become a favourer of the Gospel. To repel all such calumnies, he states what was the principle of his life; both when he was the bitterest enemy, and zealous friend, of the Christian cause. It was that he had always acted according to his knowledge and conscience; although he would readily have owned the former to be in many cases nothing better than ignorance, and the latter but an incentive to wickedness, instead of a guard to virtue. And had he been permitted to go on with his defence, he would no doubt have clearly explained himself upon this subject, as he had done against former accusations. But he was prevented by the high priest, Ananias; who, taking offence at the boldness of his first address, "commanded them that stood by him, to smite him on the mouth." So gross an act of injustice and intemperance provoked a severe expression from St. Paul, in which we discover the same kind of authority, that was sometimes used by God's prophets and messengers towards wicked men, even in the highest stations: "God, says he, shall smite thee, thou whited wall," that is, God shall punish thee for this among thing other offences, thou false hypocrite, Which prediction was, according to Josephus, not long after accomplished for the assassins having made themselves masters of the city, persons of the best quality were driven for concealment into the sinks and sewers; among these were Ananias and his

brother Hezekias, who were drawn out and murdered.

Nothing can be more just and proper, than the reproof which follows; for sittest thou to judge me after the law, yet commandest me to be smitten contrary to the law?" What could be more scandalous and indecent? Had St. Paul been guilty of personal insult to the high priest, he ought not to have been punished in such a manner, but so as became the dignity of the tribunal before which he stood but he had committed no offence either against the magistrate or the law, and had only advanced a general truth in his own vindication. The act of Ananias was therefore as illegal as it was degrading, nor could common justice be expected from an assembly, where the chief member was suffered to forget the respect due to the whole body, as well as all moderation and humanity in their proceedings. Here is a striking example of that insolence of office, which must ever be productive of fatal consequences; especially when found in the eminent station of administering the law. Calmness, temper, dignity, forbearance, mercy, are almost equally indispensable with a love of justice, and sense of duty. But where all these qualities are put aside, as in the present instance, all reverence for authority must be lost, the people become discontented, and the state disturbed. It is impossible to forbear contrasting such a monster

of iniquity with the mild and beneficent form of justice, as she appears under our merciful constitution; where the accused is presumed innocent, and the judge his advocate; where every favourable circumstance of former good character and conduct meets with all due attention; where the slightest doubt of guilt is urged as reason to acquit. And, as if this humane spirit were transfused from the law into the breasts of its expounders and interpreters, all candid men, even enemies 1 will allow, that in no nation under heaven is cri minal justice administered with more considerate and generous concern for the feelings and advan tage of its objects. When we compare this blessing with the execrable mockery of justice, which has defiled and ruined a miserable people not very remote from us, we can never be sufficiently thanks ful to Providence for securing to us this, among other invaluable privileges. Let us take care not to forfeit them by our misdeeds, nor force the law out of its usual temperate course, by setting it at defiance. And let all those concerned in its administration be equally cautious, lest they abuso their authority, and under colour of this commit illegal or even rigorous acts: for nothing is more likely to alienate the hearts of men from the government under which they live, than such profanation of the venerable sanctity of justice. But to

return.

Some persons in the assembly, being offended by the language of the Apostle, said, "revilest thou God's high priest? Then said Paul, I wist not, brethren, that he was the high priest."-There are various opinions as to the true sense and spirit of these words. For it is thought an hard matter to conceive, that St. Paul did not know the person, who commanded him to be smitten, was the high priest. Some then will have the meaning to be ; I did not consider that he was the high priest, that is, I did not duly weigh my words, otherwise I should not have violated the written command, thou shalt not speak evil of the ruler of thy people."— Others understand the words to have been tauntingly spoken, as if he had said, I cannot acknowledge him to be high priest, who hath obtained the title by corruption, and who so foully dishonours the office by illegal violence. And therefore I have neither violated nor dishonoured a command which does not apply to the present case. If these constructions be thought forced, I see no difficulty in the literal supposition, that St. Paul, who had been a good while absent from Jerusalem, should not know the high priest, if he happened not to have on his own peculiar habit; especially in a period when the office was frequently and suddenly chang ed. And perhaps Ananias was only high priest by courtesy, being allowed to retain the name, as we have seen of Annas, in a former lecture, who was

called so as well as Caiaphas. Or the assertion may be accounted for in a still more simple manner, by supposing the eyes of the Apostle to be turned another way at the time; and that, without precisely knowing from whom the order to smite him proceeded, he addressed himself to the insolent judge among them, whoever he might happen to be. As to the objection against these last opinions, derived from the Apostle possessing the gifts of the Holy Ghost, I conceive it to have no force; because these gifts were bestowed for particular purposes, and do not seem to have had any concern with the common incidents of life, to which the present case evidently belongs. No man can for a moment suppose a mere ignorance of the quality and person of men to be derogatory to the apostolic character.

The next point for our consideration occurs in the sixth verse: When Paul perceived, that the one part (of the assembly) were Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, he cried out in the council, men and brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee; of the hope and resurrection of the dead, I am called in question." There was great wisdom and address in this: for having to deal with an assembly deeply prejudiced against him, he had no means of escape, but by suggesting matter upon which those unfair judges might be set at variance among themselves. Looking at his conduct in no other point of view, than a fair expedient to shift off