and has no further power over himself. A second such donation would be an invasion of the just rights of his community, unless it gave its consent. In case, however, the Order to which one wishes to transfer himself is of a stricter observance, the first community cannot withhold its permission without special reason. 4. No community has the right to receive members contrary to the provisions of its own Constitutions. Its laws must be complied with, or the profession is invalid. This does not mean, however, that failure to observe every slight provision of the Constitutions of necessity invalidates a profession. It must be inquired in each case whether the intention of the Constitutions is to invalidate professions that are not conformed to the point in question; or whether it means only to provide for the general well-being of the community by laying down certain requirements. For example, where a Superior unlawfully dispensed an aspirant from his novitiate, his act would invalidate profession; but if the Master of Novices should fail to comply with some detail of the required training, such neglect would by no means be of invalidating force. Questions of this kind are not likely to arise in well-ordered communities at the present day, but in such an event, each case, considered on its own merits, would require the judgment of those wellversed in ecclesiastical law and custom governing such causes. Where there is any apparent possibility of these questions arising much embarrassment will be avoided if all doubts are resolved before an aspirant is admitted to the novitiate. II. Of Hindrances Rendering Religion There are many circumstances that, while not invalidating it, make Religious profession inexpedient or even sinful. In respect to many of these no hard and fast rule can be made, as they often involve difficult questions of justice and charity that have to be considered and decided in their relation to the circumstances of the particular case. III. Of the Obligation of Children to Parents Those who are not of legal age1 should not be allowed entrance into Religion without the permission of their parents, or of those who are lawfully in loco parentis. At the same time, parents are not without sin who baulk a child in entering upon a vocation to which he believes God is calling him. On filial grounds, however, one desiring to make trial of Religion should seek to obtain his parents' consent, even delaying his vocation for some time in order to secure it; but being on guard lest he be persuaded for the love of an earthly father to reject the call of his Father in heaven. The necessity of a parent may prevent a child's entrance into Religion. There are three kinds of possible necessity that have to be considered: extreme, grievous, and common. Extreme necessity in a parent is that which, if not relieved, may lead to possible loss, or shortening, of life. He who leaves a parent under such necessity 1 St. Thomas, Summa. 2. 2, Q. 189, Art. 5. 2 Ibid., Art. 6. sins, and the Superior of any community that knowingly receives one under such circumstances makes himself responsible for such sin. Grievous necessity is that which involves extraordinary hardship to the parent, necessitating loss of position and unusual indigence, or a livelihood maintained only by such drudgery as is unreasonable to expect on account of age or quality. A child cannot, without sin, leave a parent when the necessity is grievous. Necessity is common when it requires the parent to live economically, and forbids luxuries. A child is not bound to defer entrance into Religion when the parent's necessity is common. In cases of extreme or grievous necessity, a child is not bound to remain with the parent unless there is reasonable ground for supposing that by so doing he will be able actually to relieve the necessity. When there are other children equally under obligation who might relieve the parent's necessity, the one desiring to enter Religion cannot do so unless he is morally certain that such others can and will actually fulfil their duty. It does not remove his obligation that others are equally bound with himself, and that they will be guilty of sin if they fail to do their utmost to discharge their obligation. All obligations concerning the care of parents bind the children not only in respect to present need, but in respect to need in the future. A child should not, however, defer entrance into Religion on the ground of a mere possibility, or even a remote probability, that a parent may in future need his services in extreme or grievous necessity. If such conditions arise in the future, the child is bound, even though he be a professed Religious, to leave his monastery and devote himself to the relief of the parent as long as may be required. No state of life upon which one enters as a work of counsel can make void an obligation of divine precept such as is created by the fifth commandment. Nor should such temporary withdrawal from active community life be considered as a dispensation, for it does not lie within the discretion of any Superior to decide whether or not a son fulfils an undoubted obligation to a parent. In the face of such a condition, the vow, for the time being, automatically ceases to bind, because no vow can bind a soul to do what is contrary to the command of God. No good Religious, however, would fail to take counsel with his Superior as to his best course, and in every possible point to be guided by him.1 Such a condition in no sense releases one from the Religious obligation save in those things that are necessary for the discharge of the filial obligation that lies upon him. He is still held by his vows, and as soon as the necessity which called him from his community ceases to exist, he is bound to return. During the time of his absence he will not be competent to possess himself of anything save for the benefit of the parent to whose care he is devoting himself; and he is in all things bound to obey his Superior and to conform to his Rule save in those points that are incompatible with his duty to his parent.2 1 St. Thomas, Summa. 2. 2, Q. 101, Art. 4 ad 4. 2 Ibid. 1 In certain cases where no question of personal service to a parent is involved, but only that of securing sufficient goods for bodily maintenance, a community may prefer to allow the necessary sum to a Religious for such use. In this event, the Religious finds his duty to the parent satisfied, and would not be free to leave the monastery. A Superior might also arrange the work of a subject under obedience, provided he allowed him a sufficient sum from his labour to meet the exigencies of the case. Cassian tells us of the Abbot Archebius, who met a like condition by working within the cloister to relieve his mother of a burden of debt left by his father.1 IV. Of Opposition of Parents to Vocation Amongst us at the present day, the Religious State is held in small repute, and difficulties are made for almost all aspirants by friends and family. It is common for the plea to be raised that one or another should not enter Religion because of some such alleged claim as we have been discussing. There is one question, the answer to which usually solves all doubts, especially in the case of women. Can the one in question leave a parent to enter upon the estate of marriage without working a like wrong? If she can, then there is no doubt that it is right for her to enter upon the Religious State. In other words, if she, without breach of justice or charity, can give herself to an earthly spouse, so as no longer to be able to 1 Cassian, Institutes, v, 38. Migne, P. L., Tom. xlix, col. 259. |