rence.

The truth is, it is altogether incompatible with the first great fundamental principle of natural religion; namely, that God being just, will render to every one according to his moral character and conduct. And, here, I would repeat what has often been remarked by writers on this subject, that deists have ever been in the habit of borrowing from revelation, without giving credit for what they take; and perhaps, without knowing whence the sentiment is derived. Men, born and educated under the light of revelation, however they may come to reject the Bible, and all the positive institutions of Christianity, cannot divest themselves of all those important moral principles, which, directly or indirectly, they have derived from this source. The light of divine revelation is widely diffused in Christian countries, and has given complexion to all our laws, institutions, and systems of education; so, that a man can no more escape entirely from its influence, than from the effect of the light of the sun. Many truths which the deist pretends to have discovered by the light of reason, are nothing else than the reflected light of divine revelation ; for how else can you account for it, that the theory and moral system of our sober deists, should be so much superior to the attainments of Socrates, Plato, and Cicero? Their conduct resembles that of a man, who should light his taper by means of the sun's rays, and then pretend that all the light around him, he had struck out himself; or, that it was produced by the feeble taper which he held in his hand.

But, to return to the point under discussion. If a man, now he is a sinner, can certainly know that the punishment of his sins can be evaded by a repentance completely in his own power, he could also know this before he sinned. Then, with the law written on his

heart, and sanctioned with a penalty, he had the clear knowledge from reason, that commit whatever atrocious sins he might, and incur whatever punishment he might, that he would at any, and at every moment of his existence, have it in his power, to escape all the punishment which he had merited, simply by the act of repentance. This is a plain and fair statement of the case; and it is easy to see, that it is completely subversive of the law of God, as a binding rule; and leaves it fully in the power of the creature to do whatever he pleases. He may deliberately determine, that he will rebel against his Maker, till the last moment of life, and then disarm his vengeance, by repentance. The penalty of the law may be in itself, tremendous, but it can deter no one from any course which he may be inclined to pursue, because, he can, at any moment, remove himself from its operation. What greater license could the most daring rebel wish, than what is thus granted ? This single principle admitted into the moral government of God, would be a complete nullification of the divine authority.

These consequences of the doctrine under consideration, are evident and inevitable, and demonstrate that it cannot be a principle of reason, or natural religion. But it may be thought by some, that the same objection will lie, with all its force, against the doctrine of the Gospel, which promises a plenary pardon to every true penitent. But this is a mistake: the evangelical doctrine of repentance stands on entrirely different grounds. That such an offer would be made, could be known by no creature before he sinned. This doctrine does not in the least clash with the justice of God; for all the sins of the penitent, to which pardon is granted, are virtually and actually punished in the sinners

substitute. Here is the grand point of difference between Christianity, and deism and all other systems. The former maintains the glory and harmony of all the divine attributes; the latter obscures, or would destroy one attribute, to make way for another. The consequence is, that the way in which pardon is granted to the penitent, according to the Gospel, has no tendency to relax our obligation to obedience, or to lessen our sense of the evil of sin; but the deistical principle of forgiveness, as we have seen, nullifies the law and authority of the Governor of the universe; and leaves it completely at the option of the creature, whether he will obey or transgress the law of God. The former is perfectly consistent with the justice of God, extending pardon to no sin for which satisfaction has not been made; while the latter is in direct repugnance to the clearest demands of justice.

But another objection to the opinion that the punishment of sin is remitted upon repentance, is, that this is contrary to experience, and fact. We have seen that the deist is fond of considering the punishment of sin as being nothing else but its consequences, arising out of the laws of nature. Is it true, then, that the laws of nature change their course as soon as a sinner repents? Is it not a fact, that the penitent thief, in the penitentiary, and the repentant debauchee, in the hospital, are still suffering the consequences of their crimes, long since committed ? Repentance cannot bring back lost health, ruined reputation, dissipated fortune, and alienated friends. How then, can the deist, on his own principles, pretend, that the punishment of sin is removed by repentance? He may allege, that the future punishment of sin will be remitted; but how does he know this ? reason can judge nothing in regard to the future, but by some analogy with what is observed to take place in this life; and from the facts stated, it is manifest, that all analogy is against the opinion, that the evil consequences of sin will be terminated by death.

Again, if pardon be granted only to the penitent, and the impenitent be punished according to the demerit of their crimes, then there is a state of sinning which renders it proper that sin should be punished rigidly according to its desert. There can, therefore, be no argument drawn from the goodness and compassion of God, against the condign punishment of sinners. But why is impenitence alone to be considered as exposing a sinner to the wrath of God? And why are the penitent alone, exempt from the penalty of the law.? The answer must be, either, that the sin of impenitence is so great as to deserve this severe treatment; or, the merit of repentance is such as to alone for the greatest sins, which man can commit. But supposing that impenitence draws after it deeper guilt than all other sins, this does not prove that this alone should be punished; it only proves, that it should be punished more: but if there be a plain principle in jurisprudence, it is, that every sin should certainly be visited with punishment, but exactly according to its nature. There is no reason why a less sin should be suffered to pass rather than a greater. Strict justice

a says, let every sin have its due retribution. The greatness of the sin of impenitence, therefore, cannot be a reason why the impenitent alone are to be punished. Nor can this great difference in the treatmeni of sinners, be owing to the merit of repentance; for it would be difficult to tell, wherein its most extraordinary merit consisted. It must either be in the obedience, or

the suffering involved in the exercise of repentance. But it cannot consist in the degree of obedience which it contains; for, if this were perfect, it could do no more than answer the demands of the moral law, for the time being, but could have no effect on sins already committed. I think it a self-evident truth, that my obedience, this moment, cannot atone, or satify, for my disobedience, the preceding moment; for in the latter case, I do no more than my duty. Then, certainly, the obedience included in repentance cannot alone for all past sins, however enormous, for it is imperfect; and, moreover, has nothing in it which enhances its value, above other acts of obedience. Neither can the suffering involved in repentance atone for past sids; for, these pangs of compunction owe all their virtue to the obedience with which they are connected, and without which they would not even be of a moral nature. Unless some one should be of opinion, that these penitential sorrows are to be considered as an equivalent for the penalty of the law: but this cannot be correct, because an equivalent for the penalty of the law, would be an equal degree and duration of suffering. If, indeed, a person of higher dignity and greater worth is permitted to suffer in the place of another, in proportion to the difference in dignity, the sufferings may be diminished. It is, however, always a matter in the breast of the Supreme Judge, whether to allow of such a substitution. I see nothing unreasonable in it. But in the case under inquiry, the same person who owes the suffering, if I may so speak, endures the sorrows of repentance; and how, I would ask, can the pious grief of a few hours or days, be an equivalent for the punishment of the most heinous transgressions? Besides, the penitent sinner ever feels, and is ready to