chapters by the aid of Swedenborg's hitherto neglected Arcana, and it is astonishing what a number of passages, in other and remote parts of the Word, we shall be able to explain, and how often we shall find that we have anticipated our author when we come to read his interpretation of these passages, while we shall ever find in it much that is new, varied, suggestive, comprehensive, and "full of light."

Surely "the finger of Jehovah is here."

PHILO.

REVIEW OF "T. R.'s" REMARKS ON "MATTER AND NATURAL SUBSTANCE."

66

WE are sorry to have to appear before the readers of the Intellectual Repository in a controversial manner, but the opposition offered by our much-respected friend T. R." to our idea, in the article on "Matter and Natural Substance," has rendered this course necessary. It would have been much more in agreement with our feelings had he stated his opposition personally, so that we might have endeavoured to reconcile our differences of opinion privately; but, no doubt he had reason in his own mind to justify his proceeding. Probably he thought that, as the supposed errors were spread to the extent of the magazine's circulation, a correction ought to follow to the same limit, and that by the same medium. If that was the case, then, while we beg to differ with him in our views, we approve of his motive. Our difference is not of the greatest importance, because the subject is not strictly a theological one; nevertheless, we believe that if it be made subservient to religion, it will become a very powerful handmaid.

The first objection of "T. R." is, concerning the judgment of the eye. We had stated that to conclude that the substance of any form was the same as it was before it was organized into a form, is to judge from the eye, and not from the mind; in opposition to which he says-" Now, who can say that the substance of the body of a living man appears to the eye to be the same as the food which is spread upon his table? Yet, if the above application of Swedenborg's words be correct, it should appear so." This, we think, is trifling both with our remarks and the sense of Swedenborg, the judgment of the eye not meaning sight, but 66 a conclusion drawn from the appearance of a thing, and not from its essence." A. E. 1215. The eye does not judge, or draw conclusions, but simply sees. It is the mind which judges; and that part of the mind which judges according to appearances is the sensual principle; this receives all things as they are presented, and draws its conclusions

from their appearances. The fallacy in the above illustration of our friend is, that the human body and the food have both material properties; therefore, they are both material. The sensual principle, or sensual man, cannot raise his thoughts to the contemplation of the real causes or essences of things, these being above his sphere; but he looks for the cause of any effect upon the plane of the effect itself, and he says " -“We know it must be so, because it has been built up from the same." The following remarks of "T. R.," in the same paragraph, we pass over, inasmuch as he makes no difference between matter and mere matter, the distinction between which we have clearly pointed out, in a few words just preceding those which he has quoted (see also page 539).

He next says (after quoting-" We must always judge of substance from its essence, which is known from its properties, &c.")" Now, here is either a great discrepancy, or I do not think rightly." We believe that no one who thinks rationally upon the subject will see any discrepancy in the remark. The conclusion which he draws is just the reverse of the one drawn by the writer. He says "I should say it is right, according to this rule, to call anything material which has material properties." This is the judgment of the sensual principle, and it is the conclusion to which materialists alone arrive. When we read the writings of any individual we should endeavour to think as he does, or it is impossible to ascertain what his ideas are; if we read his words under the influence of pre-conceived notions, we shall be liable to arrive at conclusions which he never intended, and which will be, instead of his ideas, conclusions of our own; and if we rise to offer opposition to his supposed views, we may be, instead of opposing him, opposing ourselves— we may be battling with a creature of our own imagination, fancying all the time that we are contending against a real object. It is quite possible that we may imagine that there is "a great discrepancy," when, if we understood the writer, there is perfect consistency; and though we may have taken our own thoughts as the criterion by which to judge of those of others, we may, after all, “not think rightly."

It is not our intention to criticise our critic, but still, we object to being tested by a false standard; and, if we find that such has been introduced, it will become our duty to show its fallacy, and reject it.

"T. R." next gives a definition of property, viz., " What is proper to it and not common to other kinds of things." With this we agree, and we conclude that if any substance has certain properties they are its own. Matter, or unorganized ultimate substance, has certain properties-length, breadth, thickness, &c. These are common to all matter, both unorganized and organized; therefore, they are matters and pro

perties. When unorganized it is mere matter; when it is organized it is matter, but not mere matter. This distinction is essential, and if it be not seen our ideas cannot be understood. That which possesses nothing but the properties of unorganized ultimate substance is mere matter, which are, impenetrability, extension, divisibility, inertia, &c. Now, if we see that there is substance which possesses properties that are not common to "other things," or substance, though it may possess those of matter beside, what are we to think of that? Are we to say that it, though it possesses those additional properties, is still mere matter? The properties of matter are the existence of mere matter; but, if substance become possessed of additional properties, are we to say that these are the existence of mere matter also? or, ought we not to say that they are the existence of another substance? Here we would be understood aright. By another substance we do not mean that matter is dissipated, and something substituted in its place, but, that there is joined to it, by organization, another substance, which is the essence of the form that is assumed, and this essence is the substance of those additional properties. Whatever substance be joined to another, by organization, it is a superior substance; it is interior and superior, and can, therefore, act in the other and through it. It is the superior which assumes the inferior, and, by the assumption, organizes it, or makes it into the form of itself.

This organizing is what we mean by assumption. When an inferior substance is so assumed by a superior the two exist together as a one, the superior acting in the inferior and ruling it; not destroying it, or anything which is proper to it, but imparting to it what is proper to itself, and existing in it as a one with it, so that what is derived appears to be inherent; the two substances, though distinct in their natures, make one thing or being by organization. The superior substance is the essence, and the inferior is the form, and there is no other essence. It is nugatory and vain to talk of dead essences; as well might we talk of dead existences, or inactive activities. Every essence is active with respect to its form. Matter is dead when compared with spirit, and every form is dead with respect to its essence, and the whole of creation is dead with respect to the Creator; but are we to say, on that account, that the things of creation do not live, or, which is the same, do not exist? Everything lives that has life, and everything that has life lives; there are various degrees of life, for everything receives it according to its capability, or according to its form. When we say everything receives life according to its form, we mean everything in this world, and do not include spiritual substance, which is proper to

the spiritual world; still, as it is here in this world with respect to the reception of life, so it is there in that world, each spiritual thing receiving life according to its form, which is its capability of receiving. Every essence is said to live, because it communicates life to its form; not that the essence has life in itself, but that it is a recipient of life in a superior degree to that in which the form is. The more superior the form is, the more superior is the essence, and the more perfect recipient of life. Originally it is the life that gives the form, and, also, it is the life that quickens it, for it is the only active principle; but of absolute life we cannot predicate anything, nor can we think of it. It is of forms only which we can think, and of which we predicate life in a relative sense, and of course we speak relatively when we speak of the things of creation, whether spiritual or natural.

It would appear from our friend's preliminary remarks that he understands us to believe in transmutation (see p. 28); but nothing can be more remote from our ideas. We have stated, and shewn, that matter is not transmuted into spirit, but that when it becomes organized it retains all the material properties which it had before, which properties are matter itself; and that it does not lose anything by being made more perfect by receiving induced properties, it is not made spiritual; it is still on the same plane. But we fear that our friend is labouring under a mistake; we should be sorry to attribute to him an opinion which he does not entertain, for we know that he is capable of distinguishing truth from error in an interior degree; but we have all received more or less of error, and the chief difficulty which we have with respect to the understanding is to part with those things which we believe to be true, and have cherished a long time; and some of these notions are deeply rooted, not because they have the brilliant appearance of truth, but because they are popular, and what is popular passes unsuspected. Our friend's definition of property we are willing to abide by, viz :— "that which is proper to any thing, and not common to other kinds of things"; and by this definition he would disprove the truth of the existence of induced properties. He says "That seeming life which matter acquires, when taken into the body of an animal or a man, is not a property of the matter at all." Now what does he mean by this assertion? Does he mean to convey the idea that those additional and superior properties which animals and men have, which are signified by their life, are not possessed by them? He cannot mean to tell us that unorganized matter does not possess the life of organized beings; this is too plainly understood by every one. By life here we presume he means those particular activities or properties which characterize animals

"

and men, and constitute a broad line of distinction between them and mere matter. By matter we also presume he means the bodies of animals and men. Now, if those properties do not belong to the bodies in which they exist, to what do they belong? He says the property of any thing is what is proper to it. The properties of an animal are proper to it, they exist in it and nowhere else; and if they exist in it, and are not common to other kinds of things, they must belong to it and to it only; they are not to be found anywhere else, nor in any other thing; they therefore are its own peculiar properties, or its life. Again, he says-"The life of man is communicated from his soul apparently to his body. But it cannot therefore be called a bodily property." Why not? Because," says he, "it is not proper to the body." Now we would with all respect ask him, what it is a property of? It is not a property of the soul, for it exists in the body; it is not in the soul, but in the body only. The life of the body is the body living; its life is its own, just as the soul's life is its own. It is little better than trifling with the subject to say that the life does not belong to the body because it is derived. But it is said that "even the appearance of life which the body enjoys is common to the soul." This we deny. We maintain that the soul has only apparent existence as well as the body has, but the appearance of life in the soul is not the same as the appearance of life in the body; for the consciousness of life in the two is totally different; the soul lives its own life, and the body lives its own life; the body's life is not felt in the soul, but only in the body. It does not follow that because the body receives its life through the soul, it does not receive it at all. The soul receives its life; but it does not follow that because it receives its life from another source, it does not live; it lives the life which it receives, and the body does the same; and if we say that the soul lives in the body, it amounts to the same as saying that the body lives from the soul. God alone is life, but whatever subject receives life from him, it lives, and the life that it lives is predicated of it, and is attributable to it. Life is always predicated of the subject which receives it; this life is as real with respect to the subject as the subject itself is real; its life is as really its own as the form in which it lives is its own; they are both from God, but are real only with regard to finite things; in regard to the infinite, the finite is not a real existence; but any finite thing, in regard to other finite things, is real, and it is in relation to things finite that all finite things exist.

Further Whatever a body has by organization is not proper to it." This is a singular conclusion. It is a property which does not exist in any other subject, and still it is not a property of the only subject in