as the means of usefulness are increased, the disposition to improve them will not be diminished; à Supposition which is crossed by every day's experience. The least observation upon ourselves or others may convince us, that the usual tendency of prosperity