this reason, the Fathers are unanimous in declaring Obedience to be the source and root, the mother and mistress, of all the virtues.

Third. St. Thomas gives a further reason for exalting Obedience above other virtues; because it advances us to the final end of Religion which is Perfection more directly and perfectly than any other virtue, and for this reason is the most perfect. Rodriguez concludes from the above considerations" that Obedience is the virtue that essentially constitutes Religion, and properly makes a Religious.” "Take Obedience along with you as your guide," he says, and embrace all the occasions it shall present you, and you need do no more." And St. Francis de Sales teaches: "If the Religious does not obey, he cannot have any virtue, because it is principally Obedience that makes him a Religious as being the proper and especial virtue of Religion."

III. Of the Vow of Obedience

The vow of Religious Obedience contains two distinct obligations. (1) A promise made to the community and to the Superior to obey them, and (2) a vow to God to keep this promise.

It follows from this that one violating Religious Obedience is guilty of a double transgression. He 1 Rodriguez, op. cit., Vol. iii, pp. 228-9.

2 A sermon on Obedience and Humility, doubtfully attributed to St. Augustine, gives the same doctrine: "Sine obedientia virtutes nullae. Ubi abest, adest superbia."-See Migne, P. L., Tom. xl, col. 1221.

3 St. Francis de Sales, Spiritual Conferences, xi, p. 166. 4 See St. Thomas, Summa. 2. 2, Q. 88, Art. 5.

commits the sin of sacrilege in breaking his vow to God, and he adds to this the sin of unfaithfulness or injustice by breaking his promise to man.

The vow of Obedience binds one to submit to all lawful commands of Superiors, and to observe all the Rules that express or imply an obligation.1

This requires some explanation. The only essential object of the vow is an action that is definitely commanded. This follows from the nature of obedience; for there can be no obedience, properly speaking, where there is no command.

A subject might bind himself to conform to every known wish of his Superior, and such an attitude might be praiseworthy as indicating a good and thorough Religious; but it would not touch the vow of Obedience, since there can be no Obedience where there is no command.

No Religious, therefore, is bound, so far as his vow is concerned, to comply with the mere pleasure or wish of a Superior. Such an attitude on the part of the Superior does not create an obligation in view of the subject's vow of Obedience, however meritorious it may be in the subject to respond to the known wish and pleasure of his Superior, especially if it be on his part an act of the mortification of his own self-will.

IV. Of the Matter of Religious Obedience The matter of Religious Obedience may be the written Rule, Constitutions and Custumal, to which the Religious is bound, or a lawful precept imposed by the will of those in lawful authority.

1 Gautrelet, op. cit., Vol. ii, p. 70.

The matter is twofold-remote or general, and proximate or particular. The remote matter is every act that the Superior has the right to command. The proximate matter is the particular precept that a Superior may prescribe at any given time, and in whatever manner, if only his will be clearly expressed to the subject.

Two qualities are necessary to render a precept valid. (1) It must be a lawful thing, i.e., such as a Superior has the right to prescribe, and (2) the Superior giving the command must have the lawful power and authority to exact this obedience. If either of these qualities is lacking, the precept will not be proper matter of obedience.

V. Of Superiors, and their Duty of Enforcing Obedience

It is incumbent on a Superior to give opportunity for the exercise of Obedience. Religious profession, as we have seen, is of the nature of a contract. As the subject violates his contract if he fails to obey, so the community violates its part of the agreement if through the laxity of a Superior it withdraws from the subject, without due cause, the opportunity of that practice of obedience that is necessary for his advance in perfection.

It is a like fault in a Superior if he consult too much with the Religious concerning his obediences and the method of fulfilling them. The opportunity for increasing the grace and virtue of obedience is often thus withdrawn; but more serious still, a temptation is offered him to bring the Superior's directions

before the tribunal of his own judgment, often to his own hurt.

A Religious takes his vows in accordance with the Rule of his community. In requiring the obedience of his subjects, a Superior therefore is limited by what the Rule commands, permits, or implies. He must confine his commands to those things which belong at least to the spirit of the Rule he is set to administer.

The Religious by his vow binds himself to obey in all things that are conformed to the spirit of the Rule, and in those things which are neither beyond the Rule nor contrary to it.1

Those things are beyond the Rule which are foreign to it, which lie altogether outside its scope, or that exceed its requirements. A Superior has no right to demand things that are foreign to the Rule, or that lie outside its intent, but he can on occasion command that which may exceed its ordinary requirements. He would, however, have no right to set such permanent requirements as would involve a practical change in the Rule. For example, if the Rule required the members of the community to give three hours a day to manual labour, he would have the right in order to meet the exigencies of a special occasion to require double that time of any or all of his subjects, but he could not change the period of work permanently for the whole community.

Those things are contrary to the Rule that are (a) less perfect than the Rule contemplates; (b) that are

1 Suarez, Opera Omnia, III, liv, x, c. 8 (Paris, 1866).

clearly opposed to its letter or spirit; (c) that are evil. Were such things demanded, the subject would not be bound, as they are not comprehended in his vow of Obedience. In regard to the last point, St. Gregory states the doctrine that all the authorities without exception adhere to: "A sin ought never to be committed through Obedience,1 but sometimes a good deed which is being performed ought, through Obedience, to be given up." Many good actions must indeed be refrained from, except under Obedience. This applies especially to practices of bodily mortification in almost all communities. St. Francis de Sales speaks with great vigour against those "who, deluded by their own fancy, measure holiness by austerity, and more readily offer to deprive their appetite of food than their hearts of self-will."

The Superior, however, has the same right, as is described above, to set less perfect requirements on special occasions as his judgment may dictate, but these would generally fall under the head of dispensations. Nothing that is against conscience can be demanded by him.

A subject may be guilty of disobedience by excess as well as by defect. "The kind of disobedience is one and the same," says the Abbot Daniel, “if a man break the Elder's commands, whether it be owing to zeal in work or love of ease

1 See also St. Basil, Reg. Brev., 114.

except that those

2 St. Gregory Mag., Moral. Lib. xxxv, cap. xiv. Tom. lxxvi, col. 766. See St. Basil, Reg. Brev., 60. Observances of Barnwell Priory, p. 93.

Migne, P. L.,

See also Clark,

3 St. Francis de Sales, Preface to The Rule and Constitutions of the Sisters of the Visitation.