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the Church discovers the principles which we purpose setting forth as binding upon those who have taken an unqualified vow of poverty.

So rigid was the rule of poverty in the early monastic communities that Cassian informs us "that no one ventures to say even in word that anything is his own; and it is a great offence if there doth pass the mouth of a monk such an expression as my book,' 'my tablets,' 'my pen,' 'my coat,' 'my shoes'; and for this he would have to make satisfaction by a proper penance, if by accident some such expression escaped his lips through thoughtlessness or ignorance."1 All things were held in common, as the Abbot Abraham taught: "Monks alone maintain a lasting union in intimacy, and possess all things in common, as they hold that everything that belongs to their brethren is their own, and that everything which is their own is their brethren's." St. Benedict, more than a century later, is quite explicit: “Let no one presume," he says, without the leave of the Abbot, to give, or receive, or hold, as his own, anything whatsoever, either book, or tablets, or pen, or anything at all; because they are men whose very bodies and wills are not in their own power. Let all

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It is clear that the obligation incurred by the vow 1 Cassian, Institutes, Lib. iv, cap. xiii. Migne, P. L., Tom. xlix, col. 169. The Augustinian Observances of Barnwell Priory gave the same direction: "He is not to call anything mine, or my own, but ours.”—Clark, p. 223. So also St. Basil (a.d. 360): “The Scripture forbiddeth us to say mine and thine among the brethren."-Reg. Fus. Tract., 32.

2 Cassian, Conferences, xxiv, 26. Migne, P. L., Tom. xlix, col. 1323. 3 St. Benedict, Regula, 33.

of poverty extends only to temporal things, that is to say, to things which can be bought with money, or that have a moral equivalent in money. It does not involve spiritual things, and the Religious does not renounce his dominion over these. That is to say, he retains his right over prayers, intercessions, etc., that he may choose to make; and over the intentions of his Mass and Offices, provided these are not directed under obedience.

A Religious cannot have or acquire any temporal thing in his own name or right so as to have personal dominion over it. Neither can he have the right of use in any temporal goods, without permission. “Use is something of money value; it is therefore an object of the vow."1

By his profession he becomes incapable in the court of conscience of such possession or acquisition.2 Gautrelet describes this as "the highest degree of the vow of poverty." The force of this might be illustrated by saying that if one should steal property from a Religious, he would not be bound in conscience to make personal restitution to the individual from whom it was taken, except as that individual may be the agent of his community or of some other for whom he was administering the property so stolen. It is held that one who receives a gift from a Religious, made without permission, is bound to make restitution to the community, on the same principle that requires a receiver of stolen goods to make restitution to the rightful owner.a

1 Gautrelet, op. cit., Vol. i, p. 228.
2 Ibid., p. 213. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., p. 253.

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Gautrelet, commenting on the vow of poverty, says: 'The Religious, not content with depriving himself of the goods that he possesses, and of those that he might one day acquire, despoiling himself of what he has and what he might have, deprives himself of the very power of possession and acquirement. Not content to give the fruits, or even to cut off the branches and stem, he pulls up the roots that might produce new stems."1 It is as Cassian tells us it was with the Religious of the primitive Church, not only do they give up all, but they are "vowed utterly to forsake them," which obligation is in no sense fulfilled by him who maintains rights of ownership or disposition of property, independently of his Superior's will.

A Religious cannot use or retain any temporal things whatsoever without the express or implied permission of his Superior, and he must be ready and prompt in will and act to give up at any time those things that he may be holding or using through such permission.

In order for a sin against the vow of poverty to be grave, the matter must be grave, and the knowledge and consent full and deliberate, as is the case with other sins.

II. Of Ownership and Permissions

Only an act of ownership can violate the vow of poverty. It is necessary then for us to inquire particularly what constitutes an act of ownership. Ownership is the power of disposing freely and

1 Gautrelet, op. cit., Vol. i, p. 253.

independently of an object, using it, giving it, alienating it at one's will. This free and independent use of things is what is called an act of ownership, an act whereby a person disposes of an object as its possessor, as absolute master, independently of the will of others, and consequently in Religion, independently of the will of his Superior, and without permission obtained from legitimate authority.

The presence of permission entirely neutralizes all ownership, for in that case it is the Superior acting through the subject, who is therefore the former's agent, and no longer acts independently. Therefore no ownership is exercised.

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One sins against the vow of poverty every time he acts as master without dependence and without permission in the disposal of things which are of the matter of the vow he has made."1 This quotation from Gautrelet sums up what the exercise of independent ownership means. It also reminds us of what we must constantly keep in mind, that the obligation of poverty depends for its extent and application upon the terms of the particular vow that has been taken, and on the provisions of the particular Rule and Constitutions we have vowed to observe.

It is the permission of the proper authority that establishes that subordination of the subject to the will of the Superior which renders it safe for one to deal with temporal goods without running the risk of exercising ownership. It is the absence of this permission that gives independence to such dealing, and constitutes an exercise of ownership. It is, therefore, 1 Gautrelet, op. cit., Vol. i, p. 217.

of grave importance to the Religious to know the conditions of lawful permission under which he can safely act. Otherwise, he might easily, through ignorance, exercise that ownership which would be an offence against his vow of poverty.

Permission in its form may be express, tacit, or presumed. In its essence it may be just or unjust, and valid or invalid.

III. Of Permission Express, Tacit, or Presumed Permission is express when by a formal act, as by word or writing, a Superior permits a certain act or course. "By such permission the Superior approves the action of his subject, adopts it and makes it his own," and the inferior becomes an agent only, the Superior being responsible for what is done.

Permission is tacit when it is included in an express permission. For example, an express permission to accomplish a certain end carries with it the tacit permission to use the ordinary means necessary for reaching that end. If a Superior gives an express permission to make a journey, he tacitly gives permission to expend the money required for the railway fare.

Again, express permission to perform some complex action carries with it tacit permission to do all subsidiary things that are involved.

Again, if one has express permission to keep certain articles for his use, he thereby receives tacit permission to use his judgment as to the time and circumstances of their use.

1 Gautrelet, op. cit., Vol. i, p. 218.

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