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1. That a state of happiness is not to be expected by those who are conscious of no moral or religious rule. I mean those who cannot with truth say, that they have been prompted to one action, or withheld from one gratification, by any regard to virtue or religion, either immediate or habitual.

There needs no other proof of this, than the consideration, that a brute would be as proper an object of reward as such a man, and that, if the case were so, the penal sanctions of religion could have no place. For, whom would you punish, if you make such a one as this happy?—or rather indeed religion itself, both natural and revealed, would cease to have either use or authority.

2. That a state of happiness is not to be expected by those who reserve to themselves the habitual practice of any one sin, or neglect of one known duty.

Because, no obedience can proceed upon proper motives, which is not universal; that is, which is not directed to every command of God alike, as they all stand upon the same authority.

Because such an allowance would, in effect, amount to a toleration of every vice in the world.

And because, the strain of Scripture language excludes any such hope. When our duties are recited, they are put collectively, that is, as all and every of them required in the Christian character. "Add to your faith virtue, and to virtue knowl"edge, and to knowledge temperance, and to temperance pa"tience, and to patience godliness, and to godliness brotherly "kindness, and to brotherly kindness charity."* On the other hand, when vices are enumerated, they are put disjunctively, that is, as separately and severally excluding the sinner from heav "Neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor draukards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, "shall inherit the kingdom of heaven."t

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* 2 Pet. i. 5, 6, 7. † 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10.

Those texts of Scripture which seem to lean a contrary way, as "that charity shall cover the multitude of sins;' * that "be "which converteth a sinner from the error of his way, shall hide "a multitude of sins ;" cannot, I think, for the reasons abovementioned, be extended to sins deliberately and obstinately persisted in.

3. That a state of mere unprofitableness will not go unpunished.

This is expressly laid down by Christ, in the parable of the talents, which supersedes all further reasoning about the matter. "Then he which had received one talent, came and said, Lord, "I know thee that thou art an austere man, reaping where thou "hast not sown, and gathering where thou hast not strawed; and “I was afraid and hid thy talent in the earth: Lo, there thou "hast that is thine. His lord answered and said unto him, Thou "wicked and slothful servant, thou knewest (or knewest thou ?) "that I reap where I sowed not, and gather where I have not "strawed; thou oughtest therefore to have put my money to "the exchangers, and then at my coming I should have receiv"ed mine own with usury. Take therefore the talent from him, "and give it unto him which hath ten talents: for unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance; "but from him which hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath; and cast ye that unprofitable servant into outer darkness, there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth."‡ III. In every question of conduct, where one side is doubtful, and the other side safe, we are bound to take the safe side.

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This is best explained by an instance; and I know of none more to our purpose than that of suicide. Suppose, for example's sake, that it appear doubtful to a reasoner upon the subject, whether he may lawfully destroy himself. He can have no doubt but that it is lawful for him to let it alone. Here therefore is a case, in which one side is doubtful, and the other side safe. By virtue therefore of our rule, he is bound to pursue

1 Pet. iv. 8. t James, v. 20. Matt. xxv. 24, &c.

the safe side, that is, to forbear from offering violence to himself, whilst a doubt remains upon his mind concerning the lawfulness of suicide.

It is prudent, you allow, to take the safe side. But our ob servation means something more. We assert that the action, concerning which we doubt, whatever it may be in itself, or to another, would, in us, whilst this doubt remains upon our minds, be certainly sinful. The case is expressly so adjudged by Saint Paul, with whose authority we will for the present rest contented." I know and am persuaded by the Lord Jesus, that there "is nothing unclean of itself; but to him that esteemeth any thing "to be unclean, to him it is unclean.-Happy is he that condem"neth not himself in that thing which he alloweth ; and he that "doubteth is damned (condemned) if he eat, for whatsoever is "not of faith,(i. e. not done with a full persuasion of the lawful. ness of it) is sin.'

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*Rom. xiv. 14. 22, 23,

BOOK II.

MORAL OBLIGATION.

CHAPTER I.

THE QUESTION, WHY AM I OBLIGED TO KEEP MY WORD! CONSIDERED.

WHY am I obliged to keep my word?

Because it is right, says one.-Because it is agreeable to the fitness of things, says another.-Because it is conformable to reason and nature, says a third.-Because it is conformable to truth, says a fourth.-Because it promotes the public good, says a fifth. Because it is required by the will of God, con cludes a sixth,

Upon which different accounts two things are observable :FIRST, That they all ultimately coincide.

The fitness of things, means their fitness to produce happiness; the nature of things, means that actual constitution of the world, by which some things, as such and such actions, for example, produce happiness, and others misery; reason is the principle by which we discover or judge of this constitution; truth is this judgment expressed or drawn out into propositions. So that it necessarily comes to pass, that what promotes the public happiness, or happiness upon the whole, is agreeable to the fitness of things, to nature, to reason, and to truth; and such (as will appear by-and-by) is the divine character, that what pro

motes the general happiness is required by the will of God, and what has all the above properties, must needs be right; for right means no more than conformity to the rule we go by, whatever that rule be.

And this is the reason that moralists, from whatever different principles they set out, commonly meet in their conclusions; that is, they enjoin the same conduct, prescribe the same rules of duty, and, with a few exceptions, deliver upon dubious cases, the same determinations.

SECONDLY, It is to be observed, that these answers all leave the matter short; for the inquirer may turn round upon his teacher with a second question, in which he will expect to be satisfied, namely, why am I obliged to do what is right; to act agreeably to the fitness of things; to conform to reason, nature or truth ; to promote the public good; or to obey the will of

God?

The proper method of conducting the inquiry is, FIRST, To examine what we mean, when we say a man is obliged to do any thing; and THEN to show why he is obliged to do the thing which we have proposed as an example, namely, "to keep his word."

CHAPTER II.

WHAT WE MEAN WHEN WE SAY A MAN IS OBLIGED TO DO A THING.

A MAN is said to be obliged, "when he is urged by a violent "motive resulting from the command of another."

FIRST, "The motive must be violent." If a person, who has done me some little service, or has a small place in his disposal, ask me for my vote upon some occasion, I may possibly give it him from a motive of gratitude or expectation; but I should

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