CHAPTER XI

RELIGIOUS RULE

I. Of the Significance of Rule

THE essential necessity of a Rule for those who have entered upon the Religious State, is implied in the ordinary terminology of the monastic life. Professed Religious are commonly called Regulars; and the life often spoken of as the Regular Life, from the Latin word Regula, which means a Rule, a standard, something by which one is to measure himself to see if he conforms to the ideal set before him.

In the East, the like idea prevailed, and the word Kaváv (Canon), which is the Greek equivalent for Regula, came to be applied in the same way to those who lived under a Rule. The term has a wide use both in East and West. St. Chrysostom and other Fathers call nuns Canonesses, which is the same as to say female Regulars.

At the present day, when the general term Rule is used, it is meant to include the Rule proper, the Constitutions, and the Custumal.

The distinction between Rule and Constitutions is given by St. Francis de Sales as follows: "Rules in Religion point out the means of becoming perfect in God's service, and Constitutions indicate how these

means are to be used. For example, such a Rule prescribes that prayers be sedulously attended to, and the Constitutions particularize the time, the quantity and the quality of the prayers that are to be performed. . In brief, the Rule tells what is to be done, and the Constitutions how to do it."1

As we have seen in considering the subject of Obedience, the Religious is not held strictly to go beyond his Rule; and yet it is well to remember that every good Rule is formed on the principle that a recent writer has described as underlying the ancient Rule of St. Pachomius. "The fundamental idea of his Rule was to establish a moderate level of observance which might be obligatory upon all; and then leave it open to each, and, indeed, to encourage each, to go beyond the fixed minimum, according as he was prompted by his strength, his courage, and his zeal." He would be a lukewarm Religious who was content never to offer God anything beyond the minimum that his vow required of him.

II. Of the Obligation of Rule

Religious Rules do not ordinarily bind under pain of sin, either mortal or venial. It is, however, the practically unanimous opinion of the authorities that when a duty is laid upon Religious, it being explicitly

1 St. Francis de Sales, Visitation Constitutions, Preface. The Observances of Barnwell Priory place Rule and Constitutions in the same relation as the Decalogue and the words of the Prophets, and as the words of the Gospel and the writings of the Apostles. See Clark, P. 37.

2 Butler (quoted by Morison), Lausiac History of Palladius, i, p. 233, seq.

stated that it is required " in virtue of holy obedience," a failure to obey involves a grave degree of sin, since the refractory person explicitly refuses to give the obedience to which his vows oblige him.

If under ordinary circumstances, infraction of Rule constituted mortal or venial sin, the Religious State would then be more perilous than the secular state, since instead of being a help against sin it would offer constant opportunities for sin from which men in the world would be free.1

The above statement must be understood to mean that infraction of the Rule per se does not constitute sin. For example, if a Rule bound a Religious to be in choir at noon, absence from choir at that hour would not be a sin merely because of the terms of the Rule.

The reason for this is that the Rule is not of divine, but of human institution, and it cannot make that to be sin which is not sin according to the divine decree.

A wilful infraction of Rule, however, is a violation of an obligation which one took upon himself, and the opinion of the authorities is that such an act rarely fails to constitute some kind and degree of sin. To break wilfully, or through sloth, a Rule which has union with God as its end, can rarely be free from guilt. Scripture is full of strong teaching concerning the obligation to pay the vows that are made to God, and everywhere it is implied that He will hold to strict account those who fail to pay Him that which they have vowed.

1 St. Thomas, Summa. 2. 2, Q. 186, Art. 9.

So he who fails to observe his Rule in any matter that involves a violation of poverty, chastity or obedience, sins in a degree corresponding to the seriousness of the violation. We say that he sins in a degree corresponding to the seriousness of the violation, because no act can have a greater degree of guilt than the intrinsic seriousness of the act involves. No sort of obligation expressed in the Rule could make an act to be mortal sin which did not possess sufficient seriousness of matter to be mortal sin regardless of the Rule.

It is scarcely necessary to add that when the Rule enjoins what is already a divine precept, violation of this injunction involves a double sin: first, that of breaking the divine precept, and, second, that of violating the vow made to God. In this case, the sin arises not in virtue of the Rule itself, but in virtue of God's command and of the vow.1

The theologians teach that a Religious can, in practice, rarely violate his Rule deliberately without sin. St. Thomas refers to carelessness as well as to anger, and voluptuousness, as being causes of such violations, when the infraction of the Rule in itself may be of the lightest possible character."

Gautrelet says of this opinion of the theologians : "The reason for this decision is that ordinarily, at least, one violates a Rule only from some wrong motive. Vanity, sensuality, human respect, curiosity, lightness, idleness, are the motives which oftenest keep us from observing our Rule. Now if the motive 1 Rodriguez, op. cit., Vol. iii, p. 313.

2 St. Thomas, Summa. 2. 2, Q. 186, Art. 9.

or the principle of the action is evil, it is evident that the action itself cannot be good." 1

1

The foregoing considerations concerning what is allowable short of actual sin in violating the Rule, are not to be qualified, but the weakness of human nature being what it is, it behoves the Religious to beware how he takes deliberate advantage of God's goodness and pity. For, says Gautrelet, "the disposition of a Religious to observe only what is imposed under pain of grave sin cannot be excused, for although, strictly speaking, it may suffice for tending towards perfection to employ the means absolutely necessary for that end-i.e., the vows, and the rules that are binding under pain of mortal sin—the disposition to avoid only grave faults and to allow oneself all venial faults would shortly expose one to the danger of committing mortal faults, and from contempt of venial sin one would be led to contempt of mortal sin, and of perfection itself inasmuch as it is the goal of the Religious State. This disposition is therefore regarded by theologians as ordinarily involving grave sin."a

III. Of Violation of Rule Through Contempt

Dealing with the obligation of Rule, especially in matters that are not of divine precept, St. Thomas says: "As for those things that go beyond the necessity of the precept, they do not bind under mortal sin in breaking them unless it be done through contempt; because the Religious is not bound to be perfect, but to be always striving for and tending 1 Gautrelet, op. cit., Vol. ii, p. 51. 2 Ibid., Vol. i, p. 195.