Matter, then, may be defined, a Permanent Possibility of Sensation. If I am asked, whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he does, I believe in matter : and so do all Berkeleians. In any other sense... The Christian Examiner - Página 3101865Vista completa - Acerca de este libro
| 1866 - 830 páginas
...matter. He says — " Matter, th5n, may be defined a Permanent Possibility of Sensation. If I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he docs, I believe in matter, and so do all Berkleians. In any other sense than this, I do not. But I... | |
| David Masson - 1865 - 432 páginas
...world. " Matter, then," he says, " may be defined a Permanent Possibility of " Sensation. If I am asked whether I believe " in matter, I ask whether the questioner...Berkeleians. In any " other sense than this, I do not." 1 Similarly, in the same notion of a present shifting experience reposing on and certifying an infinitely... | |
| David Masson - 1866 - 334 páginas
...world. " Matter, then," he says, " may be defined a Permanent Possibility of Sensation. If I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner...Berkeleians. In any other sense than this I do not." f Similarly, in the same notion of a present shifting experience reposing on and certifying an infinitely... | |
| 1866 - 732 páginas
...possibility of sensation " (I. 243). Mind is only a permanent possibility of feeling: "If I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner...does, I believe in matter, and so do all Berkeleians." Truths which most philosophers consider as necessary and absolute are in his view contingent, the result... | |
| 1866 - 622 páginas
...delusion. He defines matter as ' A Permanent Pos' sibility of Sensation.' ' If I am asked,' says he, ' whether I ' believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner...it. If he does, I believe in matter, and so do ' all Berkeleyans. In any other sense than this, I do not,' This is very explicit, if not quite plain. He... | |
| 1866 - 826 páginas
...matter. He says — " Matter, then, may be defined a Permanent Possibility of Sensation. If I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner...it. If he does, I believe in matter, and so do all Berkleians. In any other sense than this, I do not. But 1 affirm with confidence that this conception... | |
| 1866 - 778 páginas
...possibility of sensation" (I. 248). Mind is only a permanent possibility of feeling: "If I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner...accepts this definition of it. If he does, I believe in mutter, and so do all Berkeleians." Truths which most philosophers consider as necessary and absolute... | |
| 1866 - 726 páginas
...possibility of sensation " (I. 243). Mind is only a permanent possibility of feeling : " If I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he does, 1 believe in matter, and so do all Berkeleians." Truths which most philosophers consider as necessary... | |
| 1866 - 854 páginas
...matter. He says — " Matter, then, may be defined a Permanent Possibility of Sensation. If I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it. If ho does, I believe in matter, and so do all Berkleians. In any other sense than this, I do not. But... | |
| 1893 - 464 páginas
...statement that "Mutter is a Permanent Possibility of Sensation." "If" [said Mr. Mill] " I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner...Berkeleians. In any other sense than this I do not," Now there is no such thing as comprehending Kant's "Critique of Pure Keason " — there is no use of... | |
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